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Foreword
Climate change is one of the biggest long-term risks to 
global development. That threat has originated largely ow-
ing to the greenhouse gas emissions of developed countries, 
which continue to emit far more per capita than developing 
countries and which are obliged by the Climate Convention 
to take the lead in fighting climate change. But developing 
economies also add to pressure on the limited remaining 
space for atmospheric carbon dioxide, and their actions, 
too, matter importantly. 
No comprehensive global agreement yet spells out how 
the Climate Convention’s goal of stabilizing atmospheric 
greenhouse gas levels will be accomplished and financed. 
Clearly, developed countries will need to throttle back 
their emissions. The challenge for developing countries 
is to create a cleaner path to rapid growth than has pre-
vailed in  earlier growth episodes, avoiding needless local 
environmental damage and taking advantage of emerging 
technologies and financing opportunities. In the absence 
of a global agreement, the World Bank Group (WBG) has 
to chart its course, focused on today’s urgent development 
needs yet mindful of long-term risks.
The Strategic Framework on Development and Climate 
Change walks this tightrope. While putting development 
first, it urges the WBG to seek “no regrets” actions that 
 advance development with cobenefits in climate change 
mitigation, while mobilizing funds to defray the added costs 
of low-carbon growth. The Framework has  accelerated a 
 proliferation of innovative efforts in energy, forestry, trans-
port, and other fields. This evaluation, which focuses most-
ly on the pre-Framework period, begins the work of sorting 
out the results of those efforts.
Because the WBG is a small player in the climate arena, in 
a world of immense needs, it must be as efficient as possible 
in catalyzing development and greenhouse gas mitigation. 
It must first be cognizant of where the “no regrets” options 
lie. If hoped-for climate finance materializes on a large scale, 
clients and funders will want hard, reliable information on 
the most effective ways to fund low-carbon development. 
They will also want to understand the trade-offs and com-
plementarities among social, economic, and climate goals. 
So a sound, evidence-based results framework—focused on 
measures of economic and carbon outcomes—is critical.
The WBG has the potential to make a difference greater 
than its size suggests. It can provide support for policies that 
enable low-carbon growth. It can contribute to transferring 
and adapting innovations in technology, finance, and insti-
tutions, developing a portfolio of high-return options that 
can be scaled up and widely deployed. And it can finance 
and deploy the innovations it has incubated. To do so, it 
will need to tap the immense value of its experience with 
countries and partners across the World Bank, the Inter-
national Finance Corporation, and the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency, learning rapidly from its successes 
and failures and constantly improving its efforts.
Vinod Thomas
Director-General, Evaluation
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Unabated, climate change could derail development, with a 
one in four chance of a six-degree Celsius hike in temperature 
this century. Although industrialized countries are historical-
ly responsible for the build-up of heat-trapping greenhouse 
gases (GHGs), the United Nations’ goal of stabilizing atmo-
spheric GHG levels requires urgent and concerted world-
wide efforts. Choices and investments made in the next two 
 decades—in buildings, power plants, transport systems, and 
forest use—will  irreversibly shape the global climate’s future. 
This evaluation seeks lessons for development and climate 
change mitigation from the World Bank Group’s (WBG) 
far-reaching portfolio in energy, forestry, and transport. 
The assessment is not exhaustive but covers subsectors that 
represent the great bulk of evaluable WBG activity with 
potential GHG cobenefits. Over the period 2003–08 the 
WBG scaled up annual investments in renewable energy 
and energy efficiency from $200 million to $2 billion and 
helped mobilize more than $5 billion in concessional funds 
for GHG reduction. In 2008 it adopted the Strategic Frame-
work on Development and Climate Change  (SFDCC), 
which triggered a spate of investment and analytic activ-
ity, too new to assess. Yet the WBG’s resources are small 
compared with the multitrillion dollar investments needed 
for low-carbon growth. How can the Bank have the greatest 
impact, both for development and for GHG mitigation? 
One important way the WBG can achieve leverage is 
through advice and support for favorable policies: removal 
of energy subsidies and of other biases against renewable 
energy and energy efficiency. This topic was covered in 
Phase I of this evaluation series (IEG 2009). 
A second way is to act more like a venture capitalist—in 
the public sphere as well as for private investments—by sup-
porting the transfer and adaptation to local conditions of 
 existing technologies, policies, and financial practices. By 
taking modest risks in pilot projects, the WBG can identify 
a high-return portfolio of development solutions that can 
be deployed on a large scale, as climate finance expands. 
The WBG has been successful in this kind of technol-
ogy transfer—but only when demonstration and diffusion 
mechanisms were well thought out. Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) support has been crucial in mitigating cli-
ents’ perceived risk, and expanded concessional funds will 
be needed for larger-scale demonstrations. Support for 
more advanced technologies has usually been unsuccessful, 
though there could be niches such as land use where the 
WBG has a role. 
Third, the WBG can refocus on high-impact sectors and 
instruments. Energy efficiency stands out among areas for 
intervention. Early results suggest, for instance, that distri-
bution of compact fluorescent lightbulbs offers economic 
returns that dwarf those of most WBG investments while 
providing significant cobenefits in carbon dioxide (CO2) 
reduction, exemplifying the Strategic Framework’s call for 
“no-regrets” investments. To meet power demands, the 
WBG’s scarce human and financial resources will be best 
spent helping clients find domestically preferable alterna-
tives to coal power, such as through increased energy effi-
ciency. Coal support should be a last resort used only when 
lower cost and concessionally financed alternatives have 
been exhausted and when there is a compelling case that 
WBG support would reduce poverty or emissions. 
Among forest interventions, indigenous and protected areas 
that permit sustainable use have reduced tropical deforesta-
tion by up to two percentage points a year (compared with 
unprotected areas), thus promoting social, environmen-
tal, and climate goals. Among instruments, carbon finance 
needs to be redirected away from hydropower, where it 
has minimal impact on project bankability, to applications 
where it can have more leverage. Long-duration loans are 
critical for support of renewable energy. Guarantees have 
not transformed the market for energy efficiency lending 
but could be increasingly important for renewable energy 
as investors seek reassurance that favorable policies will be 
maintained over the long run. 
To pursue this agenda, the WBG should orient itself strongly 
toward results and closely monitor performance. In this fast-
changing area, being able to understand what is working, 
what’s not, and why is a source of value for the institution, 
for its clients, and for the world. 
Evaluation Framework
This evaluation reviews a broad range of WBG activity in 
the adoption and diffusion of emissions-reducing technol-
ogies and practices. It addresses three main concerns:
What actions will deliver the greatest overlap between •	
GHG mitigation and local development? 
Where and how does the WBG have the highest lever-•	
age in promoting those actions? 
How can the WBG best use feedback from ongoing ex-•	
perience to improve performance? 
Executive Summary
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Because the range of activities is great, because most have not 
yet been subject to a fi nal evaluation, and because most do 
not generate consistent and accessible data on impacts, the 
evaluation is selective, though it covers the bulk of evaluable 
WBG experience. Within each of the main GHG-emitting 
sectors—energy, transport, and forestry—it examines spe-
cifi c issues that capture a large part of the relevant WBG 
portfolio (such as support for energy effi  ciency via fi nancial 
intermediaries), illuminate sectorwide issues (such as the 
role of fi nance for grid-connected renewables), or pioneer 
novel approaches (such as payment for ecosystem services). 
It also addresses three special issues: technology transfer, the 
WBG’s carbon funds, and the role of the WBG in coal power. 
Th e evaluation looks at how the WBG has diagnosed barri-
ers to technology adoption, the eff ectiveness of prescribed 
interventions, and likely economic and mitigation impacts.
Th e fi rst volume of this climate change evaluation (IEG 
2009) looked at WBG support for key areas of policy re-
form. Th is second volume focuses on two other areas of 
intervention: (i) development, transfer, and demonstration 
of technical and fi nancial innovations and (ii) fi nance and 
implementation.
Findings
WBG-supported interventions vary widely in nature and 
eff ectiveness. Th is evaluation fi rst looks at sectoral fi ndings 
and then at cross-cutting lessons and recommendations.
Congruence of mitigation and development 
Th ere is ample scope for projects that promote local devel-
opment goals while also mitigating GHGs. (See fi gure 6.1, 
which illustrates economic and carbon returns for a range of 
energy projects.) Energy effi  ciency, more than other invest-
ments, off ers a combination of high economic returns and 
GHG benefi ts. Other projects may individually have high 
carbon returns (forestry) or economic returns (solar home 
photovoltaic systems). To optimize carbon and  economic 
gains, it may oft en be necessary to construct portfolios of 
projects, rather than pursue multiple goals with a single in-
strument.
Renewable energy
Grid-connected renewable energy reduces CO2 emissions, 
off ers the additional domestic advantages of local air pol-
lution reduction and energy security, and could potentially 
stimulate industrial development. But investors may not 
take account of the national or global benefi ts. Lenders may 
shy away from capital-intensive investments in less-proven 
technologies. Utilities may not know how to deal with in-
termittent energy sources.
Technical assistance can help overcome these barriers. Th e 
World Bank helped Sri Lanka institute standardized small 
power purchase agreements that facilitated access to the 
power grid. Analytic work, capacity building, and demon-
stration have contributed to Mexican and Chinese adoption 
of favorable renewable energy payment schemes, which in 
turn have stimulated more than 20 gigawatts of installed 
wind capacity in China and hundreds of megawatts under 
construction in Mexico. 
Provision of long-duration loans (as in lending by the In-
ternational Finance Corporation [IFC] and World Bank 
on-lending projects) has a much bigger impact on project 
bankability than the purchase of carbon credits, at cur-
rent carbon prices. As countries increasingly rely on pay-
ing price premiums for renewable energy, World Bank and 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) guar-
antees against breach of contract and other political risks 
could be catalytic. 
Th e WBG’s direct lending for renewable energy is domi-
nated by hydropower, the only grid technology for which 
there is a substantial evaluable record at the WBG. Among 
evaluated hydropower plants, 76 percent had outcomes 
rated as moderately satisfactory or better, with better rat-
ings in recently initiated projects. Unsuccessful projects are 
oft en those for which preparation or implementation of 
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 resettlement plans has been ineffective. About two-thirds of 
hydropower investment volume now goes to run-of-river 
hydropower (that is, without substantial reservoirs), which 
has less potential for local social and environmental dam-
age but is more vulnerable to climate change.
Direct WBG investments in wind power have been mod-
est. On average, wind power offers significantly lower eco-
nomic and carbon returns than hydropower because of 
high capital costs and often low capacity utilization. Manu-
facturing cost reductions at the global level, together with 
better siting and maintenance, are crucial to increasing the 
competitiveness of wind and other new renewable energy 
technologies. 
The largest single area of off-grid renewable energy invest-
ment has been in solar photovoltaics, mostly for home use. 
Since 1992, the WBG has contributed $790 million to solar 
home system (SHS) components in 34 countries, almost 
all using GEF-funded subsidies. World Bank efforts, us-
ing quality-contingent producer subsidies and relying on 
microfinance for consumers, have been more successful 
than those of IFC. These projects can have economic rates 
of return of 30–90 percent but have little impact on GHG 
reductions because off-grid households use so little energy. 
At current prices, SHSs have been successful in a narrow 
niche market: the off-grid household that is either relatively 
well-off by rural standards or can access good microfinance 
services. 
Energy efficiency
Phase I of this evaluation (IEG 2009) assessed the most im-
portant barrier-removing policies: energy price reform and 
promotion of energy efficiency policies such as building and 
appliance standards. It noted that the Bank had pursued 
price reforms in energy but had relatively few—and mod-
estly funded—projects dealing with energy efficiency. Since 
then, there has been increased attention to policy-efficiency 
linkages, including Bank-IFC support for a recently adopt-
ed energy efficiency law in the Russian Federation, support 
for a G20 study of energy subsidies, and a recently approved 
Vietnam power sector development policy operation.
Owners of factories and buildings often fail to borrow for 
apparently highly profitable energy efficiency opportuni-
ties. The WBG’s diagnosis: Borrowers lack information, and 
lenders lack experience and comfort with energy efficiency 
project finance. The largest WBG response has been to 
support financial intermediaries—banks, special-purpose 
funds, and energy service companies—with guarantees and 
technical assistance. These programs have appropriately 
been directed to China and Eastern Europe, where energy 
inefficiency has been high. 
Parallel programs have been implemented by the World 
Bank and IFC, both supported by the GEF, and without 
much communication between them. Yet, contrary to ex-
pectations, loan guarantees have turned out not to be a 
temporary, market-transforming measure that could be 
discontinued once the banks gained familiarity with energy 
efficiency lending. Inadequate lending for energy efficiency 
often reflects wider credit market failures, including oner-
ous requirements for collateral. 
Guarantees have triggered energy efficiency lending to 
credit-strapped small and medium enterprises. Because 
borrowers achieved high rates of return, guarantee pro-
grams could achieve higher impact through tighter target-
ing on less creditworthy companies. 
World Bank-supported projects have been successful in 
introducing energy service companies (ESCOs) to China, 
with high returns, significant GHG impacts, and sponta-
neous replication. However, further replication and scale-
up must address the ESCOs’ own credit problems and 
 recognize that energy performance contracting, the stan-
dard paradigm for ESCOs, may require major adaptations 
in many developing countries.
IFC also lends directly to industry for energy efficiency. 
IFC’s program of screening its clients for energy efficiency 
opportunities supports mostly small loans with low GHG 
impacts. 
Three areas of existing activity stand out as having high 
impact and high potential for scale-up: first, proactive IFC 
support for energy efficiency in the atypical but important 
cases of large, carbon-intensive factories that face credit or 
information barriers; second, increased support for trans-
mission and distribution loss reduction, which offers eco-
nomic rates of return of 16–60+ percent and lifetime carbon 
returns of 7–15 kilograms per dollar. Third, substitution of 
compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) for incandescent lamps 
offers estimated direct economic returns (in saved energy) 
of 50–700 percent, together with deferred construction of 
power plants and emissions reductions of 27–134 kilograms 
of CO2 per dollar. These returns would be further magnified 
if initial projects catalyzed spontaneous diffusion of CFLs. 
However, rigorous evaluation of CFLs is lacking.
Forestry
Forest loss, especially in the tropics, generates a quarter of de-
veloping countries’ emissions. The local and global values of 
standing forests often greatly exceed the gains from destroy-
ing those forests. Tapping this value could therefore offer 
large economic and GHG gains. The Forest Carbon Partner-
ship Facility is a pilot that explores options to monetize the 
value of standing forests. However, the mechanisms to use 
the funds to conserve forests are still being planned. World 
Bank experience provides some models for scaling up.
Payment for Environmental Services programs also seek 
to reward property owners who maintain forests. World 
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 Bank-supported programs in Costa Rica and Mexico 
have demonstrated the logistics of paying for services and 
have helped to globally popularize this approach. Howev-
er, a substantial proportion of payments has gone to areas 
that are not at high risk for deforestation, diluting carbon 
and  environmental benefits and prompting attention to 
 targeting. 
The most prominent line of action associated with forest 
conservation is support for protected areas. These now 
cover more than a quarter of the tropical forest estate, an 
area equivalent to Argentina and Bolivia combined, much 
of it with World Bank support. A global analysis shows 
that these areas are on average effective in reducing defor-
estation. Areas that allow sustainable use are more effec-
tive than strictly protected areas, and indigenous areas are 
most effective of all. They also offer precious biodiversity 
 benefits. These findings support the feasibility of the Re-
duced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation ini-
tiative (REDD) in combining sustainable development and 
forest conservation. 
Urban transit
Growing transport demand clogs limited roadway space 
in the developing world, resulting in severe congestion, air 
pollution, and GHG emissions. The single largest WBG re-
sponse has been to support the deployment of bus rapid 
transit systems, which cost much less than tramways or 
subways. Key barriers have been the lack of intermunici-
pality coordination, and opposition by displaced minibus 
drivers. However, systems have been successfully initiated 
in Bogota and Mexico City and are being expanded there 
and replicated elsewhere. 
The immediate economic benefits in Mexico City provide 
an estimated 81 percent economic return and a GHG re-
turn of 10 kilograms per dollar. Larger, sustainable long-
run gains will require demand-side management of traffic 
and rational land use planning.
Coal power
Coal is a cheap source of power for a power-hungry world, 
but coal is a major source of GHG emissions. How does the 
WBG maximize development returns for clients with no 
GHG reduction obligations, while protecting other clients 
threatened by GHG emissions regardless of their source? 
SFDCC criteria restrict WBG support to instances where 
coal has the lowest cost after environmental externalities 
have been considered, there is optimal use of energy effi-
ciency, and no concessional funds are available to finance 
the incremental cost of low-carbon alternatives.
The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) examined five 
pre-SFDCC coal power projects to determine whether 
WBG involvement contributed to greater efficiency and 
whether lower-carbon alternatives had been considered. 
IEG found that none of the investment cases would have 
met the SFDCC criteria, either because they were not 
least-cost for generation after accounting for local air pol-
lution burdens or because they did not fully explore effi-
ciency alternatives. The complexity of the issues, however, 
is illustrated by IFC’s support for a supercritical coal plant 
in India. On one hand, it will be one of the largest point 
sources of CO2 on the planet, adding to the atmosphere’s 
pre-existing burden as GHG concentrations climb toward 
dangerous levels. On the other hand, it may nevertheless 
have reduced emissions by about 10 percent compared with 
a scenario without IFC involvement, and indirectly accel-
erated the diffusion of this higher-efficiency technology in 
a country that will continue to rely on coal for decades to 
meet urgent power needs. More than a quarter of India’s 
power is lost in transmission and distribution. Nationwide, 
reduction in distribution losses and other efficiency mea-
sures can offer higher returns in power availability, local 
environmental improvement, and GHG reductions than 
new construction. 
The WBG’s highest leverage for promoting low-carbon 
growth is at the level of the power system. The World Bank’s 
technical assistance to Kosovo points to a way of resolving 
the tensions surrounding coal. A study (World Bank 2005) 
assessed options for power system expansion using a sys-
temwide power model that accounted for local health costs 
from pollution. It showed if CO2 abatement was valued at 
€10 per ton, it would be optimal to retire small, inefficient 
coal plants but also to construct a large, efficient one. (The 
impact of higher carbon prices was not explored.) Models 
like this, if extended to include energy efficiency as an al-
ternative to expanded generation, can serve as a basis of 
discussion for identifying technical and financial options 
for pursuing low-carbon growth at a national level. 
Carbon finance
As an institutional innovation, the World Bank’s Carbon 
 Finance Unit (CFU) has played an important demonstration 
role in helping open an entirely new field of environmental 
finance, popularizing the idea of carbon markets, and con-
tributing to the institutional infrastructure of the market. 
The Bank’s carbon business exit strategy called for the CFU 
to relinquish its role as carbon offset buyer as the private 
market began to flourish. But although the Bank indeed 
moved into higher-risk, pilot areas of the carbon market 
(the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and the Carbon 
Partnership Facility), it continued to build up its lower-
risk Kyoto-oriented business after that market was already 
thriving. It also failed to mainstream carbon finance within 
the Bank. 
As a vehicle for catalytic finance and technology transfer, the 
CFU’s record is mixed. It has contributed to the diffusion 
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of some technologies, such as landfi ll gas, and supported 
fi rst-of-kind technology investments in some countries. 
Th e BioCarbon Fund and the Community Development 
Carbon Fund have supported small-scale, rural, and for-
estry projects—and learned in the process that this is dif-
fi cult to do. 
In contrast, much of the CFU’s support for energy 
 technologies has gone to projects where its fi nancial 
 leverage—and hence its catalytic impact—was relatively 
small. In addition, two-thirds of carbon fund purchase 
commitments have been for projects that destroy HFC-23, 
a highly  potent, industrially generated GHG. Th e projects 
tapped a Chinese low-cost GHG abatement opportunity 
and gave participating companies high profi ts, 65 percent 
of which were then taxed for development purposes. Al-
though this was an allowable use of the carbon market, an 
alternative would have been to use international funding to 
pay only for the low marginal costs of destroying the gas, 
deploying carbon funds with higher leverage elsewhere.
Technology transfer
Technology transfer is one of the pillars of the Bali Action 
Plan (under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate) and of the SFDCC. Th e WBG has contributed to 
the transfer of existing clean technologies through projects 
that pilot, debug, demonstrate, and diff use innovations in 
engineering and fi nance. Th ese have been successful when 
the logic of demonstration and diff usion has been well 
thought out.
Th e Renewable Energy Development Project (China), 
for instance, used a combination of quality-contingent 
subsidies, research and development grants, and techni-
cal assistance to foster the growth of a competitive solar 
photovoltaic industry. Th e Energy Conservation Project 
supported China’s fi rst ESCOs, with strong emphasis on 
knowledge sharing and diff usion. Th e Regional Silvopas-
toral Project in Latin America piloted diff erent approaches 
to integrating trees with pasture, rigorously documenting 
that some techniques were highly profi table even without 
reckoning carbon and biodiversity benefi ts, and was able 
to convince the Colombian government to scale up the 
project. In all these cases, GEF support was essential to 
mitigate up-front risk and to pay for global benefi ts of 
knowledge created.
Conversely, technology transfer has foundered in the 
absence of a solid logical framework that links interven-
tions to technological diff usion, especially in the case of 
advanced technologies. Early eff orts to support concen-
trated solar power, for instance, incorrectly assumed that 
a few scattered projects would spur cost reductions at the 
global level. (A new concentrated solar power initiative 
under the Clean Technology Fund is more appropriately 
scaled.) Projects incorrectly assumed that private benefi -
ciaries of technology (such as recipients of technology li-
censes in the China Effi  cient Boilers Project) would share 
proprietary technology with competitors. Several IFC in-
vestments, pursuing multiple but confl icting objectives, 
tackled an insurmountable combination of inexperienced 
entrepreneurs, unfamiliar technology, and an uninter-
ested target market. Finally, both the concentrated solar 
power and effi  cient boiler projects underestimated the dif-
fi culty of procurement when technology suppliers are few 
and costs are poorly known—an inherent feature of newer 
technologies. 
Learning and incentives
Rapid feedback and learning is essential for adapting tech-
nology to new sites, for deciding which technologies to 
scale up, and for ensuring that they are working as planned. 
Technology demonstration projects work best when it 
is clear what is being demonstrated, how, and to whom. 
 Although recent demonstration projects have good plans 
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for monitoring their direct results, they do not yet track 
how effectively these results are reaching their intended au-
dience.
As other IEG reports have noted, cost-benefit analysis has 
fallen out of fashion, impeding the WBG’s ability to identify 
high-return investments. The estimates quoted here remain 
an unvalidated and possibly overoptimistic guide. The lack 
of good impact evaluations of forest projects, for instance, 
has deprived the REDD agenda of urgently needed guid-
ance on how best to combine forest protection with eco-
nomic development.
Publicly disclosed monitoring of carbon projects shows the 
gains from feedback. Landfill gas projects proliferated with 
the advent of the carbon market, but monitoring reports 
soon showed that these projects were systematically un-
derperforming, relative to their design expectations. This 
feedback revealed that the appraisal models were based on 
US experience, which is inapplicable to the waste streams 
of developing countries. The WBG helped to publicize this 
discovery. 
Newer projects have incorporated design and operational 
lessons. This kind of systematic feedback is missing from 
most projects, though IFC’s monitoring system is begin-
ning to cover it. Feedback is especially needed for renew-
able energy projects, where economic and carbon impacts 
are proportional to capacity utilization. Many hydropower 
and wind projects are underperforming for reasons that are 
not clear.
At the organizational level, the WBG has framed SFDCC 
goals in terms of dollars committed, rather than outcomes 
or impacts. This sets up poor incentives. For instance, en-
ergy efficiency projects are expensive in staff time and lead 
to relatively modest volumes of lending, yet can benefit cli-
ents more than cheaper-to-prepare, larger-volume genera-
tion projects. 
Recommendations
The WBG should maximize its leverage in promoting low-
carbon development. This will require a strategic approach 
to portfolio choice, instruments deployed, and technology 
policy. And it means scaling up what works and redesign-
ing what does not, using learning to unlock value for clients 
and for the world. Key aspects are as follows.
Act like a venture capitalist
In both the public and private spheres, the WBG can sup-
port the transfer, adaptation, piloting, and demonstra-
tion of innovative technologies, policies, and financial 
 practices—as it has, for instance, with ESCOs, bus rapid 
transit, solar home systems, and agroforestry. These dem-
onstrations carry risks but can offer high returns. What 
counts for clients, the WBG, and the world, however, is the 
return on the portfolio in development, poverty reduction, 
and GHG mitigation.
A first challenge is to mitigate risks. This means using GEF 
or other concessional funds (grants or low-interest loans) 
to support the earliest and riskiest ventures, so that failures 
are less costly to borrowers. Because of the potential for 
high returns, this could be a much higher-leverage use of 
climate finance than the purchase of carbon offsets from 
marginally profitable renewable energy projects. Risk is 
further mitigated by staging successively larger pilots and 
demonstrations, from test site to province to nation. With 
increasing experience and comfort, scale expands and risk 
declines. Changes are necessary, too, in internal WBG in-
centives to reward staff and managers for conducting in-
formative pilots and for producing results at the portfolio 
rather than the project level.
A second challenge is to design projects effectively for learn-
ing and diffusion. Pilot or demonstration projects must 
have a clear, logical framework showing how they will pro-
mote diffusion the knowledge gained through experience. 
Pilot, demonstration, and technology transfer  projects re-
quire additional support for preparation and supervision in 
funding and on-call expertise.
Though there is a clear case and large scope for WBG in-
volvement in technology transfer at the national level, the 
case is less clear for WBG involvement in new technology 
development at the global level. Candidate technologies 
would be those where WBG support could make an ap-
preciable difference to the global market, helping to push 
costs down. Of special interest are technologies that ben-
efit poor people and are difficult to protect from copying 
(and therefore attract little private R&D)—for instance, in 
agriculture and land use. The proposed new WBG effort 
to support concentrated solar power is a plausible area of 
support because a large proportion of the suitable resource 
is located in client countries, the technology is suitable for 
manufacture in client countries, and the proposed effort 
is sufficiently large to globally push the industry down the 
cost curve. 
The World Bank and IFC should—
Create incentives and mobilize resources to sup-•	
port effective pilot, demonstration, and technology 
 transfer projects that have a clear logic of demon-
stration and diffusion. This will include mobilizing 
GEF and other concessional funds to mitigate World 
Bank borrower risk, reshaping incentives for staff and 
managers, providing adequate resources for the de-
sign and supervision of complex projects, and making 
available specialized expertise in technology transfer 
and procurement through a real or virtual technology 
unit. 
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Scale up high-impact investments
Energy efficiency offers high economic and carbon returns. 
The WBG should—
Place greater emphasis on large-scale energy effi-•	
ciency scale-up, as measured by savings in energy 
and  reduced need for new power plants. This in-
cludes support for efficient lighting and for exploring 
the scope for accelerating the global phase-out of in-
candescent light bulbs. It also includes continued and 
expanded support for reductions in transmission and 
distribution losses. And it includes a proactive search 
by IFC for large-scale, catalytic investments in energy 
efficiency. There is scope to coordinate World Bank 
support for demand-side energy efficiency policies 
with IFC support for more efficient manufacturing and 
more efficient products.
The WBG should, wherever possible, help clients find 
cleaner, domestically preferable alternatives to coal power. 
Moreover, the WBG faces strategic choices in staffing and 
programming between building up expertise in “sunrise” 
sectors of broad applicability and limited private sector 
competition (energy efficiency, land use management for 
carbon, energy systems planning) versus “sunset” sectors 
such as coal power. The WBG should—
Help countries find alternatives to coal power while •	
retaining a rarely used option to support it, strictly 
following existing guidelines (including optimal use of 
energy efficiency opportunities) and being restricted 
to cases where there is a compelling argument for pov-
erty or emissions reductions impacts that would not be 
achieved without WBG support for coal power. 
The WBG cannot tackle this issue alone. Complementary 
financing for renewable energy and investments in technol-
ogy R&D are needed from the developed world to provide 
better options for the WBG’s clients.
Protected areas—especially those permitting sustainable 
use—reduce tropical deforestation, providing local envi-
ronmental benefits as well as carbon emissions reductions. 
The WBG should—
Continue to explore, in the REDD context, ways to •	
finance and promote forest conservation and sus-
tainable use, including support for indigenous forest 
 areas and maintenance of existing protected areas.
In terms of its instruments—
MIGA’s upcoming FY 2012–15 Strategy should out-•	
line the role and scope for MIGA to provide politi-
cal risk insurance to catalyze long-term financing for 
renewable energy projects, building on its expertise 
and existing portfolio of climate-friendly guarantee 
projects.
The World Bank should •	 enhance the delivery of its 
guarantee products by taking actions to improve poli-
cies and procedures, eliminate disincentives, increase 
flexibility, and strengthen skills for the deployment of 
the products. It should assess the potential for greater 
use of partial risk guarantees to mobilize long-term fi-
nancing for renewable energy projects, particularly in 
the context of feed-in tariffs or other premiums to sup-
port investment in renewable energy. 
The Carbon Partnership Facility and other post-•	
Kyoto carbon finance efforts should focus on demon-
strating effective technical and financial approaches 
to boosting low-carbon investments. Funds and facili-
ties should have clear exit strategies.
Reorient incentives toward learning and impact
There is an urgent need to better understand the economic, 
social, and GHG impacts of a wide variety of scalable in-
terventions. How can REDD programs incorporate the les-
sons of protected areas, environmental services payments, 
and community forestry? What is the best way to encour-
age energy efficiency in the building sector?
Traditional evaluation cycles are too slow when tens of 
billions of dollars may be deployed annually for climate 
 finance and where there is a danger of lock-in to high-
 carbon growth. At the same time, information costs are 
plummeting, remote sensing resources are multiplying, and 
cell phone access is nearly universal. By wiring up projects 
to return early information on impacts, global innovation 
can be accelerated and the WBG can optimize project su-
pervision and new project design.
The WBG’s extensive project portfolio and support for 
country strategies makes it a natural nexus for this global 
public good. The WBG should—
Measure projects’ economic and environmental im-•	
pact both during execution and after closure and ag-
gregate this information for analysis. For instance, 
renewable energy projects should monitor capacity 
utilization, and energy efficiency projects should moni-
tor energy savings. This may require the use of conces-
sional funds to defray additional costs of monitoring by 
staff, clients, and project proponents. 
Link these measures to a results framework that shifts •	
the SFDCC toward a focus on outputs such as pow-
er produced, power access, forest cover, and transit 
share of urban trips, rather than on money spent.
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Management Response
I. Introduction
Management welcomes the second phase evaluation by the 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of lessons-learned 
for development and climate change mitigation from the 
World Bank Group’s (WBG) portfolio in energy, forestry, 
and transport. As noted in the first phase evaluation (IEG 
2009), IEG’s evaluation covering the expanding project-
level experience of the Bank and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) in promoting renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, and carbon finance enables a comprehensive as-
sessment of the focus and success of the WBG’s efforts on 
low carbon development. Management appreciates the fact 
that this report covers activities across the entire WBG, 
including IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA).
The report addresses a very important topic and summa-
rizes a major exercise to review how the WBG portfolio 
has been contributing to low-carbon growth objectives. It 
approaches this exercise from an appropriate and construc-
tive angle: not to be the “judge” of the past WBG perfor-
mance in promoting low-carbon growth, since, until very 
recently, it was not a stated WBG objective, but rather to 
use available experiences and lessons to inform future ac-
tions. It correctly recognizes that projects can contribute to 
low-carbon growth even if they do not necessarily include 
it in development objectives, and thus assesses a wide pool 
of projects with and without explicitly stated mitigation 
related objectives. While the report does not look at every 
sector and subsector where significant mitigation coben-
efits can be obtained, its selection of sectors is reasonable.
Management appreciates the many useful observations and 
suggestions provided in the report and concurs with aspects 
of IEG’s main findings. Many of these comments reinforce 
the messages expressed in the WBG Strategic Framework 
on Development and Climate Change (SFDCC) and are 
complemented by emerging lessons from analytical stud-
ies, sector strategies, and relevant project level experiences 
across the WBG. At the same time, management differs 
with some of IEG’s findings and recommendations.
II. Key Issues of Agreement and Divergence 
Overview of response
This Management Response first outlines the areas in which 
management broadly agrees with the analysis in the review, 
noting, however, areas where IEG could have given a fuller 
account of efforts the WBG has made or is making. It then 
discusses areas in which Management believes that IEG 
has drawn conclusions from an analysis based on limited 
coverage, without fully taking into account the significant 
ongoing changes that have been facilitated by the adoption 
of the SFDCC.
A. Areas of agreement
Low-Carbon Studies. Appendix J, referring to the low-
carbon pilot program, provides a useful summary of the 
available work. It also includes the comment that access to 
energy is generally not considered. Management would like 
to emphasize that this statement should not be generalized 
about all work on low-carbon studies, since the observation 
is based only on work presently in the public domain (for 
example, Brazil and Mexico and the review of renewable 
energy targets and power dispatch efficiency for China). 
The low-carbon study for India has paid attention to the 
access issue.
In addition, the appendix does not address the issue of long-
term planning (20 years+) and demand for capacity build-
ing in this area, which has been integral to the low-carbon 
work along with the need to engage and build consensus 
across broad stakeholder groups. These are the emerging 
key lessons, and as such should be incorporated in the low-
carbon work to be pursued in the future.
Development cobenefits. With respect to the issue of 
energy access, IEG correctly notes that monitoring and 
evaluation data are rarely available to quantify cobenefits 
of low-carbon interventions in terms of poverty reduction, 
energy/transport access, and gender equity. In this regard, 
management believes that it is worth noting the priority be-
ing given to developing results frameworks for the SFDCC 
and the Climate Investment Funds (CIF). This ongoing 
work aims to identify indicators which would allow for a 
better tracking of distributional and gender dimensions, 
with a view to assessing the extent to which development 
cobenefits actually result from low-carbon interventions. 
A new set of International Development Association (IDA) 
core indicators has also been prepared to better capture the 
development impacts of energy projects. Also, the forth-
coming report on transport and climate underscores the 
impact of development cobenefits in moving toward a low-
carbon transport sector.
Finally, since the issue of development cobenefits is of 
central importance to the WBG, management feels that it 
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should have been strengthened in the report. This would 
have helped identify a set of concrete suggestions on how 
best to capture and measure the potential development 
dividend of low-carbon growth.
B. Areas of divergence
Strategic direction. Management is of the view that sev-
eral major policy decisions made by the WBG on climate 
change needed to be better reflected in the IEG report. Spe-
cifically, the report tends to imply that the SFDCC requires 
“optimizing” both local and global benefits and outcomes. 
However, this premise is not the message of the Strategic 
Framework; the SFDCC very clearly states that the WBG is 
to help clients “maximize” national and local development 
outcomes, taking advantage of low-carbon growth oppor-
tunities to achieve these outcomes whenever possible. It 
would have been better if the IEG report had correctly pre-
sented current WBG policies as articulated in the SFDCC.
While the IEG report makes selective references to specific 
recent initiatives that draw on lessons from experiences 
over the study period, it does not recognize the signifi-
cance of ongoing changes that have been facilitated by the 
adoption of the SFDCC. These changes cut across project 
design and implementation, corporate targets, and new fi-
nancial instruments and are also reflected in organizational 
restructuring as well as addition of new staff with special-
ized expertise. While it is too soon to evaluate their impact, 
these actions are indicative of greater corporate commit-
ment to addressing climate change. For example, climate 
change work has become a major focus of IFC’s business.
The IEG report should also have emphasized more strongly 
that the “debate” has moved beyond “low-carbon” develop-
ment to “climate smart” development as noted in the World 
Development Report 2010, taking into account syner-
gies that exist between climate resilience and low-carbon 
growth.
Cleaner production. An area of difference in views con-
cerns IFC’s Cleaner Production (CP) program, which IEG 
summarizes as dedicating “significant resources … to small 
loans” and largely dependent for impact on concessional 
lending. In contrast, management perceives cleaner pro-
duction more broadly as part of a systematic approach to 
helping clients identify opportunities for resource and en-
ergy efficiency which can be implemented at low cost and 
with continuing benefits. Management would like to stress 
that the CP program is one initiative among others that aim 
to improve resource-use efficiency in IFC operations.
Coal power. Management would like to emphasize that the 
application of the system analysis suggested for evaluating 
investment decisions for coal power projects should take 
into account differences across power markets. The IEG 
report’s conclusion that investment in transmission and 
distribution (T&D) loss reduction would avert the needed 
capacity addition from the Tata Mundra project in India is 
oversimplified. This conclusion does not account for differ-
ences in power supply-demand balances or the level of T&D 
losses within India’s regional networks (the 27 percent T&D 
losses cited in the report is an average across five regional 
networks). An investment decision on capacity additions 
is always linked to a prospective service market, not to the 
entire country. The analogy of using the same system wide 
approach as for the Kosovo electricity system analysis is an 
inappropriate extrapolation, since the total system capacity 
is only about 1,000 MW linked through a single national 
transmission network. For Kosovo, any investment in T&D 
loss reduction will result in capacity availability in any region 
of the country; whereas in India, the power market is much 
larger, and the supply-demand situation varies locally.
Energy efficiency. Management is of the view that the 
 report’s evaluation of energy efficiency is somewhat 
 oversimplified in that it does not include a discussion of 
operationally-relevant nuances vis-à-vis energy efficiency 
barriers. By limiting the discussion to specific financing 
tools such as credit lines, the analysis does not fully ap-
preciate the broader challenges in dealing with energy ef-
ficiency implementation through key delivery mechanisms 
(for example, incentive systems, market-based approaches, 
and regulatory policies to implement energy efficiency sub-
projects) which are required to overcome energy efficiency 
sector constraints and address transaction risks. Further-
more, by focusing on only a few types of interventions, the 
 discussion does not mention some of the barriers addressed 
through other operations (technical assistance, policy work, 
and so forth), which are meant to create additional drivers 
for energy efficiency (mostly through incentives or through 
new policy drivers). As a result, the evaluation depicts an 
incomplete picture of World Bank programs in some coun-
tries, most notably in China.
Management also believes that barriers to investment in 
energy efficiency, particularly within many large energy-in-
tensive industries, remain significant and justify continued 
targeted efforts to work with banks and commercial lend-
ers. This conclusion is underscored by recent announce-
ments of setbacks in achieving Chinese targets for energy 
efficiency improvements in key industrial sectors. IEG’s 
methodology, which relies primarily on self-reporting by 
industrial enterprises already under government mandate, 
needs to be reassessed, with more attention given to com-
mercial realities and constraints on clean energy lending.
Outstanding data issues. Management finds that the data 
file provided in the report is difficult to reconcile with the 
energy database, and as such, does not allow for verification 
of IEG’s numbers. Further efforts to ensure consistency of 
data would be desirable.
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Technology. As a general observation, in recent years the 
WBG has been becoming much more involved in the pro-
motion of efforts to develop and transfer new energy tech-
nologies. These efforts build on donor-funded programs, 
particularly the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and 
more recently the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), but also 
include significant on balance sheet investments by IFC’s 
clean tech unit and funds department. The combined re-
sources of the WBG, GEF and CTF, if leveraged, can help 
scale up advanced technologies including concentrating 
solar power (CSP) and carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
in developing countries. IEG should have recognized the 
WBG’s efforts in this regard, including the establishment of 
the CCS Capacity Building Trust Fund in 2009. The WBG’s 
proactive approach to CSP and CCS is helping to consider-
ably change the Bank’s role in supporting advanced tech-
nology transfer.
Carbon finance. There are significant differences between 
the views of management and the IEG report with regard 
to the exit strategy, knowledge transfer, and technical assis-
tance provided through the Bank’s involvement in carbon 
finance. The report does not differentiate between carbon 
markets (e.g., the market for allowances in Europe and the 
Clean Development Mechanism market), and fails to un-
derstand that withdrawal by the Bank in 2005 from the car-
bon markets where its Carbon Finance Unit operates would 
have been catastrophic to the long-term stability of these 
markets. Management also believes that the report should 
have acknowledged that a major goal of carbon markets 
was to bring in private capital as per United Nations nego-
tiations, and that the unpredictable nature of carbon flows 
poses a fundamental problem in using carbon financing in 
the Bank and elsewhere. Management feels that the report 
misses the knowledge transfer and technical assistance 
provided through instruments such as the Prototype Car-
bon Fund Plus, Community Development Carbon Fund 
(CDCF) Plus, or Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) 
Readiness Fund, and by the World Bank Institute’s CF As-
sist program, all of which help increase the  availability of 
carbon finance to potential projects inside and outside the 
Bank. Finally, the report argues that “carbon finance needs 
to be redirected away from hydropower, where it has mini-
mal impact on project bankability.” Here, management be-
lieves the report should have discussed alternative financ-
ing avenues, in particular for Africa, where hydro remains a 
vast and largely untapped reservoir of clean energy.
Management would have liked to see a stronger emphasis 
in the report on the potential role the Bank may play in pro-
moting carbon finance reform, so as to facilitate transition 
toward programmatic and ecosystem based approaches, 
and speedier and simplified administrative processes.
Agriculture. IEG’s review made the decision to exclude the 
agriculture sector, while acknowledging its contribution to 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Management believes, 
however, that given this sector’s importance (together with 
Forestry it accounts for 30 percent of GHG emissions and 
more in many developing countries), the report should 
have recommended that management pay more attention 
to the role of agriculture, including livestock and land and 
water management, in low-carbon growth in the future.
In this regard, the report and its recommendations would 
have benefited from using a broader perspective. The evi-
dence is that many of the “causes of deforestation” lie out-
side the forestry sector (for example, forest fires related to 
land clearing for agricultural intensification), and in the 
use of biomass energy (for example, wood and charcoal) 
for cooking and heating.
III. IEG Recommendations
Management welcomes and in general agrees with the IEG 
recommendations. These recommendations largely fit with 
what the WBG is doing at present, and are relevant to the 
Energy and the Environment Strategies currently under 
preparation. Management’s specific responses to IEG rec-
ommendations are outlined in the attached draft Manage-
ment Action Record.
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Management Action Record
Major monitorable IEG 
 recommendations requiring a response
Management response
The World Bank and IFC should—
Create incentives and mobilize resources to 
support effective pilot, demonstration, and 
technology transfer projects that have a clear 
logic of demonstration and diffusion. This will 
include mobilizing Global Environment Fund and 
other concessional funds to mitigate World Bank 
borrower risk; reshaping incentives for staff and 
managers; providing adequate resources for the 
design and supervision of complex projects; and 
making available specialized expertise in technol-
ogy transfer and procurement through a real or 
virtual technology unit.
Ongoing/Agree
This recommendation is consistent with the SFDCC. Key ongoing work consistent 
with the recommendation includes—
WBG expects to expand its partnership with GEF, which is well positioned to take •	
on early research and development risks, through the recently established Technol-
ogy Transfer Program and GEF/IFC Earth Fund.
Through the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), Scaling-up Renewable Energy Partner-•	
ship (SREP) and Forest Investment Partnership (FIP), WBG is supporting technology 
scale-up with the help of innovative financing.
A climate technology program, launched in September 2009, is exploring the •	
 feasibility of climate technology innovation centers in developing countries as 
a way to stimulate locally relevant climate technologies and harness economic 
opportunities at the small and medium enterprise (SME) level (first centers already 
under development in Brazil, India, and Kenya).
A new MDTF has been established for supporting the introduction of CCS •	
 technologies and providing technical assistance to clients.
IFC’s clean-tech investment practice will be housed in the newly-created Climate •	
Business Group. CLEANTECHNET is a practice group that meets virtually and in 
person to share knowledge and issues in the technology space.
The potential for additional initiatives to support these objectives will also be •	
explored in the Energy Strategy.
The WBG should—
Place greater emphasis on large-scale energy 
efficiency scale-up, as measured by energy saved 
and generating capacity avoided. This includes 
support for efficient lighting and exploring the 
scope for accelerating the global phase-out of in-
candescent light bulbs. It includes continued and 
expanded support for reductions in transmission 
and distribution losses. And it includes proactive 
search by IFC for large-scale, catalytic invest-
ments in energy efficiency. There is scope to 
coordinate World Bank support for demand-side 
energy efficiency policies with IFC support for 
more efficient manufacturing and more efficient 
products.
Partially Agree
WBG agrees with the general emphasis proposed, but does not agree with the 
specific action areas proposed. WBG does focus on large-scale or bundled energy 
efficiency projects to avoid high transaction costs associated with small-scale invest-
ments.  Estimates of energy saved are computed as part of the appraisal of projects 
with energy efficiency components.
However, World Bank finds the recommendations on efficient lighting and T&D to be 
rather prescriptive and limited in terms of scope and impacts. They do not account 
for a variety of untapped energy efficiency scale up opportunities and available long-
term EE potential in other sectors, on both the supply and demand sides, which could 
have much larger impacts, such as in district heating, industry, and municipalities. 
IFC intends to increase its climate-related lending from 10 percent of annual 
 commitments in fiscal 2009 to 20–25 percent in fiscal 2013, and will undertake 
a  proactive search for suitable investments. Energy efficiency is expected to be 
a  significant contributor to meeting this target. IFC will define an approach to 
 estimating avoided emissions associated with its climate-related activity. IFC agrees 
with the potential for investments in manufacturing of more efficient products and is 
actively seeking such opportunities, having made several such investments in fiscal 
2010.
(continued)
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Management Action Record (continued)
Major monitorable IEG 
 recommendations requiring a response
Management response
The WBG should—
Help countries find alternatives to coal power 
while retaining a rarely used option to support 
coal power, strictly following existing guidelines 
(including optimal use of energy efficiency op-
portunities) and being restricted to cases where 
there is a compelling argument for poverty or 
emissions reductions impacts that would not be 
achieved without WBG support for coal power.
Ongoing/Agree
The policy proposed is consistent with SFDCC criteria for coal investments. 
SFDCC criteria for coal investments have been clarified in the “Operational Guidance 
for the World Bank Group Staff: Criteria for Screening Coal Projects Framework for 
Development and Climate Change,” which took effect on April 15, 2010. The specific 
stress on “optimal use of energy efficiency opportunities” presented in the IEG recom-
mendation seems unnecessary, as there are no priority criteria either in SFDCC or 
the Operational Guidance and all required criteria must be adequately addressed. 
The Operational Guidance makes clear that coal investments should focus on cases 
where there is a compelling argument for poverty reduction and a clear need for WBG 
 support.
The WBG should—
Continue to explore, in the REDD context, ways 
to finance and promote forest conservation and 
sustainable use, including support for indig-
enous forest areas and maintenance of existing 
protected areas. 
Ongoing/Agree
By definition, REDD+ includes reducing emissions from deforestation and forest deg-
radation and addressing the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The World Bank is assisting countries to 
engage in REDD+ activities through two programs: FCPF and FIP. Both of these will 
contribute to financing and promoting forest conservation and sustainable use, 
including support for indigenous forest areas and forest conservation. FCPF involves 
37 countries, and has mobilized $160 million for capacity building and performance-
based payments to pilot projects which aim to open financial flows for sustainable 
management of forests and land. FIP, funded at approximately $600 million, will pilot 
programmatic investments to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, promote 
sustainable forest management, and conserve forests in Brazil, Burkina Faso, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mexico, and Peru.
MIGA’s upcoming FY 2012–15 Strategy should 
outline the role and scope for MIGA to provide 
political risk insurance to catalyze long-term 
 financing for renewable energy projects,  building 
on its expertise and existing portfolio of climate-
friendly guarantee projects.
Partially Agree
MIGA intends to address these issues in its annual business plan/budgeting process, 
but will not do so in the upcoming FY 2012–15 Strategy.
MIGA will consider a set of actions aimed at supporting eligible renewable energy 
and energy efficiency projects. These actions are subject to the willingness of private 
sponsors to invest in renewable energy and energy efficiency projects and the need 
for political risk insurance as a risk mitigation tool and/or a facilitation mechanism 
for funding and operations of those projects. MIGA understands that decisions to 
invest by project sponsors are subject to the uncertainties of future carbon market 
structures and prices. These markets have been actively pursued by sponsors as a 
complementary source of funds for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. 
MIGA’s current portfolio and expertise can serve as an initial step in supporting 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects, however MIGA’s actions will need to 
evolve and adapt to changing conditions in the carbon markets.
As MIGA’s upcoming FY 2012–15 Strategy will primarily be focused on MIGA’s risk-
return dynamics, including the agency’s overall appetite for risk, it may not focus 
on specific subsectors such as renewable energy and therefore may not be the ap-
propriate vehicle to address this issue. This subsector focus will therefore need to be 
addressed through a more appropriate mechanism such as MIGA’s annual business 
plan/budgeting process.
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Management Action Record (continued)
Major monitorable IEG 
 recommendations requiring a response
Management response
The World Bank should take the necessary steps 
to enhance the delivery of its guarantee products 
by taking actions to improve policies and proce-
dures, eliminate disincentives, increase flexibility, 
and strengthen skills for the deployment of 
the products. It should assess the potential for 
greater use of partial risk guarantees to mobilize 
long-term financing for renewable energy proj-
ects, particularly in the context of feed-in tariffs 
or other premiums to support investment in 
renewable energy.
Partially Agree
In response to IEG’s evaluation of WBG guarantees, Management has been engaged 
in ongoing discussions on opportunities to optimize the delivery of WBG guarantee 
instruments and has taken action to introduce greater flexibility in the use of Bank 
guarantee instruments in response to dynamic country and client needs and market 
developments. A Memorandum of Understanding was recently signed between 
the World Bank and MIGA to provide incentives to staff to collaborate and a similar 
agreement is being worked on with IFC. The Bank is working to increase potential for 
greater use of partial risk guarantees for renewable energy projects and is allocating 
more staff and resources accordingly. The World Bank feels that the delivery of renew-
able energy guarantee products should not single out the feed-in-tariff instrument, as 
the effectiveness and efficiency of its application varies across market structures and 
varies across countries depending on their energy access levels, with the potential to 
result in high energy costs that will need to be borne by consumers.
The Carbon Partnership Facility and other post-
Kyoto carbon finance efforts should focus on 
demonstrating effective technical and financial 
approaches to boosting low-carbon invest-
ments. Funds and facilities should have clear exit 
 strategies.
Ongoing/Agree
CPF and FCPF were clearly established for the purposes described. Beyond these 
facilities, the World Bank is invited to explore how to facilitate developing countries’ 
further access to the carbon market and expand the reach of market mechanisms in 
land use, including in agriculture. Work is under way to develop successor facilities to 
CDCF and the BioCarbon Fund.
Each fund and facility has its own clear exit strategy corresponding to when its capital 
has been fully committed. Regarding CPF, each tranche is to be established based on 
an assessment of the needs for further methodology development and piloting of 
new approaches to scale up the use of market mechanisms.
The WBG should—
Measure projects’ economic and environmental 
impact during execution and after closure and 
aggregate this information for analysis. For in-
stance, renewable energy projects should moni-
tor capacity utilization, and energy efficiency 
projects should monitor energy savings. This may 
require the use of concessional funds to defray 
additional costs of monitoring by staff, clients, 
and project proponents.
Disagree
While WBG assesses projects’ environmental impacts before, during, and after imple-
mentation, there are methodological difficulties in aggregating these.
There is not a clear source of concessional funding to defray the additional cost of 
monitoring by staff and project proponents, apart from climate-related trust funds, 
such as the CIF. Under the CIF, results frameworks are currently under develop-
ment. Each multilateral development bank partner and client will be responsible for 
monitoring results in accordance with the frameworks. Under the CTF and the SREP, 
indicators for renewable energy and energy efficiency investments will be tested in 
CIF-funded operations.
Measurement is being strengthened with respect to climate change mitigation. As 
outlined in SFDCC, a methodology for “carbon tagging” has been developed and 
prototyped. Once this methodology is adopted, this will help aggregate the project 
commitments coded as GHG mitigation (CO2 emission reduction). In addition, a new 
set of core indicators for IDA investment lending operations was approved by the En-
ergy and Mining Sector Board in 2009, to better capture impacts of the implementa-
tion of renewable energy projects. For energy efficiency projects in the IDA portfolio, 
a similar set of indicators, including project energy savings, is currently under review. 
The formulation of new core indicators for energy projects is also proposed for IBRD-
financed operations. 
IFC feels that collecting information on project performance may be complex and 
unrealistic for some financial intermediation-based lending instruments (for example, 
small loan programs for SMEs). Nevertheless, more efforts could be made in terms 
of monitoring, if additional resources were available to cover the extra costs of staff, 
clients, and project proponents.
(continued)
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Management Action Record (continued)
Major monitorable IEG 
 recommendations requiring a response
Management response
The WBG should—
Link these measures to a results framework that 
shifts the SFDCC toward a focus on outputs such 
as power produced, power access, forest cover, 
transit share of urban trips, rather than money 
spent.
Ongoing/Agree
A long-term results framework for SFDCC is under development, as stated in the 
Interim Progress Report for SFDCC, May 2010.
The SFDCC results framework will be outcome-oriented and is currently being 
developed in a consultative manner as envisioned in SFDCC. In addition to tracking 
WBG actions at the input level, the new results framework is being designed to track 
outputs, outcomes, and impacts related to WBG actions. Potential indicators at all 
of these levels (including the suggested output indicators: power produced, power 
access,  forest cover, transit share of urban trips) are currently being assessed for their 
feasibility, simplicity, and suitability in communicating results at different levels and 
scales. 
Separate results frameworks are under development for the CIF with an emphasis 
on impact, outcome and output indicators. Results chains link projects to the CIF 
final outcomes through pilot country outputs and outcomes, program replication 
 outcomes, and transformative impact. The multilateral development banks are 
 currently in a process to identify reliable indicators to measure results and achieve-
ments at each level.
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Chairman’s Summary: Committee on  
Development Effectiveness (CODE)
On September 15, 2010, the Committee on Develop-
ment Effectiveness (CODE)  considered the report Climate 
Change and the World Bank Group—Phase II: The  Challenge 
of  Low-Carbon Development, prepared by the Indepen-
dent Evaluation Group (IEG), and the draft management 
 response.
Summary
The Committee welcomed the timely discussion of the IEG 
report which, as noted by management, highlighted impor-
tant areas that are currently considered in the updates of 
the World Bank Group (WBG) Energy and Environment 
Sector Strategies. In this regard, members cautioned that, 
given the ongoing consultations, the IEG findings and rec-
ommendations should not be perceived as preempting the 
new strategies but inform the ongoing process. They wel-
comed the report’s emphasis on energy efficiency and its 
perspective on a “venture capital” approach and endorsed 
the call for a greater focus on results to complement the 
focus on mobilization and transfer of resources. There was 
appreciation for the report’s findings that many types of re-
newable energy require concessional finance.
The IEG evaluation sought to draw lessons from recent 
WBG experience (2003–08) with promoting the adoption 
and diffusion of technologies and practices that  reduce 
GHG emissions. Members noted that since the  Strategic 
Framework for Development and Climate Change  (SFDCC) 
was launched in 2008, it would be premature to evaluate the 
experience with the SFDCC. IEG clarified that the report is 
not an evaluation of the SFDCC but rather an assessment 
of earlier activities to inform the implementation of the 
 SFDCC. In addition, members agreed with management 
that addressing climate change as a development issue  raises 
the questions of how to address the access agenda while 
taking into account low-carbon development. IEG clarified 
that Phase I of the report considered this  important aspect.
Some members felt that the IEG evaluation should have 
addressed the World Bank commitments at the country 
level rather than project-by-project, suggested guidance to 
emerging countries on how to support low-carbon growth, 
and looked at geothermal, biofuel, and biomass energy. 
There were also comments on global vis-à-vis national 
 efforts; trade-offs of having a climate change agenda,  energy 
access, and social development; the role of carbon funds; 
and shortcomings of current staff incentives and resource 
constraints. Different views were expressed on the WBG’s 
involvement in coal plant projects.
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Statement of the External High-Level 
 Review  Panel
The High-Level Review Panel (Panel) has been asked to 
comment on the Phase II report of the Independent Evalu-
ation Group’s (IEG) evaluation Climate Change and the 
World Bank Group. The Phase I evaluation was devoted to 
assessing the role of policy actions in support of low-carbon 
growth and stressed the importance of energy price ratio-
nalization. Like the Phase I report, this report places special 
stress on the need for systems thinking in key sectors such 
as energy, transport, and forestry. The Panel appreciates 
both the extensive amount of work and the scope of the as-
sessment assembled by the two reports together and sepa-
rately. Summarizing World Bank Group (WBG) activities 
and giving a comprehensive review of the changing role of 
the Bank and future options is difficult because of the size 
and diversity of the Bank. The challenge of preparing such a 
report is compounded by the decline in the use of cost ben-
efit analysis over recent decades that has been documented 
in another recent IEG report (IEG 2010a).
We find the current report to be written with exemplary 
clarity. As far as we have been able to ascertain, it gives both 
an even-handed overview of the changing WBG practice 
in this area and a level-headed analysis of the options and 
alternatives ahead. 
The report is at once supportive and critical of the various 
dimensions of the WBG activities and represents an element 
of an ongoing evolution of the thinking about the work al-
ready under way, or in need of further implementation, 
in the multiple activities of the WBG. The Panel also both 
supports and criticizes the reviewed practices of the WBG 
and equally recommends a continuing evolution of WBG 
perspectives in its adaptation to the pressing needs for cli-
mate finance. In this comment, we want to reinforce the key 
messages in the report: that the WBG can and should play a 
central role in the multilateral and national responses to the 
worldwide development/climate problems before us. 
We believe that the tensions between development and 
climate are a chimera: the damages from climate change 
will counteract the development aspirations of low-income 
countries. To mitigate climate damages is a vital develop-
ment goal. Again, in agreement with the report, we believe 
that the newer and integrated strategies for low-carbon 
growth can, if well and consistently pursued, minimize or 
overcome these tensions. Finally, we emphasize that the 
WBG, as other institutions that grew up before the chal-
lenges of climate resilient development were apparent, 
must alter its practices of investment and capacity building 
to adapt to the different politics and technologies that now 
are present. We hope our comment will be read in the same 
spirit as the IEG report, reinforcing and extending the work 
we are charged to review. 
The Challenge of Climate Change and 
 Low-Carbon (Green) Growth
A number of features set the management of climate risks 
apart from most developmental and environmental prob-
lems. It spans centuries, forcing us to rethink intergen-
erational equity issues between and within countries. If 
 unchecked, climate change might threaten the development 
aspirations of the poor. If approached creatively, it opens 
development opportunities. Rapid economic growth in 
the last decades has substantially reduced poverty in some 
countries, but now the very sustainability of this growth is 
seriously threatened by climate change unless we change 
our growth strategies. Some implications of the long-run 
low-carbon strategy are clear, such as the virtual phase-out 
in this century of fossil fuel use. This will require a high 
price on carbon emissions or other aggressive policy mea-
sures and incentives, with inclusive participation across 
the world. Others aspects of these alternative development 
strategies in the areas of forestry and innovation suggest 
quite immediate interventions to preserve depletable assets 
or lay the foundations for the commercialization and diffu-
sion of newer technologies that cannot be deferred.
Although the short-run capital, operational, and transition 
costs of managing climate change risks are sizable, they are 
still dwarfed both by the benefits of and by the resources 
available from a century of growth. Green growth and win-
win opportunities are increasingly recognized by national 
leaders as real options, but coal is often the cheapest cur-
rent investment and the (shadow) carbon prices currently 
discussed are, as shown by the IEG report, inconsequential. 
In the multilateral climate negotiations, the distribution of 
these costs is deeply contentious and it will take some time 
to resolve. Eventually we will live in a world where all pro-
ductive resources, including the climate regulating functions 
of the atmosphere have a price—just like land does today in 
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most places. Before we get there, we are in an interregnum 
when policy making is quite complex. What the situation 
needs are credible agents that provide the vision to bridge the 
gap, leadership in this crucial task, and the capacity to mobi-
lize and channel resources responsibly. As suggested in this 
report, the WBG can and must contribute to this leadership.
The WBG Role
Th e report fi nds that there are multiple and overlapping 
reasons for WBG involvement and action. First, it is evi-
dent that when environmental externalities are taken into 
account, unregulated markets will not optimize social 
well-being. Second, given past regulatory practices and the 
rising costs of sustainable energy services associated with 
climate change and with other environmental and resource 
problems, there is good reason to believe that greener 
growth built on less extensive exploitation of this resource 
base can increase productivity and development. Th ird, the 
historically low resource prices associated with prior indus-
trial growth have failed to motivate innovation of systems 
that use resources in smarter ways. Looking systematically 
at these opportunities through integrated planning is the 
responsibility of agencies such as the WBG, which make 
investment capital available, especially in poorer countries 
with less institutional capacity to perform this analysis. 
Th e IEG report highlights that the problem of responsible 
leadership in this fi eld is compounded by the inability of 
the multilateral system over the past years to agree on a 
 regime for giving meaningful price signals and comple-
mentary incentives for managing carbon risks. It has been 
recognized in principle that climate change is a true threat 
to development and poverty alleviation, and there is a 
growing (although not yet suffi  ciently large) willingness to 
pay for global mitigation services. Yet there are not inclu-
sive sanctions imposed on greenhouse gas emissions that 
would signal to all nations that resource use must change 
or provide the funds for climate-specifi c transfers to put a 
signifi cant positive incentive behind cleaner technologies 
in less developed countries. In the absence of such agreed 
international policy guidance to markets, it is especially 
important that established global coordinating agents use 
fi nancial markets to internalize the shadow costs of carbon 
and the prospective returns of green investment into their 
investment portfolios. We believe that the WBG—with its 
access to world capital markets, the ears of policy makers 
in all countries, and a credible engagement in both devel-
opment and environmental issues—is a strong candidate 
for this position. Th ere are many other important agents, 
including governments, industry, and the United Nations. 
However, in the current situation, there is a particular 
need for the WBG to consider its exceptional position to 
articulate and promote the long-run investment horizon, 
the production of global public goods and services, and the 
systemic planning perspective that few other fi nancial bod-
ies are able to defi ne and pursue. 
Although the report does not make the overall portfolio of 
WBG energy investments a principal subject of criticism, 
we urge that this question of WBG perspective receive 
more direct attention. Th e bottom line is that virtually 
all forms of energy supply entail some serious issues, and 
hence optimization of demand through eff ective manage-
ment, overview of tariff  structures, reduction of grid losses, 
and other methods of increasing energy productivity should 
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be WBG priorities. The WBG has made significant gains in 
recent years through its Clean Energy Investment Frame-
work, and it reports that it achieved a 40 percent share of its 
total energy commitments for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency for fiscal 2009. This total commitment  figure can 
include funds for energy efficiency in fossil energy, hydro-
power facilities, new renewable energy technologies, and 
both specific donor funds and structural lending. These 
alternative types of climate finance should be clearly and 
separately reported to facilitate transparent understanding 
of the changing composition of WBG activities. The Panel 
also makes specific remarks about continuing WBG lend-
ing to coal fired power below. However, given the strong 
findings of the IEG report on the economic viability of in-
creasing numbers of renewable energy or clean transport 
investment and the social value of the WBG acting to low-
er capital and operational costs of newer technologies and 
systems, the Panel urges the WBG to move more quickly 
in its structural energy lending to assume the coordinating 
role of a strategic renewable energy investor.
As does the IEG report, the Panel realizes that a change in 
WBG investing stance is not a simple or politically easy task. 
Our position, like that of the evaluation, is more forceful than 
the WBG Strategic Framework on Development and Climate. 
We recognize that various WBG stakeholders contest its abil-
ity to lead on climate finance, that the WBG operates in a 
partial policy vacuum, and that it has neither a clear mandate 
nor control over many of the necessary international policies 
to complement its investments. In spite of these factors, the 
Panel would go beyond even the IEG evaluations and reiter-
ate by consensus that the Bank Group is uniquely positioned 
to take on roles that would as an investor and trustee be in-
ternally innovative and politically opportune in showing the 
way toward a comprehensive multilateral system in which 
the financing of low-carbon growth is the essential reform. 
General Findings
It certainly is true in the short run that low-carbon growth 
costs more (ignoring externalities) than business as usual 
growth (the evaluation emphasizes that renewable energy, 
aside from medium to large hydropower, does have higher 
costs or lower returns than other kinds of power genera-
tion); but the Panel, like the report, puts great stress on the 
potential for a congruence of mitigation and development. 
The report shows there is ample scope for projects that 
 promote local development goals while also mitigating 
greenhouse gases (see figure 6.1 of the report). In addition 
to energy efficiency investments, other projects may indi-
vidually have high carbon returns (forestry) or economic 
returns (solar home photovoltaic systems). To optimize 
carbon and economic gains, it may often be necessary to 
construct portfolios of projects, rather than pursue mul-
tiple goals with a single instrument.
The IEG report directs attention to energy efficiency, which 
offers low-cost or negative-cost opportunities to reduce 
carbon emissions. It finds that many people, inside and 
outside the WBG, do not appear to take energy efficiency 
seriously. However, especially noting that hoped-for large-
scale climate funding may not appear soon and that many 
countries simply do not have good immediate alternatives 
to fossil power, many kinds of energy efficiency offer both 
high economic returns to the borrowing country and high 
abatement returns to the world. Some types of energy ef-
ficiency investments can be undertaken immediately, with 
concurrent huge economic benefits and significant climate 
benefits. At the same time, aggressive pursuit of energy 
efficiency today can defer the locking in of new carbon-
 intensive power construction like diesel or coal plants for 
a few years, allowing time both for technical progress to 
reduce the cost of renewable alternatives and for the inter-
national political process to muster more climate finance. 
Although the Panel insists that it is necessary to reinforce 
the effects of such investments by anticipating with com-
plementary policies—such as tariff and tax reform—the 
rebound effects of falling energy prices, it emphasizes the 
conclusion of the IEG report that the WBG should give 
very high priority to energy efficiency. 
The Panel also underscores the evaluation’s finding that the 
WBG can emulate a role played by venture funding in the 
private sector. With current carbon prices, the power of 
concessional finance is often limited in mitigating the risk 
of high-risk projects. At $10/ton for CO2, carbon finance 
simply doesn’t constitute a make-or-break factor in low-
carbon investments. Yet there is a whole class of projects 
that offer high economic returns (to the adopting coun-
try) together with carbon benefits, but that present some a 
priori risks. Bus rapid transit and silvopastoral systems are 
examples given in the text. Although risk-averse borrowing 
countries will shy away from these until they are proven, 
concessional funds can mitigate this risk. WBG clean tech-
nology funds or other WBG climate finance could be used 
to support a number of individual “start-up” projects, scal-
ing up the ones that work, and produce an overall portfolio 
with very attractive rates of return. The difference between 
this and private venture capital is that the benefits accrue 
to the Bank’s client countries rather than the Bank itself—
hence the need for concessional capital. 
Although the IEG report demonstrates a record of con-
siderable success in many WBG projects in the energy 
efficiency and off-grid photovoltaics (renewable energy), 
the WBG’s record in renewable energy more generally has 
been more mixed and modest. Many hydropower and wind 
projects have underperformed relative to expectations. Still 
greater caution about the value of WBG programs should 
be attached to the Group’s extensive efforts in piloting 
international carbon markets between Annex I and 
CI Change Prelims.indd   26 11/3/2010   2:07:05 PM
 non-Annex I countries. Th e World Bank’s Carbon Finance 
Unit (CFU) has led, through its extensive activities in Clean 
Development Mechanism markets, to expanding the role 
of, and the infrastructure for, carbon trading between de-
veloped and developing nations. However, there has been 
criticism of the environmental quality of many projects that 
the WBG has supported, including industrial gases, hydro-
power, and fossil (gas and coal) power plants, which may 
well have been either profi table in themselves or were pur-
sued primarily for the purpose of national energy diversifi -
cation and security policies. In addition, although the CFU 
was promoted as a market maker that could act as a carbon 
off set buyer until the private market fl ourished, the WBG 
continued to build up its trading aft er that private market 
was fully established. Finally, as a vehicle for catalytic fi -
nance and technology transfer, the IEG fi nds the CFU’s re-
cord is at best mixed. Th e Panel suggests that the WBG has 
a public responsibility to ensure that its behavior advances 
programs have been valuable in exposing that inadequate 
lending for energy effi  ciency oft en refl ects wider credit mar-
ket failures, including onerous requirements for collateral. 
However, it is important to note that, contrary to expecta-
tions, although market transformation programs were oft en 
conceived as temporary, WBG experience indicates that 
these actions proved diffi  cult to discontinue even as banks 
or fi rms gained familiarity with energy effi  ciency lending. 
Th e Panel fi nds that the WBG could focus even more exten-
sively on these less usual categories of  transition fi nancing, 
but needs to pay careful attention to the incentives that will 
help convert such demonstrations of market potential into 
commercial local fi nance as rapidly as  possible. 
Th e Panel also applauds the report’s attention to the im-
portance of technology development or promotion and 
its transfer or diff usion. Technological innovation requires 
special conditions to be successful. Th e report argues that 
innovations are more apt for WBG support when the 
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the quality of international institutions that regulate carbon 
fi nance markets, rather than acting principally as a pure 
market player profi ting from expanding market scale.
Both the report and the Panel underline the importance 
of market transforming measures. Th e Panel confi rms the 
view in the report that loan guarantees, innovative forms of 
insurance for joint ventures and other types of commercial 
organizations that encourage the international transfer of 
technologies, can be valuable. Likewise, investment in new 
service providers such as energy service companies  (ESCOs) 
or transmission and distribution loss reduction programs 
are especially valuable in climate-related activities. WBG 
Bank can help defray risks that are peculiar to a certain 
 environment or when the supported innovations are par-
ticularly adapted to conditions, inputs, or skills found in 
developing countries. Th e barriers to technology diff u-
sion are very oft en related to institutional factors such as 
the character of competition and industrial structure. De-
pending on market structure, competitors may resist the 
diff usion of technology and the WBG must have a realistic 
strategy and realistic goals that take this into account. Th e 
report argues that in numerous cases international support 
was essential to mitigate up-front risk and to pay for global 
benefi ts of knowledge created. 
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Yet WBG experience shows that the returns from invest-
ment in technology development may often be lost with-
out associated programs to encourage and facilitate wide 
technological diffusion. Some projects have incorrectly as-
sumed that private beneficiaries of technology would share 
proprietary technology with competitors. As discussed in 
the IEG report, other lessons on fomenting technology in-
novation and diffusion can be garnered from projects that 
fail because of multiple, conflicting objectives, inexperi-
enced entrepreneurs, unfamiliar technology, an uninter-
ested target market, and the difficulty of procurement when 
technology suppliers are few and costs are poorly known. 
The Panel suggests that the WBG devote particular atten-
tion to the analysis and selection criteria for programs to 
compensate private actors for technology and diffusion 
risks in its future climate finance portfolio. Analytical clar-
ity by the Bank may also help dispel confusion about these 
issues, often found in the multilateral climate negotiations. 
We believe that the role of capacity building, though men-
tioned in the report, could be given even more emphasis 
as an integrated part of WBG programs and as a separate 
standalone activity.
The WBG needs to demonstrate a comprehensive low-
 carbon development pathway for developing countries. 
In promoting low-carbon development, it should apply 
a strategic approach, rather than simply supporting proj-
ects based on sector-specific priorities. The IEG correctly 
highlights how difficult this is, in the absence of a global 
deal that requires governments to account for the external 
costs of climate risk. Naturally, one can focus on combat-
ing perverse subsidies and on pursuing currently available 
win-win options, but these will not be enough. The climate-
development dilemma is that many green options are not 
economically profitable, especially in the short term, or 
they threaten governments with substantial transitional or 
political costs. 
However, the report also suggests that a portfolio of lower 
carbon actions across many sectors—including energy, in-
dustry, transport and forestry—can mitigate overall devel-
opment costs and bring ancillary benefits from improved 
local environmental services and energy security. And over 
the long term, technical progress will reduce the costs of 
currently noncommercial technologies, yielding systematic 
productivity gains. Prospective economic gains from in-
novation imply that it is most important to avoid land use 
patterns and technology investments that have almost irre-
versible lock in. Cases illustrated in the report include op-
tions to use energy efficiency savings to increase electricity 
supply and forestall the need for more current investment 
in power plants with 50 years useful life, and to avoid urban 
architectures (buildings, roads, and so forth) that “require” 
(or at least promote strongly) heating, cooling, or passenger 
car transport. As many nations currently lack the capacity 
to implement more systemic and forward-looking develop-
ment planning, there can be a particularly high return to 
WBG support in building and institutionalizing intellectual 
and political capacity in climate science, climate econom-
ics, and technology strategy.
Specific Findings
In addition to the main points raised above, the Panel agrees 
with many of the recommendations of the IEG report. We 
cannot comment on all sectors or recommendations, but 
we would particularly like to emphasize a number of spe-
cific additional issues.
Energy efficiency
Although the emphasis on large-scale energy efficiency 
scale-up goes in the right direction, further study is needed 
on the relative importance of efficient lighting and reduc-
ing power losses in transmission, for WBG intervention. 
Incandescent bulbs and power loss are problems for both 
developed and developing countries. The potential scope 
for WBG intervention in developing countries, particularly 
in household and building sectors or other areas where op-
portunities for decentralized actions are needed but sub-
stantial, needs to be systematically analyzed. In addition, 
many ESCOs are already playing a role in implementing 
profitable efficiency opportunities, such as phasing out in-
candescent bulbs. The WBG needs to explore how better to 
complement and leverage the role of ESCOs by providing 
them concessional funds. Likewise, the potential for WBG 
intervention to reduce power loss in developing countries 
needs to be measured, and the carbon saved per dollar by 
reducing power loss needs to be compared with that of other 
projects. Large-scale gains are also available in the industry 
and transport sectors. These gains are often more simple to 
organize because the scale of savings offers reduced trans-
action costs, and so they may deserve top priority in many 
developing countries. 
Finally, the Panel emphasizes its particular appreciation 
that the IEG report consistently highlights and analyzes 
the separate roles of renewable and energy efficiency. We 
agree both with the importance of the scale-up of energy 
efficiency programs and with the practice of measuring and 
evaluating results by energy saved and generating capacity 
avoided rather than by funds dispersed, which can easily 
lead to inefficient effort. 
Transportation and urban design 
Another major field covered is urban architecture. The fo-
cus when it comes to urban issues is rightly and well placed 
on transit, although rising demands for local indoor clima-
tization (cooling and heating as well as other demands for 
urban energy) could perhaps have been given some more 
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attention. In a couple of decades, countries that spent large 
sums on urban infrastructure—such as big roads, sparsely 
populated cities, and homes with high heating or cooling re-
quirements—will feel that they wasted resources—just like 
those who spent their money on copper telephone lines. Th e 
WBG should help tilt the building of long-run infrastruc-
ture in a carbon-lean direction: shipping rather than air 
freight, rail rather than road, virtual communication rather 
than physical, and so forth. Th us, urban planning, building 
design, modern and climate-adapted systems for transport, 
forestry, energy portfolio, and infrastructure could be the 
critical structural factors in pursuing low- carbon develop-
ment pathways by developing countries. Th e WBG should 
aim to incorporate a low-carbon paradigm shift  in those 
structural areas. 
Th ough reliable data are not readily available, economic 
loss caused by traffi  c congestion in most developing coun-
tries would range from three percent to six percent of GDP, 
particularly in urban areas. Th us, investment in mass transit 
could not only save carbon but could also reduce economic 
losses in developing countries. Th e WBG should aim to in-
corporate a low-carbon paradigm shift  in these structural 
areas. 
In almost all developing countries, the transport sector, in 
particular mass urban transit, chronically suff ers from un-
derinvestment. Th e historical trend of developed countries 
clearly shows that it is the transport sector that will be the 
most diffi  cult in which to curb the soaring increase of car-
bon emissions. Th e bulk of future emissions from devel-
oping countries will come from the transport sector. Th is 
must be forestalled by massive investment in infrastruc-
ture, rapidly and through a paradigm shift  toward com-
fortable and accessible low-carbon mass transit, which will 
be a critical component of low-carbon development. Th e 
WBG, in particular the International Finance Corporation, 
should engage in mapping out an ambitious strategy of 
promoting low-carbon mass transport systems in develop-
ing countries. Th is is consistent with the large-scale energy 
effi  ciency scale-up recommendation. As with other energy 
sectors, it is crucial to complement these investments with 
a sound price and tariff  policy. In this case we recommend 
tax reform, shift ing more of the burden of taxation away 
from goods used by the poor and onto environmentally 
unsustainable goods such as fossil fuels. Without high fuel 
prices, grand schemes for urban transit cannot compete 
and will merely fall into disrepute. 
Coal-fi red power
We appreciate the care that the IEG report has taken in 
discussing the thorny issue of support to coal-fi red power 
plants. Th e report recommends assistance to countries 
to fi nd alternatives to coal power and raises fairly formi-
dable barriers to coal projects by requiring adherence to 
guidelines that include optimal use of energy effi  ciency 
 opportunities as well as restricting coal projects to cases 
where there is a compelling argument for poverty or emis-
sions reductions impacts that would not be achieved with-
out WBG support. 
However, the report stops short of fully banning engagement 
in the sector for fear that the Bank would lose infl uence over 
and contact with the sector where such investments will go 
ahead without even the advantage of the WBG guidelines. 
Th e report gives an example of a country that urgently needs 
base load power and where a new effi  cient coal-fi red plant re-
places a number of older and highly ineffi  cient plants— also 
within a context of overall system optimization. Although 
it appreciates the latter argument, this panel would want to 
emphasize the signaling value that the WBG has both when 
it chooses to fi nance and when it chooses not to. It is hard 
to envisage situations where the arguments in favor of WBG 
support to coal power outweigh the arguments against. Th is 
applies particularly if suffi  cient concessional carbon funding 
can be leveraged. Th e argument against a complete ban may, 
however, have some validity. 
It is necessary to make sure that coal is used in a most pru-
dent manner, but it is better to focus on improving the en-
ergy portfolio as a whole rather than focusing only on coal 
at the project level. Th e WBG should be able to advise and 
off er a strategy of diversifying and scaling up renewable en-
ergy sources in order to shift  toward a low-carbon energy 
portfolio.
Forestry, land, and other resource use
In addition to access to carbon fi nance in energy-related in-
vestment, one of the potential advantages of the WBG is its 
superior overview of such issues as global externalities and 
the related politics of negotiations. In the shorter run, the 
rapid depletion of forests and other land-based carbon stor-
age systems (for example, peat lands and agricultural soils) 
represents a stock of assets that can rapidly be exhausted. Im-
mediate opportunities to prevent the continuation of long-
standing resource exploitation practices in these sectors are 
abundant. Substituting degraded lands, themselves the con-
sequences of ineffi  cient resource use, for the further loss of 
primary stocks can allow national development of timber, 
pulp and paper, oil palm, agroforestry, agropastoral, and 
fi shery economies that are currently promoted in an unsus-
tainable manner by exploitation of natural areas. Food secu-
rity concerns in many developing countries are equally open 
to better management through productivity increases using 
intensive techniques instead of simply  extending tradition-
al production by plowing under more forests or throwing 
out more nets. Because these newer techniques are usually 
more capital and knowledge intensive than what has been 
done under business as usual, the WBG is in a particularly 
strong position to support national agricultural and forestry 
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 services with increased loan capital and concessional funds 
to cover the added costs of transition to new practices. 
Because forestry, agriculture, and fi shing are oft en critical 
areas for many poorer developing countries in pursuing 
low-carbon development, the WBG should not only “ex-
plore” these mitigation opportunities, but should be able 
to prioritize immediate support. Th is support may demand 
the use of public funding to supplement the privately avail-
able income fl ows that fi rms, families, or communities can 
reap from less-sustainable resource uses and the delivery 
of these public funds through innovative measures like 
easements or contracts for ecosystem services. Moreover, 
as the WBG expands its activities in these sectors, it needs 
to carefully synchronize its approaches with the Reduced 
Emission from Deforestation and Degradation negotia-
tions and other elements of the United Nations process in 
order to complement and encourage political progress in 
this  priority negotiation fi eld. 
Recommendations
Th e panel agrees with most of the excellent IEG report. Our 
own statement is short enough to not require any summary. 
We close by reiterating only four key points that have been 
emphasized both in the IEG report and our statement: 
Climate damage is a serious threat to development, •	
 especially for the poor. 
It is essential that the WBG as a development institution •	
lead in building capacity, understanding, and practical 
standards to support governments’ implemention of 
low-carbon growth strategies. 
Th e WBG can and should expand its structural lending •	
and grant programs for energy effi  ciency, renewable en-
ergy, and market transformation programs that create 
correct incentives consistent with these strategies. 
Finally, the WBG is well placed to take on a mission •	
to encourage and leverage fi nancing for low carbon 
growth. To do so, it must continue to reform its orga-
nizational goals, operational practices, internal incen-
tives, and performance management criteria to value 
and reward results at the systemic, rather than at the 
project level. 
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Glossary
Additionality To generate carbon offsets recognized under the Clean Development 
Mechanism or Joint Implementation, projects must show that their emis-
sion reductions would be in addition to those that would occur in the 
absence of carbon finance. 
Bankability The ability of a project to attract sufficient financing to be viable. A proj-
ect might not be bankable if its profits are not high enough in early years 
to cover the needed debt payments.
Base load The amount of power required to supply minimum customer demands 
(as power demand fluctuates throughout the day, or seasonally).
Bus rapid transit (BRT) An efficient urban transit form using priority or dedicated bus lanes.
Bus rapid transit system (BRTS) An integrated system of multiple bus rapid transit lines.
Carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2e)
Number of tons of carbon dioxide considered to have the same impact on 
global warming as a ton of a specified gas. For instance, one ton of meth-
ane is considered equivalent in warming to 25 tons of CO2.
Carbon finance unit (CFU) The World Bank unit that manages carbon funds and purchases carbon 
offsets.
Carbon fund A trust fund established to purchase carbon offsets.
Carbon offset (or credit) A commodity representing a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (in-
cluding gases other than carbon dioxide), used by purchasers to meet 
regulatory or voluntary limits on emissions. Certified emission reduc-
tions are one type of carbon offset.
Carbon return The effectiveness of a project in reducing carbon dioxide emissions (as 
opposed to the economic return, or other environmental benefits). Mea-
sured in lifetime kilograms of CO2e emissions reduced per dollar of in-
vestment cost. 
Certified emission reduction A carbon credit (measured in tons CO2e) for an emissions reduction as-
sociated with a Clean Development Mechanism project.
Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)
A mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol by which developed countries 
can  finance greenhouse gas emission reductions or removal projects in 
developing countries. In turn, the developed countries receive credits for 
doing this, which they may apply toward meeting mandatory limits on 
their own emissions.
Combined heat and power (or 
cogeneration)
The production of both electricity and economically valuable heat (for 
industrial processes or space heating), for example, from a steam boiler. 
Combined-cycle turbine A relatively efficient technology for power generation from combustion, 
usually of natural gas.
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Compact Fluorescent Lamp 
(CFL)
An efficient light bulb that uses only 20%–30% as much power as a stan-
dard incandescent bulb.
Concentrated solar power A solar power technology that uses focused sunlight to drive a steam tur-
bine or heat engine in order to produce electricity.
Concessional funds Donor-provided grants and subsidized loans. 
Demand-side management 
(DSM)
Actions or incentives, often directed by energy utilities to their custom-
ers, to reduce the level of energy demands (typically through efficiency 
measures) or change the timing of those demands. Can also apply to mea-
sures to reduce demand for transport, such as road or parking pricing.
Debt service coverage ratio The ratio of net operating income to debt repayment obligations (interest 
and principal). 
Development Policy Loan 
(DPL)
A World Bank lending instrument used to support structural reforms in 
an economic sector or in an economy as a whole.
District heating Centralized system for the provision of steam heat to an urban neighbor-
hood or district.
Economic Rate of Return (ERR) The annual percentage rate of return on a project, considering all costs 
and benefits to society. In this evaluation, ERRs are computed using only 
domestic costs and benefits; carbon benefits are reckoned separately.
End user energy efficiency 
(or demand-side energy 
efficiency)
Energy efficiency improvements carried out by power consumers, such as 
through appliances or industrial equipment that consumes less energy. 
Energy services company 
(ESCO)
A company that provides clients with some combination of assessment, 
financing and implementation of options for increased efficiency of use 
and reduced expenditure on energy.
Financial intermediaries Financial institutions such as banks that borrow money and then lend it 
on to other institutions.
Global Environment Facility 
(GEF)
An independent, international financial organization that provides grants to 
developing and countries with economies in transition for projects that sup-
port environmental objectives, including those related to climate change. 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) Gases whose atmospheric buildup contributes to global warming and cli-
mate change. Greenhouse gases regulated under the Kyoto Protocol are 
CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and 
sulphur hexafluoride.
HFC-23 A potent greenhouse gas (with a global warming impact 11,700 times 
that of CO2) generated as a byproduct of the manufacture of the refriger-
ant HCFC-22.
Hydropower with storage Hydropower plants that have substantial reservoirs (as opposed to run-
of-river hydropower). 
Incandescent Lamp The “standard” lightbulb technology, in use since the 19th century.
Incremental cost The additional cost of substituting a low-carbon for a high-carbon 
 investment. 
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Joint Implementation A mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol through which a developed coun-
try can receive “emissions reduction units” when it helps finance projects 
that reduce net greenhouse gas emissions in another developed country.
Low-carbon Term applied to activities that provide outputs while producing less CO2 
(or other greenhouse gases) than alternative “standard” methods. 
Mitigation Abatement of greenhouse gas (or other pollutant) emissions.
No regrets/win-win actions An action that provides net benefits both to the nation that adopts it and 
to the world at large. Individuals or groups may suffer losses under win-
win policies, though in principle they could be compensated from the 
benefits. Also, actions that would be valuable even without considering 
climate change mitigation  benefits.
Nontechnical losses In a power system, power that is consumed but is not billed to customers, 
because of power theft, meter failure or utility employee collusion. Also 
called commercial losses.
Off-grid Power generation not connected to the main power grid, such as solar 
home systems, mini-grids, or small portable diesel generators.
On-grid Power generation connected to the main power transmission grid.
Parts per million (ppm) A measure of concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Payment for Environmental 
Services (PES)
A mechanism for rewarding landholders for providing environmental 
services (for example, watershed protection or carbon storage), such as 
by growing or conserving forests.
Peak load (or peak demand) The amount of power needed to supply consumers when demand is at 
its greatest. Peak demand typically occurs in early evening hours, when 
electric lights and household appliances are turned on.
Protected area A clearly defined geographical area, recognized, dedicated, and man-
aged—through legal or other effective means—to achieve long-term con-
servation with associated ecosystem services and cultural values.
Renewable energy Energy produced sustainably without net carbon emissions and without 
consumption of fossil or nuclear fuels. Includes hydropower, wind power, 
solar power, geothermal power and biomass power.
Return on equity The rate of return realized by shareholders in a project.
Run-of-river hydropower Hydropower plants without significant storage capacity. These usually 
still have a small dam but do not create a large reservoir.
Silvopastoral systems The practice of combining agroforestry and pastoral animal grazing. 
Solar home systems (SHS) A small solar photovoltaic powered system (with battery storage) for use 
by off-grid households. 
Strategic Framework on 
Development and Climate 
Change (SFDCC)
A strategic framework adopted by the World Bank in 2008.
Supercritical coal A technology that burns coal at high temperature and pressure (as op-
posed to subcritical coal.) 
CI Change Prelims.indd   33 11/3/2010   2:07:07 PM
xxxiv | Climate Change and the World Bank Group
Supply-side energy efficiency Energy efficiency improvements carried out by energy suppliers, such as 
reducing the amount of fuel needed to be consumed to generate a given 
amount of power from a power plant. 
Technical losses The difference between electric power that is generated and power that is 
consumed. As power passes through transmission/distribution lines and 
transformers, some energy is converted to heat and lost. 
Technology transfer Transfer of technical hardware or know-how, or financial and institution-
al innovations, between countries.
Tenor The total length of time for a loan to be repaid, including grace periods.
Traditional financing The principal financial instruments used by the World Bank Group (IDA 
credits and grants, IBRD loans, IFC loans and equity financing, MIGA 
guarantees), as opposed to new financing sources with environmental 
aims such as carbon finance and GEF grants.
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evALuAtiOn HiGHLiGHts
The World Bank Group’s Strategic Framework • 
on Development and Climate Change pro-
motes national sustainable development and 
global action.
Prior to the Strategic Framework, the World • 
Bank Group had limited objectives speciﬁ cally 
related to climate change, but many of its 
activities have potential mitigation beneﬁ ts.
The evaluation draws lessons from that experi-• 
ence, seeking ways for the World Bank Group 
to maximize its impact on development and 
climate change mitigation.
Within the areas of energy, forestry, and • 
 transport, this evaluation looks at speciﬁ c 
 subsectors that illustrate the challenges 
to overcoming barriers to the adoption of 
 low-carbon technologies and practices.
Ph
ot
o 
by
 K
en
ne
th
 M
. C
ho
m
itz
. U
se
d 
w
ith
 p
er
m
iss
io
n.
Chapter 1
CI Change Chapter 01.indd   1 11/2/2010   11:46:04 AM
2 | Climate Change and the World Bank Group
Introduction
In 2008, the World Bank Group (WBG) adopted a Strategic Framework on Development 
and Climate Change (SFDCC). This framework addresses the challenges of promoting 
development in a changing climate. The Independent Evaluation Group’s (IEG) climate 
evaluation series does not directly assess the performance of this new framework. 
 Rather, it recognizes that the WBG has for some years been deeply involved in renew-
able  energy, energy efficiency, forest conservation, and other activities at the cusp of 
 development and climate change. An early assessment of that experience can help 
inform the implementation of the SFDCC.
The first volume of IEG’s series (IEG 2009) examined 
World Bank experience with the promotion of the most 
important win-win (no regrets) energy policies—policies 
that combine domestic gains with global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) reductions. These included energy pricing reform 
and policies to promote energy efficiency (see appendix K, 
Executive Summary of Phase I).
This second phase covers the entire WBG, including the 
 International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). It assesses 
recent experience with promoting the adoption and dif-
fusion of technologies and practices that reduce GHG 
emissions while advancing other development goals. It 
encompasses a diverse range of activities, including re-
newable energy, energy efficiency, urban transport, and 
forest management. And it encompasses a broad repertory 
Objectives
To enable the WBG to effectively support sustainable development and poverty reduction at the national, •	
regional, and local levels, as additional climate risks and climate-related economic opportunities arise.
To use the WBG’s potential to facilitate global action and interactions by all countries. •	
ActiOn AreAs
Support climate action in country-led development processes.•	
Mobilize additional concessional and innovative finance.•	
Facilitate the development of market-based financing mechanisms.•	
Leverage private sector resources.•	
Support accelerated development and deployment of new technologies.•	
Step up policy research, knowledge, and capacity building.•	
Source: World Bank 2008.
bOx 1.1 the strategic Framework on Development and climate change
How can the WBG increase its impact 
on development and climate change 
 mitigation?
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Climate Context 
Climate change is a threat to development
Climate change threatens development (Parry and others 
2007; World Bank 2010). Most of this burden falls on devel-
oping countries. Coastal areas will be exposed to inunda-
tion, flooding, and brackish water supplies. Snowmelt-fed 
watersheds will face winter floods and summer droughts. 
Crop yields will fall in many areas. Infrastructure, designed 
to cope with an increasingly unpredictable climate, will 
 become more expensive. 
Most of the climate change burden falls on 
developing countries.
Uncertainty about the magnitude of these impacts 
strengthens rather than weakens the case for urgent action. 
To quantify this uncertainty, researchers (Sokolov and oth-
ers 2009) ran a climate change model under hundreds of 
different assumptions about economic growth, techni-
cal change, and climate response. The range of outcomes 
represents, in their view, the gamble that the world takes 
from inaction. They found that, absent climate mitigation, 
there is a 24 percent chance that average global tempera-
tures will rise this century by more than 6 degrees Celsius 
(13 degrees Fahrenheit).1 A change of this magnitude, 
during the lifetime of many alive today, would be broadly 
 catastrophic. 
GHG emissions by sector and 
 country Group, 2005
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 emissions limits under the Kyoto Protocol. GHG = greenhouse gas.
FiGure 1.1
It will be difficult or impossible to achieve this goal without 
immediate mitigation actions in all major emitting nations, 
according to 14 climate modeling exercises undertaken by 
10 independent research groups (Clarke and others 2009). 
(Mitigation refers to where action takes place rather than who 
funds it.) Although developed countries have contributed 
most of the atmospheric stock of GHGs and emit far more 
per capita, developing countries account for about half the 
current flow (see figure 1.1), and these emissions are grow-
ing rapidly. Even for less-ambitious stabilization targets, 
participation of middle-income countries is key to keeping 
The WBG’s resources—human and financial—are small 
compared to the task at hand. The International Energy 
Agency estimates that developing and transition coun-
tries need $16 trillion of energy sector investments over 
2008–30 under “business as usual” operations—plus an 
additional $5 trillion to shift to an ambitiously low-carbon 
path (IEA 2009). Much more is needed for sustainable 
land and forest management and for urban transport. So a 
prime focus of this evaluation is how the WBG can get the 
most leverage—the widest positive impact on both devel-
opment and climate change mitigation—from its limited 
resources.
Managing climate risk requires urgent, globally 
cooperative action
To mitigate these risks, the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to which virtually 
all countries subscribe, sets a goal of stabilizing the quantity 
of heat-trapping GHG in the atmosphere. Although pre-
cise limits have not been agreed on, the 2009 Copenhagen 
 Accord called for limiting the global increase in temperature 
(relative to preindustrial times) to 2 degrees Celsius, often 
equated with an atmospheric GHG concentration limit of 
450 CO2-equivalent (CO2e) parts per million.2
of interventions, from technical assistance to financing to 
regulatory reform. This project-eye view of activities per-
tains to all the action areas of the SFDCC (see box 1.1). 
The third phase will look at the challenge of adaptation to 
climate change.
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global mitigation costs affordable. (There is, however, no 
agreement yet on how those costs might be apportioned.) 
The long-run goal of stabilizing the level 
of atmospheric GHGs cannot be achieved 
without mitigating actions in all major 
emitting nations. 
The need for action is urgent. If installed today, inefficient 
coal-fired power plants, poorly insulated buildings, and 
poorly targeted energy subsidies will be needlessly pump-
ing GHGs into the atmosphere through mid-century. Those 
GHGs will linger in the atmosphere for many decades lon-
ger, intensifying warming and increasing the chance that the 
climate will pass a critical threshold—leading to  accelerated 
warming, dieback of the Amazon forest, or other climatic 
disruptions.
There are many routes to mitigation 
How might mitigation take place? GHG emissions arise in 
many ways, in many sectors. To motivate the sectors cov-
ered in this evaluation, consider first the current patterns 
of emissions. 
In the developing world, 83 percent of emissions come, in 
roughly equal proportions, from power generation; industrial 
processes (including steel manufacture, cement production, 
oil refining); deforestation; and agriculture (largely methane 
from rice paddies and livestock). Transportation accounts 
for another 7 percent. However, energy and transport emis-
sions are expected to grow rapidly as economies expand.
Emphasis on energy efficiency now buys time 
for renewable energy costs to fall and for de-
velopment of advanced energy  technologies.
Because mitigation is a global public good, it makes eco-
nomic sense to compensate countries, firms, farms, and 
other actors for their contribution to mitigation. The quest 
to use global demand for climate stability as a means of 
financing climate-friendly development has shaped both 
United Nations and WBG approaches to climate change.
Global Mitigation Context and the WBG
The WBG’s approach to climate change has coevolved 
with the international climate regime. One line of coevo-
lution was with the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
which was established in 1991 as a pilot program within 
the Bank. The GEF mobilized donor funds to address 
climate change, biodiversity loss, and other global envi-
ronmental problems. Recognizing that climate and bio-
diversity are global public goods, the GEF’s approach was 
to pay countries for the incremental costs of supplying 
these goods. 
The GEF rapidly realized that its funds were too limited to 
plug the funding gap (project by project) and shifted to ac-
tivities aimed at catalyzing replicable win-win actions. The 
GEF became an independent agency in 1994, but the Bank 
remained its trustee and largest implementing agency. This 
has been an important avenue for fostering attention to cli-
mate change inside the Bank and to developing a cadre of 
staff and managers with climate expertise. 
The WBG’s approach to climate change has 
coevolved with the international climate 
regime and carbon market development.
Another line of coevolution was with the carbon mar-
ket. The UNFCCC, which became effective in 1994, did 
not specify how its mitigation goals would be accom-
plished. Attention turned to an economic approach that 
Low-cost GHG Abatement Potential, 
non-OecD countries, 2030
Energy supply
11%
Transport
13%
Buildings
38%
Industry
8%
Agriculture
14%
Forestry
11%
Waste
5%
Source: Metz and others 2007.
Note: Cost< $20/ton of CO
2
. Estimated economic potentials for GHG 
mitigation at a sectoral level in 2030 for different cost categories 
using the SRES B2 and International Energy Agency World Energy 
Outlook (2004) baselines. Total abatement potential is 9.2 Gt CO
2
e. 
GHG = greenhouse gas; OECD = Organisation for Economic  
Co-Operation and Development.
FiGure 1.2 Costs and benefits of mitigation differ by sector and are the 
subject of intense investigation. The consensus estimate of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is sum-
marized in figure 1.2, which shows low-cost abatement 
opportunities. Like many other analyses, this one points 
to increased energy efficiency (in buildings and industry) 
as the largest and most economically attractive option for 
mitigation over the next few decades. 
An emphasis on energy efficiency in the next few decades 
buys time for solar and wind power to become more cost 
competitive with fossil fuels and to develop and deploy ad-
vanced low-carbon energy technologies (such as carbon 
capture and storage and nuclear fusion) in the second half 
of the century. Energy efficiency helps preclude construc-
tion of coal power plants that might otherwise stay in ser-
vice for 40 years or more. 
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would allow industrialized countries to seek cost-effective 
 opportunities for GHG reduction in developed or transi-
tion countries. This was in line with the UNFCCC’s prin-
ciple of “common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capacities.” It would take advantage of low-cost 
options to retrofit aging infrastructure in transition coun-
tries and to install cleaner greenfield equipment in rapidly 
growing developing countries. 
This approach was piloted in the Activities Implemented 
Jointly Program, in which the World Bank participated. 
It evolved into the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in 
1997 (but did not enter into force until 2005).
The Kyoto Protocol assigned GHG emissions allowances 
to industrialized countries. To exceed its emissions limit, 
a country was obliged either to purchase allowances from 
another industrialized country or to purchase a carbon 
offset from a developing or transition country (see box 
5.2). The World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF; 
whose staff had been involved in GEF and the Activities 
Implemented Jointly Program), put in place after Kyoto 
and launched in 1999, was intended to pilot the concept of 
carbon offsets and help catalyze this avenue for investment 
in GHG mitigation.
The 2001 WBG Environment  Strategy 
 included win-win approaches and 
 mobilization of concessional funds.
The dual-track approach—win-win opportunities comple-
mented by mobilization of concessional funds—was in-
cluded in the 2001 WBG Environment Strategy and has 
been pursued since. An independent review (Nakhooda 
2008) assessed 54 Country Assistance Strategies issued 
over 2004–07 and found that 32 discussed GHG mitiga-
tion in a sectoral context. At the 2004 Bonn International 
Conference on Renewable Energies, the WBG committed 
to expand its lending for renewable energy (excluding large 
hydropower) and energy efficiency by 20 percent per year 
over 2005–09 from a baseline of $209 million. The Bank 
surpassed its commitment by a large margin (see chap-
ter 2). In 2007, the Bank endorsed an Investment Frame-
work for Clean Energy and Development. The framework 
had a broader scope than its name suggests, emphasizing 
electricity access and including climate adaptation as well 
as mitigation. The mitigation component focused on mo-
bilization of concessional funds for investments in clean 
technologies and promotion of carbon trading.
Meanwhile, the UNFCCC process began to focus on the era 
after 2012, when the Kyoto provisions expire. The 2007 Bali 
Action Plan emphasized mitigation, adaptation, and finan-
cial and technological support for developing countries. 
It opened the negotiations to include reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), a major 
source of emissions not addressed in the Kyoto Protocol. 
And it called for setting a long-term global goal for emis-
sions reductions. The Bali Action Plan was widely expected 
to culminate in a new international agreement at the 2009 
Copenhagen climate meetings.
Development and Climate Change: A Strategic Framework 
for the World Bank Group was adopted in 2008. Although 
the SFDCC recognizes the primacy of the UNFCCC in the 
climate area, its goals are to support sustainable develop-
ment, including “climate-related economic opportunities,” 
and to “facilitate global action.” 
The SFDCC emphasizes six action areas (box 1.1), aligned 
with the Bali Action Plan. Four of these areas are concerned 
with mobilizing finance, from traditional and novel sources, 
and with supporting technology investments. The frame-
work commits the WBG to increase the share of  energy 
lending devoted to low-carbon projects (including large 
hydro) from 40 percent in 2009 to 50 percent in 2011, by 
increasing financing of energy efficiency and new renewable 
energy by 30 percent per year. It coincides with the mobili-
zation of the $6.2 billion Climate Investment Funds, a new 
source of financing for pilot projects aimed at initiating 
transformational changes. The core of the Climate Invest-
ment Funds is the $5.1 billion Clean Technology Fund, pro-
viding financing for demonstration, large-scale deployment, 
and transfer of low-carbon technologies. These funds were 
seen as transitional devices, pending mobilization of much 
larger-scale financing as part of a new climate agreement.
The 2008 strategic framework emphasizes 
six action areas, four of which concern 
finance and investment. 
However, the 2009 meeting in Copenhagen did not result 
in a comprehensive, binding climate agreement. This leaves 
the WBG to operate in a partial vacuum. 
If there were an agreed, funded operationalization of the 
UNFCCC goal of GHG stabilization that spelled out roles, 
responsibilities, and funding sources, the WBG and its 
clients would be better able to make development choices 
consistent with a low-carbon growth path. Absent such 
an agreement, each development choice is fraught with 
 ambiguity, as in the controversy over coal-fired power gen-
eration (see chapter 4). And it is not clear when, if ever, 
anticipated multibillion dollar per year climate financing 
sources may come into being.
Evaluation Questions
Before the SFDCC, the WBG had limited objectives explic-
itly related to climate change. Where such objectives exist, 
IEG can assess performance against them. Activities with 
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Though it addresses related issues, this 
 evaluation does not assess the WBG’s 
 overall impact on GHG emissions. 
Because of its focus on mitigation activities, the evalua-
tion does not address the WBG’s overall impact on GHG 
emissions. It does, however, examine in detail the impact 
of WBG support for coal-fired power plants, which is em-
blematic of the wider issue.
Evaluation Framework
Barriers block adoption of low-carbon paths
Why don’t people choose lower-carbon paths: wind power 
instead of gas, agroforestry instead of pasture, fluorescent 
light bulbs instead of incandescents? Standard explanations 
cite barriers such as:
Cost-competitiveness: The low-carbon alternative is •	
worthwhile from a social viewpoint that takes climate 
and other benefits into account, but it is not competi-
tive with high-carbon alternatives from the household, 
firm, or country viewpoint.
Credit bottlenecks: Renewable energy and energy effi-•	
ciency have a big up-front capital component, so lenders 
and investors need confidence that they will be  repaid.
Lack of information or attention: People don’t perceive •	
the opportunities, don’t know what to do about them, 
or overestimate the risks of action. 
Unfavorable policies: Laws or regulations (for in-•	
stance, fossil fuel subsidies) favor the higher-carbon 
 alternative.
The WBG seeks to overcome barriers 
through analytic and lending support for 
policy reform, technology transfer, and 
project finance and implementation.
Interventions can overcome barriers to technology 
adoption
The WBG can deploy •	 interventions that address these 
barriers at the site or sectoral level, unlocking carbon 
and economic benefits.
These interventions include analytic or lending support •	
for policy reform; transfer, adaptation, and dissemina-
tion of technical and financial innovations (technology 
transfer); and project finance and implementation.
Adopted technologies yield economic, social, and 
carbon returns
Low-carbon investments can promote development along 
many dimensions, in addition to mitigating GHGs.  Ideally, 
one would want to assess each intervention’s impact on 
relevant goals include GEF projects with goals to  reduce 
GHGs, the Bonn Commitment to scale up renewable 
 energy and energy efficiency, and the carbon funds.
But because development and climate change are so closely 
linked, many development activities look like mitiga-
tion projects, even if they were not so labeled. These offer 
a wealth of lessons for a more climate-conscious future. 
In particular, they may hold lessons for the implementation 
and follow-up of the SFDCC and for the use of hoped-for 
additional climate financing.
The WBG has had limited objectives spe-
cifically related to climate change, but many 
of its activities look like mitigation projects.
The SFDCC addresses national goals of sustainable de-
velopment and global goals of climate mitigation. It puts 
particular emphasis on the pursuit of no-regrets (win-win) 
actions that promote both goals and on the use of con-
cessional funds (additional to development finance) that 
promote GHG reduction in a development context. The 
SFDCC is an evolving, adaptive framework that stresses 
learning. To increase its effectiveness, it is important to 
understand how development options compare along 
different dimensions of impact. To what extent are there 
untapped no-regrets options? If concessional finance is 
limited, which are the most attractive “climate-related eco-
nomic opportunities”?
The principal evaluation questions can be organized under 
three themes. First, to what extent do GHG mitigation goals 
overlap with other development goals?
Second, how and in what areas does the WBG have the larg-
est impact in promoting low-carbon development?
What instruments, in what contexts, have been most •	
effective in promoting the development, adoption, and 
diffusion of clean(er) technologies (looking across en-
ergy, transport, forestry, and carbon finance)?
What, in turn, is the impact of technology adoption on •	
GHG emission and development outcomes?
What internal and external factors affect project out-•	
comes and project mix?
To what extent and with what impact has the Bank’s •	
Carbon Finance Unit (CFU) catalyzed the development 
of the carbon market and its institutions?
A third emerging theme is the role of learning, feedback, and 
incentives:
To what extent, and with what rapidity, is the WBG able •	
to monitor the outcomes of its climate-related activities?
To what extent is feedback used to improve the design, •	
mix, and targeting of interventions?
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For instance, an innovation that substantially and cost-
 eff ectively increased the effi  ciency of coal-fi red power 
generation would reduce plant-level CO2 emissions. But it 
could result in greater global emissions if it triggered substi-
tution of coal for hydropower or gas power. Improvements 
in agricultural productivity could increase the incentives 
for deforestation, rather than lessening pressure on the for-
est. Th ese system-level issues pervade climate mitigation.
Summary
In looking across a diverse variety of sectors, the evaluation 
asks—
What are the barriers to technology adoption and dif-•	
fusion?
How appropriate were the WBG’s diagnosis of the barri-•	
ers and prescription of interventions?
What was the impact of the interventions on technology •	
adoption and diff usion?
What are the economic and carbon returns to adoption?•	
Looking at the chain from intervention to impacts, what •	
is the WBG’s leverage in this area?
How well measured are these impacts?•	
Evaluation Scope
Th is evaluation faces two big challenges. First is the trade-off  
between depth and breadth. Th e range of relevant activities 
is dazzling, from geothermal power to community forestry 
to biogas digesters to school insulation. Any attempt to deal 
with the idiosyncratic features of each of these endeavors 
is doomed to be shallow. So this evaluation chooses to un-
dertake detailed analyses of specifi c subsectors that are im-
portant in themselves but that also hold general lessons for 
omitted subsectors. Th is is done against a comprehensive 
description of the overall portfolio. 
growth, poverty reduction (including access to energy and 
transport), gender equity, and GHG emissions. Unfortu-
nately, monitoring and evaluation data rarely exist for most 
of these dimensions. Th is evaluation tries where possible to 
characterize an investment’s economic rate of return (ERR) 
as a summary measure of development impact. In addition, 
it tries to quantify as cobenefi ts the investments’ carbon 
rate of return: the net reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions per dollar of investment. 
Evaluation fi ndings are illustrated in fi gure 6.1. (Estimates 
are based mostly on appraisal and should be taken with 
caution.) In this fi gure, any project with emissions savings 
and a high ERR (say, higher than 15 percent) is likely to 
be a clear no-regrets investment. Projects with somewhat 
lower ERRs may still be no-regrets from a local viewpoint, 
because they confer large but hard-to-monetize benefi ts 
such as energy security. Some projects, including some for-
est conservation projects, may have low measured ERRs 
but nonetheless contribute to local development objectives 
again in diffi  cult-to-quantify ways. Th ese would be strong 
candidates for global fi nancial support. 
Leverage and catalytic impacts
Th is fi gure points to several avenues by which the WBG can 
increase its impact. Working at “retail” level, it can assemble 
portfolios of projects with high returns. It can also aspire to 
catalytic, widespread impacts (GEF 2008). One way to do 
this is through fi nancial leverage, attracting capital from 
lower to higher return activities, along both dimensions. 
A second way is to increase the returns to equity, for in-
stance, by removing regulatory barriers that discourage in-
vestment. A third avenue is to boost the returns to an entire 
class of activities, such as by supporting technical progress 
that reduces investment costs. 
An important way of boosting returns (public and private) 
is through provision of information, especially through  pilot 
and demonstration projects. Th ese projects can work out 
technical and regulatory problems and hence reduce cost 
and risk for all similar projects that follow. Th is evaluation 
pays close attention to piloting and demonstration projects. 
Th e relevant evaluation questions are: What, exactly, is be-
ing demonstrated? How is it being demonstrated, and to 
whom? How will the results of the demonstration change 
the behavior of the target audience?
Th e provision of information through pilot 
and demonstration projects is an  important 
way to boost returns to relevant WBG 
 activities.
As a result of these catalytic interventions, prices may 
change, with far-reaching eff ects that could vitiate  leverage. ©
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Pragmatically, these low-carbon sectors are renewable 
 energy, energy efficiency, urban transit, and forest projects 
related to afforestation or reduced deforestation. The choice 
of, and emphasis on, these broad sectors (energy  efficiency, 
renewable energy, forestry, and transport) was informed 
by consideration of current overall emissions  levels 
 (figure 1.1), prospects for emission reductions  (figure 1.2), 
emphasis in the Climate Investment Funds, and the scale of 
WBG commitments. 
An important but unavoidable omission was a detailed 
treatment of agriculture. Agriculture is a large source of 
emissions from developing countries. Rice paddies and 
cattle, in particular, emit large quantities of methane. How-
ever, understanding of agricultural abatement options and 
their impacts is far less advanced than for energy, transport, 
and forestry. The evaluative base is small. So although this 
is a crucial area for research and piloting, this evaluation 
limits discussion to an agroforestry project that  illustrates 
the potential for climate cobenefits from agricultural 
 development.
The core of the evaluation is an in-depth discussion of 
specific subsectors that are important areas in their own 
right but that also illustrate the challenges affecting the 
broader sectors to which they belong. For instance, the 
challenge of promoting low-emissions urban transporta-
tion is illustrated through a detailed examination of bus 
rapid transit, which is the single largest line of WBG ac-
tion in urban transit and ties together the issues of modal 
shift, fuel shift, and land use that are central to a city’s 
transport footprint. 
Table 1.1 presents a topical map of the evaluation.
The second challenge is the need to be current. IEG’s evalu-
ations often build heavily on completion reviews of closed 
projects. That is not feasible in this case. On one hand, the 
number of projects has increased dramatically over the past 
decade, technology and financial engineering are changing 
rapidly, and the national and international policy context 
is in flux. On the other hand, IFC projects are typically not 
evaluated until five years after approval, and Bank projects 
are not evaluated until closure, often eight years or more 
after approval. Consequently, of the renewable energy and 
energy efficiency projects initiated since 1990, IEG has eval-
uated only about 100; and though more than 450  projects 
were initiated between 2003 and 2008, IEG has evaluated 
only 3 of them. 
These considerations lead to the following definitions of 
scope. 
Temporal scope
For background, the evaluation relies on a detailed and 
comprehensive review of the low-carbon energy and urban 
transportation portfolios from 2003 to 2008 and a compre-
hensive but less-detailed review of the forest portfolio for 
2002–08. The post-2008 increase in climate-related activi-
ties could not be covered in detail, but is briefly described 
in appendix J. For subsectoral analyses, however (such as 
solar photovoltaics or hydropower), the evaluation ranges 
back as far as 1990 to take advantage of information from 
closed and evaluated projects. It may also report on current 
activities.
This evaluation looks at attempts to 
 overcome the barriers that inhibit adoption 
and diffusion of favorable technologies and 
practices.
Topical scope
The evaluation is concerned with evidence of attempts to 
surmount the barriers that inhibit the adoption and dif-
fusion of low-carbon technologies and practices. Hence 
it excludes most attention to the WBG’s “high-carbon” 
activities, such as oil exploration, road construction, and 
thermal power. Indeed, as pointed out in the Phase I evalu-
ation (IEG 2009), anything the WBG does to promote 
 economic growth will tend to put upward pressure on GHG 
 emissions. 
Instead, the evaluation focuses on projects that potentially 
promote development and reduce GHG emissions, regard-
less of whether they had a GHG goal. Where such a goal 
exists, it is appropriate to evaluate the WBG’s success in 
achieving it. Even where there was no explicit goal, it is 
useful to try to understand the determinants of success or 
failure.
The choice of subsectors was informed by considerations of 
evaluability (track record and data), current overall emis-
sion levels (figure 1.1), potential for generalizable lessons, 
and scale of 2003–08 WBG commitments.
Within renewable energy there are in-depth discussions 
of hydropower and solar home photovoltaic systems, the 
largest and most longstanding areas of on-grid and off-
grid investment, respectively. There is also a discussion 
of the economics of on-grid renewable power that ap-
plies to all technologies. A significant omission is biomass 
technology, itself a very heterogeneous category. Figure 
1.3 compares renewable energy coverage to the 2003–08 
portfolio.
Within energy efficiency there is extensive discussion of 
investments via financial intermediaries and of projects 
that reduce transmission and distribution losses. To-
gether these comprise about half the 2003–08 portfolio 
 (figure 1.4). Also discussed at length are projects involving 
compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs), a tiny part of the 
portfolio, but, it is argued, one worthy of scaling up. The 
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tAbLe 1.1 Map of the evaluation
sector  Subsector 
specific technologies and practices
On-grid renewable energy Hydropower
Wind
Landfill gas
Geothermal
Biomass, biogas
Off-grid renewable energy solar photovoltaic
Off-grid hydropower
Biomass
energy efficiency energy efficiency via financial intermediaries
Direct investment in industrial energy efficiency
efficient lighting
transmission and distribution loss reduction
increased efficiency in coal-fired power generation
District heating (discussed in Phase I)
Demand side management (discussed in Phase I)
Building and appliance codes (discussed in Phase I)
Efficient cookstoves
transport bus rapid transit
Demand management
Commuter rail
Intercity rail
Aircraft and truck fuel efficiency
Land use and land use change Protected areas
Payments for environmental services
Community forestry
Plantation forestry
Agricultural carbon
technology transfer Advanced technologies
intellectual property rights
carbon finance carbon finance
thermal power coal power
Natural gas (discussed in Phase I)
Source: IEG.
Note: Areas discussed are in bold type; areas not discussed are in regular type. For Phase I, see IEG 2009.
discussions of the Afsin-Elbistan coal power rehabilitation 
and of IFC’s direct energy efficiency investments cover 
most of the supply-side and much of the end-user portfo-
lio for this period. The remaining topics, including district 
heating, were covered at length in Phase I and are briefly 
synopsized in this volume.
Much of the WBG’s transportation investments go to 
 intercity and rural road construction, an emissions-
 increasing activity (though with important growth and 
poverty- reducing benefits), and are not considered here. 
Attention focuses instead on urban transit, where there is 
potential scope for shifting away from carbon-intensive 
auto traffic. Here, bus rapid transit and its variants consti-
tute half of the overall portfolio (see figure 1.5) and 80 per-
cent of the  operations (by number) where GHG reduction 
is an explicit goal.
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finance to retard deforestation): establishment of protected 
and indigenous areas; pilots of payment for environmen-
tal services projects, including BioCarbon Fund projects; 
and attempts to foster sustainable agriculture at the forest 
frontier. Omitted are large plantation projects, which can 
be carbon sequestering, and community forest projects. 
The latter, though concerned with impoverished popula-
tions and important natural resources, have in general had 
inadequate monitoring components and hence are difficult 
to evaluate. 
The evaluation also looks at WBG experi-
ence in coal power, technology transfer, and 
carbon finance.
In addition to sectoral discussions, the evaluation addresses 
three areas of intense current interest. Two are cross  cutting: 
the experience of the WBG in technology transfer and the 
experience of the WBG’s carbon funds, both as institutional 
innovations and as financial instruments. The third is an 
examination of the WBG’s controversial role in support-
ing coal-fired power plants. This will illuminate some of 
the general issues regarding the WBG’s role in other high-
carbon sectors such as cement and steel production.
WbG investments in urban 
transport 2003–08: evaluation 
coverage (by $ commitments)
Urban roads
and traffic
management Traditional
public
transport
Urban rail,
light and heavyBus lanes/BRTs
Other
Source: IEG.
Note: Black = detailed analysis with portfolio review; grey = no 
 explicit coverage. BRT = bus rapid transit; WBG = World Bank Group.
FiGure 1.5
The coverage of forestry is the most selective of the sectors. 
The focus is on three types of activities with strong implica-
tions for REDD (an initiative that seeks to harness carbon 
WbG investments in Low-carbon 
energy efficiency 2003–08: 
evaluation coverage (by $ 
commitments)
Energy
efficiency
investments via
financial
intermediaries
T&D loss
reduction
CFLSupply-side
energy
efficiency
End user
energy
efficiency
Combined heat
and power—
district heating
Source: IEG.
Note: Black = detailed analysis with portfolio review; grey = partial 
coverage/discussion of key issues. Note that Phase I of this series 
discussed district heating and end user energy efficiency in detail. 
CFL = compact fluorescent light bulb; T&D = transmission and 
distribution.
FiGure 1.4
WbG investments in renewable 
energy 2003–08: evaluation 
coverage (by $ commitments)
Biomass
Landfill gas
Geothermal
Wind
Small
hydropower
Large
hydropower
Solar CSP
Off-grid solar
Source: IEG.
Note: Black = detailed analysis with portfolio review.; grey =  partial 
coverage/discussion of key issues; pattern = no explicit coverage. 
CSP = concentrated solar power; WBG = World Bank Group.
FiGure 1.3
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eValuaTION HIGHlIGHTS
WBG fi nancing of low-carbon energy has • 
increased considerably.
About two-thirds of closed renewable energy • 
and energy effi  ciency projects had outcomes 
that were moderately satisfactory or better.
Policy advice and piloting have been helpful in • 
catalyzing diff usion of wind power.
Carbon fi nance has little impact on the bank-• 
ability of wind power and hydropower, but 
signifi cant impact for landfi ll gas projects.
Long loan tenors (time to repay) are an impor-• 
tant stimulus to project bankability.
Guarantees and political risk insurance may • 
play an increasingly important role for renew-
able energy.
Quality-contingent producer subsidies plus • 
microfi nance have been successful in promot-
ing the diff usion of solar home photovoltaic 
systems.
Capacity utilization is a key determinant of • 
economic and carbon impacts.
Better monitoring of costs and impacts is • 
needed to guide future investments.
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Renewable Energy
This evaluation devotes special attention to energy because it is by far the largest 
part of the mitigation-relevant WBG portfolio, is the focus of most existing mitigation-
oriented projects and funds, and will play the dominant role in long-term mitigation 
efforts. As an introduction to both chapters on energy, this section begins by reviewing 
the outcomes of evaluated renewable energy and energy efficiency projects and then 
comprehensively describes the recent pattern of low-carbon energy investments. 
The chapter goes on to discuss the impact of interventions to overcome barriers 
to  on-grid renewable energy investment. It then discusses the experience with 
 hydropower and with solar photovoltaics, the on-grid and off-grid renewable energy 
technologies, respectively, with the longest evaluable record at the WBG.
Low-Carbon Energy Projects and Their 
Performance
As a backdrop it is useful to consider the International En-
ergy Agency’s projections of how future power needs will 
be met over the coming two decades, in two scenarios: 
reference and ambitious mitigation (450 parts per mil-
lion; table 2.1). While some energy efficiency is included 
in the reference scenario, additional efficiency is the main 
way to satisfy demand while reducing emissions. In both 
scenarios, increases in hydropower far outpace growth in 
other types of renewable energy outside the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Table 2.1 International energy agency Projections of Power Production, 2007–30
Increase in electricity generation 2007–30: baseline versus 450 ppm CO2 scenarios (terawatt hours per year)
 2007–30 increase under baseline 2007–30 increase under 450 ppm
Power source OeCD+ Rest of world OeCD+ Rest of world
Hydro  164  1,437    384  2,196
Wind  918   443  1,425  1,180
Solar  215   182    376   554
Other renewable energy  330   414    536   957
Fossil and nuclear power  790 9,644  –1,175  3,751
Total electricity generation 2,417 12,120  1,546  8,638
Incremental energy efficiency      871  3,482
Source: OECD/IEA 2009. 
Note: Energy efficiency includes price-induced demand reduction. OECD+ = Organisation for Economic 
 Co-operation and Development + non-OECD European Union members; ppm = parts per million.
Performance of closed World Bank projects
Investments in low-carbon energy have increased consider-
ably over the past five years, so most are still ongoing and 
unevaluated.1 Of World Bank renewable energy and energy 
efficiency  projects2  initiated between 1990 and 2007, 91 had 
closed and been evaluated by 2009. Table 2.2 shows the out-
come of these projects as rated by IEG.
Two-thirds of evaluated renewable  energy 
and energy efficiency projects since 
1990 had outcome ratings of moderately 
 satisfactory or better.
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Two-thirds of these projects were rated moderately sat-
isfactory or better, versus 72 percent of all energy proj-
ects. Energy efficiency projects fared slightly better than 
 renewable energy projects. Just over half of such projects 
in  low-income countries3 were marginally satisfactory or 
better, compared to 70 percent in higher-income countries. 
China had 13 projects, the largest number of any country, 
and all were rated marginally satisfactory or better. About 
one-third of this portfolio was in energy efficiency projects 
in transition countries, with a 64 percent success rate. 
Performance of evaluated IFC investment projects
During the period of fiscal 1990–2008, IFC made commit-
ments to 102 investment projects in support of renewable 
energy or energy efficiency, of which 81 were committed 
during fiscal 2005–08. Because IFC projects are evalu-
ated on a sample basis after five years of operation, only 
eight projects have been evaluated, all committed between 
fiscal 1992 and 1999. Five received satisfactory ratings. 
 Twenty-six ongoing projects, committed during fiscal 
1992–2008, have internal monitoring data available.4 Of 
these ongoing  projects, 22 were reported as progressing 
successfully.
The 2003–08 portfolio of WBG investment projects
To assess the portfolio of recently initiated (2003–08) proj-
ects, IEG reviewed and validated a database of low- carbon 
project components assembled by the Bank’s energy 
 anchor (appendix G). In some cases, IEG revised the clas-
sification or funding amount of a component designated 
as “low carbon.” 
The WBG has three arms with different products. Two of 
those arms (the World Bank and IFC) can use both tradi-
tional finance and new, environmentally oriented finance: 
GEF grants and carbon payments. 
Table 2.3 breaks down commitments by technology and by 
whether financed traditionally or together with environ-
mental finance. Off-grid investments are about 11 percent 
of this $8 billion low-carbon portfolio and roughly one-fifth 
of all rural energy access commitments. Grid-connected 
 renewable energy accounts for $3.3 billion, compared with 
$2.9 billion for energy efficiency. Projects that use financial 
or other intermediaries account for about 20 percent of this 
portfolio.
Projects with exclusively traditional financing (Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD], 
International Development Association [IDA], and IFC)—
that is, without even small amounts of GEF or carbon 
cofinancing—comprise 70 percent of the 2003–08 port-
folio and more than three-quarters of the grid-connected 
renewable energy portion. Nontraditional finance is most 
important in financial intermediation for energy efficiency, 
reflecting a perception that risk aversion is deterring profit-
able efficiency loans.
evaluated World bank Renewable energy and energy efficiency Projects by Rating, Projects 
Initiated 1990–2007
Rating energy efficiency New renewable energy large hydro (>10 MW)
Highly satisfactory  2  1  2
Satisfactory 21 14  3
Moderately satisfactory 10  4  2
Marginally satisfactory  0  1  1
Marginally unsatisfactory  1  0  0
Moderately unsatisfactory  7  2  3
Unsatisfactory  5  8  2
Highly unsatisfactory  1  1  0
Total number 47 31 13
Percent moderately satisfactory or better 70 65 62
Source: IEG based on ICR reviews.
Note: MW = megawatts.
Table 2.2
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Table 2.3 WbG low-Carbon energy Commitments ($ millions) by Product line and Investment Category, 
2003–08 
Type of project Traditional 
financing (IbRD, 
IDa, IFC, MIGa)
blended financing 
(traditional + GeF 
or carbon finance)
Stand- alone 
GeF and 
carbon finance
Total
Off-grid and mini-grid renewables
Direct investments, including cookstoves and household biomass/
biogas
  228   224  64  515
Indirect, with funds that support subprojects   101   124  10  235
On-grid renewable energy
Direct investments in renewable energy (may include some ancillary 
transmission and distribution loss reduction)
2,277   282 496 3,055
Indirect, with financial intermediaries   202     0  11  213
energy efficiency
Transmission and distribution loss reduction   529   104   0  633
End user energy efficiency   338    21  63  422
Combined heat and power and/or district heating   344    77  56  477
Supply-side energy efficiency   460     2  66  528
Energy efficiency via financial intermediaries   200   514  98  812
Other
Both renewable energy and energy efficiency, or unspecified, via 
financial intermediaries 
  227    85  23  335
Development program lending, other investment programs, and 
technical assistance
  646    14  93  753
Total  5,553 1,446 980 7,978
Source: IEG calculations, low-carbon component database. 
Note: Excludes freestanding WBG analytic and advisory activities, IFC advisory services, and special financing. Note that these data exclude 
 transmission and distribution projects that may reduce technical losses but were not classified by the WBG as low-carbon activities.  
IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development Association; IFC = International Finance 
Corporation; GEF = Global Environment Facility; MIGA = Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
Figure 2.1 shows the location of these projects. Africa’s 
share is large relative to its population; its 30 percent share 
of grid-connected renewable energy reflects investments in 
large hydropower. The Europe and Central Asia Region has 
a large relative and absolute investment in energy efficiency, 
reflecting a legacy of inefficient equipment and underpriced 
energy in the transition countries. In contrast,  energy 
 efficiency investments in South Asia are small  relative to 
investments in hydropower and coal; this is striking in view 
of large transmission and distribution losses.  (Efficiency 
and transmission investments increased in fiscal 2009, 
however.) The Middle East and North African portfolio for 
this period is very small; the amount counted as renewable 
energy includes hybrid solar thermal plants that are mostly 
gas fired. 
Seventy percent of the low-carbon energy 
portfolio was financed purely through 
 traditional instruments.
location of 2003–08 low-Carbon 
Portfolio, by Type
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
AFR
EAP
ECA
LCR
MENA
Re
gi
on
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breakdown of 2003–08 low-Carbon Portfolio by Country Income Group and Type
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FIGuRe 2.2
The WBG funds committed to energy 
 efficiency and new renewable energy greatly 
exceed the amounts agreed under the Bonn 
 Commitment.
Figure 2.2 show the breakdown of this portfolio by coun-
try income group. About 60 percent goes to low- and 
lower-middle-income countries; China, the single largest 
 recipient, accounts for 16 percent. Energy efficiency is more 
prominent in the wealthier countries.
Meeting the Bonn commitment
At the Bonn Conference on Renewable Energy, the WBG 
promised that with the aim of ensuring an institutional 
focus on the transition toward cleaner energy sources, 
it would commit to a target of at least 20 percent average 
growth annually—in both energy efficiency and new re-
newable energy commitments—over the next five years 
(fiscal 2005–09).
IEG’s reckoning of funds committed to energy efficiency 
and new renewable energy exceeds that of the WBG. The 
Bonn Commitment was surpassed, with commitments 
growing from a base of $209 million to $2,061 million in 
2008 (IEG calculation) and $3,128 in 2009 (management 
calculation).5 Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the growth in total 
low-carbon commitments, indicating a sizeable boom in 
grid-connected renewable energy, much of it large hydro-
power not counted under the Bonn Commitment. 
Energy efficiency grew with large spurts in 2006 and 2008, 
with financial intermediaries assuming more prominence 
in the latter period. The growth was mostly in projects that 
were purely traditionally financed, with a rapid expansion 
of IFC and IBRD funds, and it occurred disproportionately 
in the lower-middle-income countries. 
Growth in low-Carbon Portfolio by 
Project Type
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FIGuRe 2.3
Based on data reported by the Investment Framework for 
Clean Energy and Development (management),  low- carbon 
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breakdown of Non-low-Carbon 
WbG energy Investments
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FIGuRe 2.5
Growth in low-Carbon Portfolio by 
Country Income Class
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FIGuRe 2.4
WbG-Supported Grid-Connected 
Generation Capacity by Technology, 
2003–08
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FIGuRe 2.6
Coal accounted for one-third of new gener-
ating capacity supported in IBRD countries.
The WBG’s on-grid renewable energy portfolio
Hydropower is the renewable energy technology with the 
longest and largest record within the WBG and the one 
with the greatest predicted potential scale-up over coming 
decades. However, there has been a rapid increase in “new 
renewable energy”: wind, geothermal, biomass/ biogas/land-
fill gas, and solar (table 2.4) Although this chapter  devotes 
special attention to hydropower, a discussion of barriers and 
interventions in this chapter also draws on recent experi-
ence with wind projects, and lessons from these  barriers 
and interventions apply to other forms of renewable energy. 
Grid-connected solar power is discussed in chapter 6.
and blended low-carbon and access projects  account for 
37 percent of all energy portfolio financing in 2003–09. 
Figure 2.5 shows the growth of the remainder.
Hydropower is by far the largest subcompo-
nent of the recent renewable energy  portfolio.
Figure 2.6 shows how total new energy generation capac-
ity was divided between fossil fuels and renewable sources. 
Large hydropower dominated power investments in IDA 
countries. In IBRD and blend countries, coal accounted for 
a third of new capacity, gas 28 percent, and large hydro-
power 18 percent. 
The WBG’s off-grid renewable energy portfolio 
In remote areas with low population densities, it can be 
cheaper to provide decentralized renewable power through 
home systems or mini-grids than to extend the main elec-
tric grid.6 This has raised hopes of fighting both climate 
change and poverty with a single instrument, or using cli-
mate finance to promote rural access. 
Those hopes are manifest in the large investments in  solar 
home photovoltaic systems (SHS), the off-grid technol-
ogy with which the WBG has the longest record and the 
focus of the discussion of off-grid renewable energy in this 
chapter. However, in the recent portfolio, SHS projects have 
been overtaken by small hydro and biomass (see table 2.5). 
Biomass projects include efficient cookstove projects as well 
as power projects.
Among off-grid renewable energy technol-
ogies, solar home photovoltaic systems have 
the longest record at the WBG
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Table 2.4 Commitments to Grid-Connected Renewable energy by Technology and Funding 2003–08 
($ millions)
Technology IbRD IDa IFC MIGa GeF Carbon Finance, World bank & IFC Total
Wind 335.7  32.9  38.5   71.2  42.8  521.1
Hydropower 849.4 825.8 358.7 225.5   0.4 182.3 2,442.2
Geothermal 202.0  31.5  57.3  88.3   8.5  18.6  406.3
biomass  20.0  28.0  32.7   40.2 108.1  229.1
Solar    142.4   142.4
Source: IEG. 
Note: Unit of analysis is the project component. Excludes freestanding WBG analytic and advisory activities, IFC advisory services, and special 
 financing. Components that support multiple technologies are included in each relevant row, so column totals should not be used. GEF = 
Global Environment Facility; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development Association; 
IFC = International Finance Corporation; MIGA = Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
Table 2.5 Off-Grid Investment Projects ($ millions), 2003–08
 IbRD IDa IFC MIGa GeF Carbon finance World bank & IFC Total
Wind  4.1  23.9  35.0  18.4  0.0  81.4
Hydropower, all 84.0 222.8   0.0  64.0  6.8 377.6
Biomass, all types  0.0  71.5 140.4 1.8 30.8 35.0 279.5
Solar 50.5 171.9  10.0  73.2  7.1 312.7
Unknown off-grid  7.1  67.3   0.0  25.3  0.0  99.6
Source: IEG.
Note: Unit of analysis is the project component. Excludes freestanding WBG analytic and advisory activities, IFC advisory services, and special 
financing. Individual components may appear in multiple rows if they support more than one technology, so column totals should not be used. 
GEF = Global Environment Facility; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development Associa-
tion; IFC = International Finance Corporation; MIGA = Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
Analytic, advisory, and technical assistance projects
The WBG also conducts analytic, advisory, and techni-
cal assistance outside of investment projects. Within the 
World Bank, many of these activities have been funded by 
two  donor-supported programs resident in the Bank: the 
 Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) 
and the Asia Sustainable and Alternative Energy Program 
(ASTAE). 
Many of the WBG analytic, advisory, and 
technical assistance activities have been 
funded by separate donor-funded programs 
within the Bank.
ASTAE is focused on energy efficiency, scaling up use 
of renewable energy, and increasing access to energy; it 
 specifically aims for high leverage. In contrast to other 
analytic and advisory assistance and investment units, 
ASTAE tracks specific indicators on its projects and 
sets impact-based (rather than expenditure-based) tar-
gets, though tracking and attribution is difficult. With 
$6.2 million of disbursements for fiscal 2007–09, ASTAE 
clamied support for new renewable energy capacity (with 
 involvement in 1.03 GW of capacity from direct projects 
and 12.4 GW from framework, regulation, and investment 
mechanisms),  energy efficiency savings (1.6 terawatt-hours 
 direct, 26.2 terawatt-hours indirect 2007–09), household 
access (611,000 new households direct, 200,000 indirect), 
and avoided CO2 emissions (99 million tons direct, 1,003 
million tons  indirect).
IFC advisory services cover a diverse range 
of activities related to renewable energy and 
energy efficiency.
IFC’s advisory services cover a diverse range of activity, 
including some investments. In the 2005–08 renewable 
 energy/energy efficiency portfolio of $40 million, $25 million 
was in GEF-supported projects with explicit climate goals. 
The largest, comprising about one-third of total  value, was 
linked to an IFC investment project; 19 of the  remaining 20 
were not. Some projects included broad-based training and 
capacity building. The non-GEF projects were mostly small 
(median size of $130,000) and involved technical assistance 
to a specific firm; almost half were linked to an existing or 
prospective investment.
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Overcoming Barriers to On-Grid 
Renewable Energy
Renewable energy has strong local advantages in addition 
to its global benefits. The electricity it provides can drive 
development and satisfy consumer aspirations. A switch 
from fossil fuels to renewable power abates acid rain and 
noxious air pollution. Renewable power also enhances do-
mestic energy security and buffers a country’s economy 
against the gyrations of international prices for oil, coal, 
and gas.
On-grid renewable energy faces barriers to investment:
Renewable power is usually more expensive to produce •	
than coal or diesel power, so it can compete only if pro-
ducers are rewarded for its local or global benefits. 
More of the cost is up-front capital than is the case •	
with fossil-fueled power. So developers need affordable 
loans, and bankers need reassurance that a stream of 
repayment will continue for many years.
Power sector laws, regulations, and operations may be •	
poorly adapted to the peculiarities of renewable energy 
and often discriminate against small producers.
In many countries, technical capacity for building, •	
maintaining, and integrating renewable energy may be 
weak.
Renewable energy, especially large hydropower, can •	
present environmental and social risks.
Many kinds of renewable energy are intermittent and •	
thus less convenient than plants that produce assured 
baseload or peak power. 
Among the barriers to on-grid renewable 
energy are costs relative to coal, oil, or gas; 
up-front capital needs; lack of adequate 
regulations and technical capacity; and 
environmental and social risks.
This analysis of grid renewable energy uses a spreadsheet-
based financial model to assess how interventions available 
to the WBG can boost project bankability, overcoming these 
barriers. The model, inspired by de Jager and  Rathmann 
(2008), is based on detailed financial appraisals of 20 hy-
dropower, wind, gas, and coal projects financed by IFC and 
the Bank’s Carbon Finance Unit. The projects, chosen for 
the depth of their documentation, are not a random sample 
but do illustrate a range of project costs, performance, and 
economic and fiscal environments. Although the financial 
model can involve baroque complexities of loans and taxes, 
a simple approximation (box 2.1) provides powerful in-
sights. (Box 2.5 illustrates how some of these interventions 
were applied in Sri Lanka.)
Support more profitable technologies
Some technologies are inherently more profitable than 
others and are thus easier to finance and more competi-
tive with fossil fuels. The key determinants of returns, as 
shown in box 2.1, are construction cost and capacity uti-
lization. Both can vary substantially. For instance, cost for 
small hydropower plants has varied from $1,400 to $3,000 
per KW. Overall, hydropower economics are generally 
much more favorable than for wind power. IFC experi-
ence (on a small sample) shows that large hydropower 
plants have an appraised average financial rate of return 
of 17 percent, small plants have a 13 percent rate of re-
turn, and wind a 9 percent rate. IEG analysis of project 
finance confirms this relationship, holding constant varia-
tion in taxes and power tariffs, and shows that returns on 
equity increase sharply as financial rates of return grow 
(figure A.1 in appendix A). 
The key determinants of returns for grid-
connected renewable energy are unit cost of 
capacity, capacity utilization rate, and tariff.
Boost capacity utilization
The economic and carbon returns of a renewable energy 
plant are directly proportional to capacity utilization (the 
ratio of actual to potential power production). So bankabil-
ity can be strongly improved by favorable siting of plants 
(for example, where winds or river flows are more reliable) 
and by ensuring better maintenance and operations. 
The economic and carbon returns of a 
renewable energy plant can be boosted 
significantly by improvements in capacity 
utilization.
Capacity utilization varies greatly and is not strongly corre-
lated with the size of the facility (see figure A.2).  Figure 2.7 
shows the distribution of imputed7 capacity utilization 
among hydropower plants registered with the Clean 
 Development Mechanism (CDM), most of which are run-
of-river. The capacity factor among all plants varied from 
less than 10 percent to more than 90 percent. No WBG 
carbon-funded plant achieved greater than 60 percent.
In China, CDM-registered wind plants have an average 
capacity factor of just 23 percent (for comparison, the US 
average is 34 percent). The low utilization rate has been at-
tributed to poor siting, inadequate grid integration, and 
low-quality turbines (Lewis 2010).
Detailed resource maps, such as wind atlases, could in prin-
ciple help governments and private developers ensure that re-
newable energy facilities are well utilized, taking into  account 
environmental constraints and availability of transmission 
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A stylized model provides useful insight into what financial and policy levers can boost the economic attractive-
ness of a renewable energy project. The economics depend on four factors: unit cost, capacity utilization, tariff, and 
carbon credit rate.
A developer needs to finance a power plant with a unit cost of $1,000–$4,000 per kW. The plant will produce a flow 
of electricity. But most renewable energy plants do not operate at full capacity. Wind plants, for instance, may only 
produce 25–40 percent of their theoretical full output. This ratio is the capacity utilization. The electricity is sold 
at a net tariff of, say, 5–15 cents per kWh after transmission costs. This renewably generated electricity may also 
 displace fossil-generated electricity, generating a carbon credit rate of, say, 0.2–1.2 cents per kWh, depending on 
the price of carbon and the kind of fuel displaced. Then (with some simplifying assumptions, such as  negligible 
costs of operations and maintenance, no peak-period tariffs, and no payments for capacity or penalties for 
 intermittency) the pretax financial rate of return to the project is
Financial rate of return = (Tariff + Carbon Credit Rate)
8,760 * Capacity Utilization
Unit Cost
.
(To get the ERR, use economic rather than market values for electricity and carbon, and  account for local environ-
mental benefits.)
This shows that if electricity sells for $.06 per kWh, then the following actions would have equivalent impacts on 
the rate of return:
Adding carbon credits at $10 per ton CO•	 2 (assuming displacement of .6 kilograms per kWh)
Adding a renewable energy premium of $0.006 to the tariff•	
Boosting capacity utilization from 30 to 33 percent through better siting, better design, or improved maintenance•	
Reducing construction costs from $1,100 to $1,000 per KW.•	
The developer cares about the return on equity, not the overall return, and therefore leverages its equity by 
 borrowing, ideally, 60–80 percent of the capital cost. This works as long as the returns are greater than the interest 
rate on the loan. The prospective returns have to be high enough to outweigh the risks. These include the risk that 
the buyer will renege on the promised tariff, which must be sustained over many years to pay back the large initial 
capital investment. 
Meanwhile, the lender wants to make sure that the investment is sufficiently lucrative that the developer can 
readily afford the loan repayments. So lenders insist that the project’s revenue be sufficient to easily cover the 
loan repayments—that is, that the debt service coverage ratio be significantly greater than one. This ratio can be 
 enhanced through longer loan lengths and lower interest rates.
Source: IEG.
Note: 8,760 is the approximate number of hours in a year.
bOx 2.1 The economics of Grid-Connected Renewable energy
lines. The WBG has funded a number of mapping exercises 
(appendix B). Most of these modestly funded exercises are 
still under way, and impact evaluation is not possible.
The WBG has financed development of a 
number of renewable energy resource maps 
that might assist in siting decisions and 
thus improve capacity utilization.
The WBG could also help, through technical assistance, to 
ensure that projects’ design plans for capacity utilization 
are realistic. Hydropower, wind, and landfill gas plants have 
undershot their planned production levels; in many cases 
this is because of inadequate assessment of resources at the 
site. Box 2.2 explains why this has happened for landfill gas 
projects and what is being done in response. 
Operations and maintenance can affect capacity utilization. 
Unavailability of spare parts can put turbines out of commis-
sion, for instance. Technical assistance for maintenance and 
manufacturing could reduce downtime. As a crude measure 
of WBG support in this area, IEG’s review of the 2003–08 
portfolio found that about one-third of minihydro and one-
quarter of wind investment components included training 
and capacity building for installation or  maintenance.
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Distribution of Capacity Factors of 
Hydropower CDM Projects
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FIGuRe 2.7
“Sanitary” landfills, as the name suggests, are a big improvement over open dumps and are an essential part of 
modern urban development. But when waste rots anaerobically in these landfills, it produces methane, a GHG 
25 times more potent than the CO2 produced in open dumps. 
With the advent of the CDM, landfill gas projects can claim credit for destroying methane at 25 times the rate, per 
ton, of CO2 reduction. This could make them bankable, even in the absence of electricity sales.
Consequently, 136 landfill gas projects were registered under the CDM between 2001 and 2009, and the World 
Bank’s CFU has purchase agreements with 21. Like all carbon projects, landfill gas projects must report and verify 
their production annually. This mandatory monitoring soon revealed that many of these projects were grossly 
underperforming relative to design expectations, producing on average only about half the planned credits. 
In 2007, the World Bank’s carbon fund sponsored an analysis of the reasons for underperformance. This and other 
studies showed that project appraisers had estimated the landfill’s methane yield based on models of US landfills. 
But developing country garbage is different from US garbage—it is richer in food waste and moisture content, 
generates less methane per ton, and decays faster. Investigation showed specific ways in which poor operation 
and construction of the landfill can also depress yields. Feedback on these factors has improved the appraisal and 
design of subsequent landfill projects, for instance, leading to more conservative estimates of production.
Sources: IEG; SCS Engineers 2007. 
bOx 2.2 Monitoring and evaluation Provides Rapid Feedback on the Performance of landfill Gas Projects
Landfill gas projects have produced much 
less gas than expected, but good monitoring 
and rapid feedback have prompted more 
realistic appraisal.
Provide carbon finance 
From an economic viewpoint, carbon payments reward 
renewable energy sources for reduced emissions. In the 
idealized world of the CDM, such a payment is supposed 
to nudge an investment project over the threshold of 
financial viability. In reality, a carbon payment, like a 
 feed-in tariff, will be one of many factors that elicits a 
 response from  investors. 
CDM projects must explain the barriers faced by the project 
and how carbon finance will help overcome them. A review 
of Bank-financed hydropower plants found that many proj-
ects (in China, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Nigeria, and 
Ukraine) claim barriers related to insecure or short-term 
power purchase agreements. If these are in fact the barriers, 
then the use of carbon finance is a project-specific bandage 
for a sectorwide problem. A higher leverage intervention 
would be to work at the policy level to correct the problem, 
potentially catalyzing the entry of many plants.
Carbon finance has had modest impacts 
on investor returns for CO2-reducing 
 renewable energy projects.
Figure 2.8 shows the impact of carbon finance in a sample 
of WBG projects, based on financial data presented for 
 appraisal. The figure shows the return on equity (ROE) com-
puted with and without the contracted carbon payments. 
The degree to which carbon may have affected investors’ in-
centives clearly differs among the cases. A strong nudge to-
ward investment is plausible in the case of one project with 
a base ROE of about 13 percent, which received a boost of 
2.5 percentage points from carbon. It is less plausible for 
projects that started with a return of 20 percent or above 
and received only 0.5 percent additional from carbon. 
The relatively modest impacts on ROE reflect the basic eco-
nomics of carbon. Renewable energy projects that  substitute 
for fossil fuels reduce CO2 emissions by 0.8 kilograms/kWh, 
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FIGuRe 2.8on average (Iyadomi 2010). (Reductions are smaller in hydro-
power-dominated countries such as Brazil.) Thus, carbon pay-
ments at $10 per ton (World Bank 2009)8 would add roughly 
0.8 cents/kWh to the investor’s revenue—a relatively small in-
crement in many competitively priced power markets. These 
carbon flows may offer greater security and less exchange rate 
risk than domestic payments from an uncreditworthy elec-
tricity off-taker, and thus serve a kind of guarantee function 
in some cases. However, as the formulas in box 2.1 show, the 
impact of carbon on ROE and ERR is proportional to the ca-
pacity utilization factor. Thus, ironically, carbon payments are 
less helpful to economically mediocre projects than to good 
ones. Of course, the impact would be much stronger if CO2 
were priced at the $30–$60 levels that many analysts suggest 
is necessary for effective global climate change mitigation.
Carbon sales have not catalyzed wind and 
hydropower investments.
Carbon market participants acknowledge that carbon sales 
have generally not been catalytic in triggering wind and 
hydropower investments. But carbon can make a big dif-
ference for projects that capture methane emissions and 
destroy them or use them for energy, as noted earlier. 
Provide better loan terms
Lower interest rates and longer repayment periods make 
projects more bankable, though they do not affect the ERR. 
The financial model suggests that a change from a 5-year to 
a 10-year tenor could boost the debt service coverage ratio 
from 1 to 1.4. This is a very significant difference, which 
might well be sufficient to make a project bankable.
Longer repayment periods make projects 
much more bankable.
Although IFC does not compete with commercial lenders 
on interest rates, it can and does offer longer tenors, of-
ten around 10 years as opposed to 5 for commercial loans 
(with much variation). In syndicated loans, IFC terms are 
usually matched by other lenders. The IBRD can offer both 
lower interest rates and longer tenors than commercial 
lenders.
IBRD’s Turkey Renewable Energy Project (2004) is an ex-
ample of the catalytic effect of longer loan repayment peri-
ods. This project loaned about $200 million to a state bank 
and a private bank. The funds were on-lent to 22 renewable 
energy investments (mostly hydropower, with wind and 
geothermal power plants as well) with total value of $774 
million and a capacity of 605 MW; claimed lifetime CO2 
reductions are about 1 million tons.9 One success factor was 
that the Turkish banks offered loans of 10 years’ duration or 
more, compared to prior norms of 4 years. This precedent 
also convinced other banks to offer lengthier repayment 
periods for renewable energy projects.
Political risk insurance could be important 
in catalyzing renewable energy investment.
Mitigate risks
Renewable energy investments can be risky. The investor 
puts a large sum into an expensive, immovable installa-
tion and must trust a utility to keep paying an agreed tariff 
for many years. This risk is more acute than for fossil fuel 
plants, because renewable energy plants cost more per MW. 
In many countries, the off-taker is in poor financial health 
or subject to external pressures. 
The use of feed-in tariffs (a producer subsidy) poses an-
other risk. Governments may promise 10 or 15 years of 
these premium payments for renewable power to make 
the initial investment worthwhile for investors. But if a fi-
nancial crisis were to hit, governments might be tempted 
to eliminate these subsidies, because the marginal costs of 
continued operation are low. Governments might also be 
tempted to renege on feed-in tariffs if prices of coal, oil, or 
gas declined. 
These considerations suggest that guarantees and political 
risk insurance could be important in catalyzing renew-
able energy investment. In principle, MIGA can provide 
political risk insurance at lower cost than private agencies, 
because the WBG’s special relationship with client govern-
ments lowers its risk. Both the World Bank and MIGA have 
in fact provided such insurance. Box 2.3 describes a MIGA 
example. Mostert, Johnson, and MacLean (2010) explain 
how WBG partial credit guarantees facilitated longer loan 
terms for a Philippine geothermal and a Chinese hydro-
power plant, making them both bankable.
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Over 2003–08, guarantees for grid-connected renew-
able energy were $541 million, about 15 percent of WBG 
 commitments for grid-renewable energy. During this  period, 
MIGA issued six guarantees for renewable energy projects. 
By far the largest guarantee was for the 1-GW Nam Thuen 
2 hydropower project in Lao PDR, which benefited from 
$91 million in MIGA political risk insurance and $50 million 
in an IDA partial risk guarantee. These guarantees were es-
sential for the participation of private lenders in the $1 billion 
loan consortium, which also included public agencies.
In 2000, an energy company was awarded a build-own-operate contract for a geothermal power plant in Africa, 
with rights to develop additional geothermal fields and expand capacity. The company signed a 20-year power 
purchase agreement with the national power utility, a parastatal. The average base generation tariff was slightly 
higher than the average cost for domestically produced electricity but lower than the cost of imported hydropow-
er from neighboring countries. The country has long suffered from power shortages, and in 2000, only 10 percent 
of the population had access to electricity. 
Major risks for the investor included currency transfer restrictions, government breach of obligations under 
the power purchase agreement, and civil disturbances. MIGA provided the company (a repeat client) coverage 
against currency transfer restrictions, war and civil disturbance, and expropriation. Expropriation coverage insures 
broadly not only against the risk of outright seizure but also against breach of contract and other forms of de facto 
 expropriation. 
Shortly after MIGA issued the guarantee for Phase 1 of the project, the government attempted to renegotiate 
the tariffs because the off-taker’s power purchase price from the company, as agreed under the power purchase 
agreement, was higher than the tariff it charged to end users. The government also refused to honor some of its 
contractual obligations under the power purchase agreement. The dispute resulted in additional costs and delayed 
completion of the first phase of the project. 
MIGA worked with both parties over five years and played a crucial part in reaching a resolution. The World Bank’s 
long involvement in the sector—it had financed two adjacent geothermal plants—provided a foundation for these 
discussions. The disputes were resolved when the utility agreed to honor the existing power purchase agreement 
without price renegotiation. The investor considered MIGA’s guarantee as critical for the implementation of Phase 
1 of the project and, on resolving the dispute, obtained additional MIGA political risk insurance to cover expansion 
of the geothermal plant’s installed capacity. 
Source: IEG-MIGA.
bOx 2.3 Mitigating Political Risks in Renewables: a MIGa case
Is there scope for greatly expanded use of the World Bank’s 
partial risk guarantees or MIGA’s political risk insurance 
in promoting renewable energy? IEG’s evaluation of WBG 
guarantees found that guarantees had been underutilized 
and that high processing and transaction costs and—in 
 MIGA’s case—eligibility restrictions on the type of risks that 
can be covered limited the WBG’s ability to expand guar-
antees. With a change in the MIGA Convention, MIGA’s 
coverage is now expanded, but its institutional constraints 
would still need to be overcome. 
For the World Bank, supporting national guarantee facili-
ties is one approach.10 The World Bank could, for instance, 
help countries assess the fiscally prudent opportunities for 
feed-in tariffs or renewable portfolio standards and support 
guarantees for countries with sustainable plans.
Guarantees have benefits, but add to the cost of finance. 
It may be possible to use carbon finance to offset some 
of this cost. As noted, at current carbon prices, annual 
revenues from carbon credit sales provides little help 
with debt  finance and little impetus for investment. Much 
greater leverage could be achieved, however, if carbon 
sales revenue were used to finance guarantee or insurance 
payments, which in turn permitted lenders to offer longer 
loan durations. 
Promote renewable energy -friendly pricing regulation
A renewable energy plant’s ROE is very sensitive to pricing 
of power. Appendix figure A.3 shows the ROE for three dif-
ferent plants, evaluated at a range of different tariffs. As in 
the case of carbon revenue, higher tariffs have a bigger ef-
fect on plants with higher capacity utilization, other things 
being equal. Under the assumptions shown, wind does 
not become commercially attractive until tariffs exceed 
10 cents/kWh.
The returns to a renewable energy plant are 
very sensitive to power tariffs.
Countries have purely domestic rationales for paying a pre-
mium for renewable energy, including local pollution reduc-
tion, insurance against fuel price shocks (Hertzmark 2007), 
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and industrial policy. An increasing number of countries, 
both developed and developing, have adopted policies that 
award premium prices to generators of  renewable  power, 
for instance, through feed-in tariffs. By early 2009, 43 de-
veloping and transition countries or subnational regions 
had adopted feed-in tariffs for renewable (REEEP 2009). 
However, pricing policies are often unfavorable to renew-
able energy. Fossil fuel subsidies and artificially low 
 electricity tariffs place renewable energy at a disadvantage. 
(World Bank responses, in promoting rationalized fuel 
and electricity pricing, were described in Phase I of this 
evaluation.)
In many countries, small power producers, including hy-
dropower and biomass plants, face unclear or discrimina-
tory regulations on access to the grid. Producers may face 
daunting years-long negotiations with utilities. In contrast, 
utilities face difficulties in accommodating intermittent, 
nondispatchable power sources.
Starting in the 1990s, the World Bank assisted a number 
of Asian countries in drawing up and implementing small 
power purchase agreements that reduced transaction costs 
and risks for independent small power producers while 
providing incentives to serve peak loads. Ferry and Cabraal 
(2006) describe the experience in India, Sri Lanka, and 
Thailand as being generally successful, with less success in 
Indonesia and Vietnam. IEG’s tally of the timing of small 
power investments (figure A.4) supports a catalytic role in 
Andhra Pradesh (India), Sri Lanka, and Thailand (where 
the emphasis was on small combined-cycle gas turbine 
plants); additional factors may be at work in Tamil Nadu, 
India.
Several WBG client countries have drafted or implemented 
renewable energy legislation. These legislative and regula-
tory initiatives were complex, country-driven processes 
often involving many external counterparts, so attribution 
of impact is difficult. Nonetheless, it appears that relatively 
low-cost analytic assistance and capacity building from the 
World Bank has helped countries craft domestically accept-
able policies to promote renewable energy. In many cases, 
receptivity to this advice is heightened by associated invest-
ments. However, counterparts view the World Bank as a 
trustworthy source of advice and analysis.
Relatively low-cost analytic assistance and 
capacity building have helped countries 
craft policies to promote renewable energy.
This was true in China, where there is a history of analytic 
work dating back to the early 1990s. World Bank-funded 
seminars, study tours, and analyses helped lay out the de-
sign choices for renewable energy pricing and funding, 
contributing to the renewable energy law of 2006. The law 
enabled a systemwide levy to fund renewable energy, trig-
gering growth of wind power capacity from 3 GW in 2006 
to 26 GW at the end of 2009. 
Dialogue in Mexico, together with demonstration wind 
projects, contributed to a renewable energy law that over-
comes previous policy biases against renewable power. GEF 
funding was used to simulate a feed-in tariff, allowing con-
struction of the first independent wind power producer. 
A sequence of dialogue and lending in Morocco culmi-
nated in a 2010 renewable energy law, but implementing 
regulations are not in place. In Egypt, there has been input 
into a proposed new electricity law.
Financing such advisory work can be 
 difficult within the Bank’s administrative 
budget.
Financing this high-leverage advisory work can be diffi-
cult within the Bank’s administrative budget, even though 
the costs are relatively low. Some clients, such as Brazil, 
have borrowed for technical assistance. The World Bank’s 
Mexico team has developed a strategy of concentrating 
lending in a single large Development Policy Loan and 
using the (proportional) preparation budget. Elsewhere, 
teams have relied on donor funding through ASTAE, 
ESMAP, and GEF. ASTAE provided important inputs in 
China.
An unusual IFC foray into policy was unsuccessful. Al-
though IFC routinely provides advice to governments on 
issues related to utility contracting and privatization, a 
GEF-funded advisory project in the Russian Federation 
sought to provide broad regulatory advice to complement 
an IFC wind farm investment. Even under the proposed 
rules, however, wind prices were not competitive with ex-
isting, subsidized fossil-fuel energy prices. The project was 
not implemented, and wind power capacity in Russia stood 
at just 16.5 MW at the end of 2009. 
On-Grid Renewable Energy: Hydropower
Hydropower is by far the largest source of renewable energy 
and according to most predictions will retain that position 
for decades to come. Hydropower with storage reservoirs is 
the main form of renewable energy that can provide reliable 
baseload power. 
Hydropower has been controversial because of its potential 
for environmental and social damage. These risks are greater 
for storage dams, which have sizable reservoirs, than for 
run-of-river facilities, which have little or no reservoir stor-
age. Risks and damages can be mitigated by consideration 
of siting; for instance, there may be less risk in favoring 
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deep, narrow reservoirs in less populated and sensitive ar-
eas. Strategic environmental assessment provides a vehicle 
for optimizing siting, as in the case of the one undertaken 
for the Nile Equatorial Lakes region.
Depending on location, reservoirs in 
 tropical forest areas can have disparate 
 levels of GHG emissions.
Hydropower reservoirs can produce methane, a powerful 
GHG, if drowned forests or vegetation inflows decay anaero-
bically. Complex biophysical processes determine the rate of 
methane production, which is thought to be highest in shal-
low tropical reservoirs (Metz and others, 2007). A study of 
9 Brazilian hydropower plants (dos Santos and others 2006) 
found 3 that produced less than 3 percent of the GHGs of a 
comparable combined-cycle gas plant and 5 that produced 
100–400 percent as much. The study did not measure out-
gassing at the turbines, which may be significant.
The fall and rise of WBG involvement in hydropower 
1990–2008
Hydropower comprises the largest share of the current 
WBG renewable energy portfolio and has the longest re-
cord within the WBG. Hydropower has been supported by 
every unit of the WBG.
The Fall and Rise of WbG Hydropower Commitments, 1990–2008 
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FIGuRe 2.9
Figure 2.9 documents the decline and rise of hydropower 
in the WBG portfolio. During the 1990s, criticism of the 
environmental and social impacts of dams and hydro-
power led to the convening of the World Commission on 
Dams and a slowdown in related WBG commitments. The 
WBG endorsed most of the World Commission’s recom-
mendations, and commitments rebounded after 2000. The 
WBG recently released a document outlining a vision of 
increased investment in hydropower, especially in Africa 
(World Bank 2009).
Table 2.6 shows the breakdown of recent investments by 
size and presence of storage. Large hydropower with stor-
age (the most environmentally and socially sensitive cat-
egory) constitutes about one-third of these commitments 
in volume; some of this is rehabilitation.
Regionally, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for one-third of 
commitments overall, a quarter of the large hydropower 
projects with reservoirs, and about half of the micro and 
pico (ultra small) hydropower projects. Half of large hydro 
with reservoirs is in Europe and Central Asia.
Large hydropower with storage constitutes 
about one-third of World Bank hydropower 
commitments.
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Table 2.6 Hydropower Investments by Size, Storage, and Funding, 2003–08 ($ millions)
Hydropower by size all hydropower  >10 MW, with storage >10 MW, run-of-river 1–10 MW <1 MW
Guaranteesa  453.0 203.1  249.9   
IBRD stand-alone  849.4 394.9  540.4 202.0  
IDA stand-alone  528.5 190.9  213.6  28.0  
IFC  358.7   351.6   7.1  
Total traditional financing 2,189.7 789.0 1,355.5 237.1  
IBRD-GEF-carbon finance blend      
IDA-GEF-carbon finance blend   72.9    72.9   
Total blended financing   72.9    72.9   
GEF stand-alone,    0.4     0.4 0.4
World Bank carbon finance  145.5   6.0 129.5   4.1 5.9
IFC carbon finance   33.7    28.7  14.0  
Total new financing  179.6   6.0  158.2  18.5 6.4
Total 2,442.2 794.9 1,586.6 255.7 6.4
Source: IEG.
Note: Unit of analysis is the project component. Excludes freestanding WBG analytic and advisory assistance, IFC advisory services, and special 
financing. GEF = Global Environment Facility; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development 
Association; IFC = International Finance Corporation. 
a. Guarantees include the World Bank and MIGA. 
The number of small hydro projects (hydro < 10 MW) in-
creased significantly after 2002. Prior to 2002, four projects 
were approved. Between 2002 and 2008, 46 projects were 
approved that targeted development of small hydropower 
facilities, of which 10 projects have specific measurable in-
dicators for small hydropower investments. The  2003–08 
portfolio consists mostly of active projects: eight are still un-
der implementation, one was closed, and one was dropped. 
Performance of WBG-supported hydropower
Forty-five closed Bank hydropower projects have been sub-
ject to desk evaluations by IEG; 11 of these have had field 
evaluations. Of the 45, 34 were connected to the power 
grid.11
Two-thirds of hydropower projects were 
rated moderately satisfactory or better.
Overall, outcomes for two-thirds of the portfolio were rated 
moderately satisfactory and better, with better performance 
for projects approved after 1998. Outcome ratings are simi-
lar in both grid and off-grid projects. 
Table 2.7 Outcome Ratings of World bank 
Hydropower Projects
approval year Number rated 
moderately 
satisfactory or better
Number rated 
moderately 
unsatisfactory or worse
1991–97 23 12
1998–2006  8  2
Total 31 14
Source: IEG, based on WBG renewable energy and energy efficiency 
progress reports, 1990–2008 and IEG 2010d.
large and four small projects with unsatisfactory ratings for 
borrower performance).
WBG-sponsored CDM hydropower 
 projects have had lower capacity utilization 
than expected.
Unlike other WBG projects, CDM-registered carbon proj-
ects and recent IFC projects provide systematic and timely 
information on postconstruction performance. CDM 
projects report actual versus expected production of car-
bon offsets; this ratio will reflect in large part actual versus 
expected production of power. Relative to expectations, 
performance of WBG-sponsored CDM projects in pro-
ducing carbon offsets was worse than that of other CDM 
sponsors. Only one of six of these WBG large hydropower 
plants achieved a yield more than 100 percent of expecta-
tions, versus 30 percent of non-WBG plants. Half of WBG 
World Bank performance in 35 of the projects was rated 
moderately satisfactory and better, as was borrower perfor-
mance in 30 projects. All unsatisfactory ratings for Bank 
performance and borrower performance occurred in the 
projects approved between 1990 and 1998. Bank perfor-
mance was rated unsatisfactory in small and large hydro-
power projects equally, whereas borrowers’ failures were 
associated mainly with large hydropower projects (nine 
CI Change Chapter 02.indd   25 11/3/2010   1:53:32 PM
26 | Climate Change and the World Bank Group
 small-scale  hydropower projects had yields of less than 
60 percent, compared with 18 percent of non-WBG proj-
ects. IFC’s Development Outcome Tracking System showed 
that four of six reporting projects exceeded planned pro-
duction on average. One did not report a baseline.
A review of project evaluations points to several recurrent 
factors that affect project success (table C.4). Planning and 
execution of resettlement is a key factor for success or failure. 
Planning for water rights has been critical. In the Tanzania 
Power IV Project, failure to define water rights up front led 
to environmental problems and implementation delays; an 
 Armenian project, in contrast, was able to extend water rights 
validity to a 40-year term. In several cases, lack of a regulatory 
framework or failure of the borrower to implement expected 
reforms was a factor in performance. In sum, and not surpris-
ingly, thorough project preparation is critical to success. 
Energy Access and Low-Carbon 
Development
A billion and a half people lack electricity. An IEG review 
(IEG 2008) showed that poor people place an extraordi-
narily high value on electricity. Even with their extremely 
limited income, people are willing to pay up to $1/kWh to 
power lights, televisions, and cell phone chargers. Improv-
ing access to household electricity is particularly important 
for women, who often have the greater work burden for do-
mestic tasks (box 2.4). Access is a critical development goal 
for both reducing poverty and fostering growth. How can 
low-carbon activities support energy access? 
Most increases in energy access will happen through expan-
sion of the grid, rather than expansion of off-grid power. 
A World Bank study (World Bank 2010) notes that in most 
countries 80–95 percent of unserved communities are tar-
geted to receive electricity supply through grid extension. 
Cost estimates of grid expansion vary widely; however, for 
all but the lowest density or most remote areas, the lower 
cost of grid-based generation tends to outweigh the high 
cost of transmission and distribution extension.
Though there are many barriers to electrification, key issues 
include the high costs of supplying rural and peri-urban 
households, a lack of appropriate incentives or financial ca-
pability for utilities, and a shortage of electricity generation 
relative to demand from existing customers (World Bank 
2010). Some actions can address these barriers while also 
reducing carbon emissions.
An IEG evaluation of gender issues in World Bank 
investment projects from 2002 to 2008 (IEG 2010c) 
identified 890 (of 1,183) projects where gender 
was relevant. Nineteen of these were energy 
projects containing low-carbon components, 
primarily energy access expansion through grid 
power extension, off-grid hydropower, or SHS. 
These projects had a range of differential gender 
impacts, including labor savings for women from 
access to electric appliances, health benefits for 
women and girls from substituting electrical power 
for kerosene or wood fuel, and high vulnerability 
for female-headed households from reservoir 
hydropower resettlement policies. Project design 
documents were rated by degree of gender analy-
sis, consultation, activities, and monitoring. Of the 
low-carbon energy projects, seven were rated low, 
five moderate, eight substantial, and none high 
for their treatment of these criteria.
Source: IEG.
bOx 2.4 Gender and low-Carbon energy
Supply constraints can be alleviated through either genera-
tion increase (renewable or not) or energy efficiency. Effi-
ciency improvements can be cheaper. Moreover, to meet an 
end user’s demand, new generation has to allow for trans-
mission losses. With technical losses of 11 percent,12 a kWh 
saved is worth 1.11 kWh generated.
Though energy shortages have traditionally been alleviated 
largely through generation increases, energy efficiency can 
play a key role. For example, Bank projects in Vietnam have 
reduced supply shortages through a mix of transmission 
and distribution (T&D) capacity expansion and  efficiency 
improvements, demand side management, and on-grid 
and off-grid renewable energy. Energy efficiency and de-
mand-side management projects have led to a combined 
reduction in peak load of 1,997 MW at far lower cost than 
 construction of new generation; at the same time this leads 
to lifetime emission reductions of 130 million tons.Techni-
cal losses fell from 15 percent in 2000 to 9 percent in 2009 
because of Bank projects and other Vietnamese invest-
ments, easing the need for new power generation. In addi-
tion, distribution of CFLs has proved to be a highly effective 
tool in reducing peak demand to alleviate urgent supply 
constraints both in Vietnam and in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Energy efficiency can play a key role in 
 alleviating power supply shortages and thus 
expanding access.
Most access improvements have been accomplished through 
grid expansion. Early pilot projects in Vietnam with reha-
bilitating micro-hydropower to increase off-grid access 
were initially successful and connected 5,000 households. 
But these projects were not expanded, in part  because of 
greater-than-expected success in rapid grid  expansion. In 
contrast, grid-expansion projects have provided access to 
power for roughly 2.5 million people. But with  connection 
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costs for remaining unelectrifi ed areas exceeding $0.50/
kWh because of small loads, off -grid supply may be the 
least cost alternative.
Off -Grid Renewable Energy: Solar 
Photovoltaics
Th is section focuses on SHS—historically the biggest 
 recipient of WBG support for off -grid renewable ener-
gy and still prominent in the portfolio (table 2.5). SHSs 
provide individual rural households with modest levels 
of power primarily for lighting and television. SHSs can 
r educe carbon emissions by substituting for kerosene 
lamps and grid-charged batteries. Because they promise 
both rural access and GHG reductions, they have attracted 
substantial funding.
Since 1992, the WBG has contributed 
$790 million to SHS components.
Barriers and interventions
Th e barriers to SHS are well established:
Cost and fi nancing for consumers•	 : Th e cost of a 20-peak 
watt (Wp) system ranged from $150 to $490 in the portfo-
lio. Although the operating cost per lumen (unit of illumi-
nation) is theoretically less than that of a kerosene lamp, 
the up-front cost is prohibitive for most rural poor with-
out fi nancing. And rural fi nance poses its own problems.
Financing for manufacturers and dealers•	 : SHS systems 
are assembled by small manufacturers that fi nd it dif-
fi cult to get capital.
Biased pricing policies•	 : In Sri Lanka, for instance, solar 
photovoltaic modules were initially subject to 35 per-
cent import duties. In Indonesia, when the price of 
photovoltaic systems increased by 400 percent due to 
currency depreciation, the import price of kerosene 
and diesel only increased by 40 percent and 58 per-
cent,  respectively, thanks to government subsidies. In 
 Uganda, solar purchases were subject to extra duties 
aimed at protecting a local battery company. 
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Since 1992, the WBG has contributed $790 million to SHS 
components in 33 Bank and 4 IFC projects in 34 countries. 
Virtually all had some degree of GEF support. Th e port-
folio is concentrated in East Asia and the Pacifi c and Africa. 
Th e Middle East and North Africa is represented only by 
a $1 million project in Morocco, despite the region’s solar 
resource. 
Th is section draws on a review of the 12 World Bank projects 
that contain an off -grid solar photovoltaic component and 
were closed or open and well documented, and that have an 
installation target greater than 10,000 SHSs (see table A.7).
Anticipation of grid connection•	 : Households much prefer 
the convenience and reliability of grid connections and 
will not invest large sums in SHS if connection to the grid 
is imminent. Ambiguous plans or too-optimistic prom-
ises on grid integration can discourage demand for SHS.
Poor quality—actual or perceived•	 : Uncertainty about 
SHS quality and reliability dampens consumer demand 
for these expensive investments; uncertainty about con-
sumer demand dampens industry supply.
Geographic barriers•	 : Off -grid populations tend to be in 
areas of low population density with diffi  cult terrain. 
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Sellers and microfinanciers find it costly to service these 
populations.
Against these barriers the WBG has deployed a number of 
instruments:
Most projects employed •	 subsidies. These subsidies 
were to buyers or renters, dealers or manufacturers, or 
 winning concessionaires under a fee–for-service model. 
Subsidies were often 10–20 percent of cost, but ranged 
up to 60 percent. They aimed at making the systems 
more affordable and at expanding overall production 
and thus pushing the entire industry down the learning 
curve, resulting in sustained cost reductions. In Bolivia 
and China, dealer/manufacturer subsidies were contin-
gent on meeting quality standards. 
Consumer credits•	  addressed the financing barrier and 
were provided through three primary mechanisms: 
dealer extended credit, credit through local banks, and 
credit through microfinance institutions. 
Investor financing•	  (beyond subsidies) was provided in 
some projects. 
Technical assistance•	  and support for standards and certi-
fication addressed the quality barrier. 
WBG-supported projects deployed 
 subsidies and consumer credit.
Project outcomes 
Active promotion of SHS now dates back two decades, to 
a time when solar modules (the main component of SHS) 
were much more expensive than they are now. Reviews 
looking over the first decade of that experience pointed to 
the persistence of price and credit as barriers (Martinot, 
Ramankutty, and Frank 2000; GEF 2004a; GEF 2004b). 
 Disappointment in these outcomes has led the GEF—the 
main financier of these projects—to deemphasize them. 
Table 2.8 Rated Outcomes of Completed Projects with large SHS Components
Project Number of installed SHS Total capacity of installed SHS (MWp)
 Targets Actual Targets Actual
China Renewable energy Development Project 350,000 400,000 11 10
India Renewable Resources Development 
Project 
 NA 2.5 – 3 2.145
Indonesia  
SHSs
200,000 (appraisal) 
70,000 (revised)
8,054 NA
Sri lanka 
energy Services Delivery
30,000 (appraisal) 
15,000 (revised)
21,000 NA
Sri lanka Renewable energy for Rural  economic 
Development (ReReD)
 87,000 by 2009 (appraisal) 
155,000 by 2011 (revised)
105,398 (as of 
June 30, 2009)
4.622
Sources: Implementation and Completion Reports and Sri Lanka RERED Statistics and Reports (http://www.energyservices.lk/statistics/index.htm).
Note: MWp = peak megawatts; SHS = solar home systems. 
An IFC self-assessment (IFC 2007) was pessimistic also, 
concluding that without some level of subsidies, solar 
 photovoltaic power in  developing countries is often too 
expensive for the average rural  consumer; that “the rural, 
off-grid, solar photovoltaic industry in emerging markets is 
a low-margin, high-risk business”; and that IFC has “been 
unable to significantly transform markets and create sus-
tainable business as originally anticipated.”
However, emerging evidence from evolving World Bank 
experience paints a more positive picture—though still 
with the qualifications that SHS appears to be a small niche 
market rather than a rural panacea and is largely still de-
pendent on subsidies.
All projects in the evaluation portfolio had the development 
objectives of (i) increasing access to electricity in rural areas 
in an environmentally sustainable manner and (ii) facilitat-
ing greater participation by the private sector in advancing 
the commercialization of photovoltaic technology. In addi-
tion, 4 of the 12 projects specifically spelled out the goal of 
fostering economic growth or improving the delivery of so-
cial services such as health and education through the provi-
sion of electricity services. The global environmental objec-
tive of the solar photovoltaic projects was to remove barriers 
to the adoption of emissions-reducing energy  technologies.
Outcomes for four of the five evaluated 
projects with large SHS components were 
rated satisfactory.
Table 2.8 reports the rated outcomes of the five completed 
projects in the evaluation sample with large SHS compo-
nents. With the exception of Indonesia—where the 1997 
macroeconomic crisis crippled consumer demand—all the 
projects performed well against targets. But good measures 
of SHS longevity are lacking.13
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World Bank experience
Two factors accounted for the success of the projects in 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and China. Consumer finance was 
crucial. In Sri Lanka’s energy services delivery project, the 
SHS vendors and commercial banks were expected to pro-
vide financing but proved ill suited to deal with collecting 
payments from the highly decentralized off-grid custom-
ers, and the project languished. The project took off after 
shifting to a microfinance model. 
The Bangladesh Renewable Energy for Rural Economic 
Development project also relied on well-functioning mi-
crofinance institutions. China’s Renewable Energy Devel-
opment Project (REDP) achieved success despite lack of 
financing arrangements in provinces where many clients 
were yak herders who could self-finance a system through 
sales of their animals.
Microfinance was a critical input for 
 success in several projects.
The second factor was the use of output-based producer 
subsidies. The development of the Chinese industry is 
noteworthy, as it illustrates an effective set of mecha-
nisms to promote manufacturing quality and capabilities. 
 Demand-driven grants enabled companies to improve their 
technologies and financial management systems. Technol-
ogy-neutral subsidies—contingent on achieving quality 
standards—served as an incentive to improve quality, pro-
vided small firms with capital for expansion, and were to 
some degree passed on to consumers, boosting demand. 
As a result, the SHS companies doubled their employment, 
tripled sales and service outlets from 266 to 721, and more 
than tripled sales. The inland city of Xining emerged as a 
manufacturing center and began to export products.
Quality-contingent output-based producer 
subsidies were important.
It is difficult to discern the impact of certification or label-
ing on consumer perception of quality and therefore on 
demand. China REDP supported the development of a 
“Golden Sun” quality label, but rural familiarity with the 
label appears to be low, and exporters seek internationally 
recognized certification.
Projects in Argentina, Bolivia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and 
Sri Lanka aimed to support the development of policy 
frameworks for off-grid electrification. The Sri Lanka ef-
fort was most clearly successful. In Sri Lanka, the energy 
service delivery project indirectly influenced the govern-
ment to rationalize a photovoltaic module import tariff, 
which was  reduced from 35 to 10 percent. Toward the end 
of the project, the government also introduced its new 
 rural electrification policy, which aims to promote sustain-
able  market-based provision of rural service. In contrast, 
in China, India, and the Philippines, multiple competing 
programs for SHS promotion sometimes worked at cross 
purposes, with heavily subsidized programs undercutting 
the progress of more market-oriented ones.
IFC experience
IFC’s attempts at promoting private sector development 
in the SHS market were generally less successful than the 
Bank’s. A candid IFC review (IFC 2007) points to a lack of 
flexibility; this is consistent with internal evaluations and 
with the views of an industry participant and former client 
(Miller 2009). A $41 million effort initiated in 2000, the  Solar 
Development Group, comprised for-profit private equity fi-
nance and nonprofit technical assistance—in two arms that 
were intended to cooperate but failed to do so. The equity 
 finance arm collapsed having disbursed only $650,000, a 
victim of unrealistic expectations about industry profitabil-
ity and rigid procedures. The technical assistance arm, more 
flexible and less demanding of returns, disbursed about 
$2.2 million to 53 small companies spread across many 
countries, so that the overall impact was highly diluted. IFC 
noted also a failure to coordinate IFC activities with World 
Bank support for favorable renewable energy policies.
IFC’s approach has been less flexible than 
the Bank’s and has had less success.
A more recent IFC-GEF effort, the Photovoltaic Market 
Transformation Initiative, provided $30 million to support 
photovoltaic enterprises in India, Kenya, and  Morocco. 
 Initially overly bureaucratic, it was restructured for more 
flexibility. It has been successful in India, where it has 
 supported performance guarantees and higher-quality 
products, though initially it was poorly coordinated with the 
World Bank project. The Initiative has been less  successful 
in  Morocco and Kenya.
Impacts
A goal of these projects was to sustainably reduce the price of 
SHS and thereby increase access. In general, closed projects 
all observed reduction in the cost of photovoltaic systems. 
Under China REDP, photovoltaic system costs declined 
from about $16/Wp to $9/Wp. In Uganda, the photovoltaic 
system cost declined from $20/Wp to $12–17/Wp by the end 
of 2008. These declines probably reflect increased domestic 
competition. The programs are too small to have affected the 
global market for solar modules, where increased  European 
demand drove down prices over the decade.
Projects have generally reduced the local 
cost of photovoltaic systems.
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Although reducing CO•	 2 emissions is a critical goal of 
most of the projects, actual CO2 savings was not care-
fully monitored. 
The Way Forward for Renewable Energy
Economic and GHG returns to renewable energy 
investment
Hydropower projects with high capacity factors and low 
costs per KW can be cost competitive with fossil fuel plants 
and also offer GHG reductions and other environmental 
benefits. Wind and other renewable energy typically offer 
significantly lower returns per dollar on both dimensions. 
But capacity factors make a large difference in returns. Re-
newable energy offers additional benefits of energy security 
(for fuel importing countries) and a possible basis for stim-
ulating domestic manufacturing. But low-capacity-factor, 
high-cost renewable energy may not be advantageous for 
low-income countries.
SHSs can have extremely high economic 
returns, but they have relatively low carbon 
benefits.
SHSs supply power at high cost yet offer extremely high 
economic returns to off-grid households because of the 
households’ large benefits from electricity access. However, 
the systems have relatively low carbon benefits. The eco-
nomics of other kinds of off-grid renewables will be similar, 
because of low capacity factors and low usage of energy by 
poor rural people. 
Overcoming barriers to adoption and diffusion
Middle-income countries are increasingly willing to pay 
premium prices for renewable energy because of its envi-
ronmental and energy security benefits. World Bank policy 
advice and piloting has been helpful in China and Mexico 
in catalyzing large-scale installation of wind facilities. This 
is a relatively low-cost, potentially high-leverage, but un-
certain line of intervention that may take years to bear 
fruit. It is through this kind of indirect catalysis, rather than 
investment in individual power plants, that the WBG can 
affect a large enough volume of investment to help these 
technologies make globally relevant advances in cost com-
petitiveness. 
WBG support has helped develop SHS 
manufacturing capacity.
World Bank support has helped develop manufacturing ca-
pacity for SHSs and reduce local prices in China, Sri Lanka, 
and Uganda. Markets are still reliant on subsidies, however, 
and are limited by the still-high prices of solar modules. 
Sustained declines in module cost, together with  promotion 
Overall, the closed projects have not made a significant 
contribution to the reduction of GHG emissions. This is 
a consequence of the target users’ poverty and low energy 
consumption. In India, the avoided carbon emissions were 
estimated to be 94,000 tons over the lifetime of the photo-
voltaic subproject. In China, a rough extrapolation implies 
total CO2 reductions on the order of 7,000 tons per year. 
Evidence on these projects’ poverty reduction impacts is 
spotty because of the lack of monitoring. In India, some 
traders reported a 50 percent increase in net income by 
 using solar instead of kerosene lighting; income of some 
rural households increased by about 15–30 percent be-
cause of increased home industry output. SHSs also 
 allowed longer study hours for children under better light-
ing conditions. In China, a 2007 end-user survey covering 
1,203 households in 6 villages reported that 95 percent of 
SHS users claimed that the use of a photovoltaic system in-
creased their incomes; 15 percent claimed that the increase 
was significant. 
Project monitoring and evaluation needs 
to be strengthened, particularly regarding 
cost data, performance of installed systems, 
poverty impacts, and CO2 savings.
Calculation of ERRs depends on technical assumptions 
about consumers’ benefit from lighting and may not be 
comparable between projects. In Bolivia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Sri Lanka, ERRs for the consumers’ invest-
ment in SHS were calculated in the 27–47 percent range. 
For China, IEG estimated a phenomenal 115 percent ERR 
(World Bank 2010). These very high numbers are  consistent 
with studies that show huge gains to rural electrification 
(IEG 2008) and could be higher in areas where grid con-
nection is possible. However, the ERRs do not include the 
dynamic gains of industry technical progress and cost re-
ductions for future consumers. 
Overall, projects monitoring and evaluation needs to be 
further strengthened: 
Disaggregated cost data, such as assembly cost, installa-•	
tion cost, and financing cost were usually not monitored 
and reported, preventing assessment of the impact of 
industrial development on price.
Performance of installed photovoltaic systems was •	
not always monitored and reported. Monitoring sys-
tems are shut down when the project closes, inhibiting 
 evaluation of the program’s sustainability—the crucial 
question of whether consumers continue to purchase 
systems after the subsidy ends.
Baseline and comparison group data are lacking, so it is •	
difficult to assess impacts on poverty.
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 environmental assessments to aid in optimizing hydropower 
sites, taking account of economics, environmental impacts, 
transmission needs, and integration of intermittent power 
sources. Spatial planning of this kind will become increas-
ingly important to aid in integration of wind, biomass, so-
lar, and other site-specific resources, especially as climate 
adaptation needs are factored in.
Learning and feedback
Systematic monitoring of output of grid-connected renew-
able energy can help explain why new types of projects are 
underperforming, so that design and operations of repeater 
projects can be improved.
Better monitoring of costs and impacts is needed to guide 
future investment portfolios. Actual long-term impacts of 
solar home systems are poorly measured—including how 
long they last.
of smaller systems (as in the Lighting Africa Project), could 
help with diffusion.
Long loan durations are an important stim-
ulus to project bankability and are featured 
in IFC lending and Bank on-lending.
Long loan tenors are an important stimulus to project 
bankability and are a feature of IFC direct lending and 
on-lending by the World Bank. At current carbon prices, 
carbon finance has a very modest leverage on the financial 
viability of hydropower, wind, or geothermal projects but 
a profound effect on projects that involve the capture of 
methane.
Systems issues
As renewable energy expands, systems integration is-
sues become critical. There is increasing use of strategic 
The World Bank has helped promote significant growth in renewable energy in Sri Lanka, through two IDA-GEF 
projects, beginning in 1997. 
The largest impact was through catalyzing the growth of grid-connected, independently operated small 
 hydropower plants. This was done by facilitating finance. A small power purchase agreement eliminated 
 time- consuming, asymmetric negotiations between small companies and the electricity board. A market-based 
feed-in tariff, with a floor, ensured a minimum income. IDA funds were on-lent by private banks for durations of 
7–9 years, as opposed to the usual 4. The government assumed the foreign exchange risk (and has borne the cost 
of a  devaluation). 
As a result, 153 MW of minihydro have been installed, generating 4.4 percent of grid-connected power (2008) 
and saving a claimed 550,000 tons of CO2 per year. Sri Lanka has gained technical manufacturing expertise in the 
process and is now exporting turbines and engineering services.
The projects also supported the rapid growth of solar photovoltaic home systems, from near zero to 125,000 
systems totaling 5.5 peak MW of capacity. Output-based subsidies (as in China’s REDP) and specialized microfi-
nance were key. Success was more modest for village hydro systems, supported through grants and loans, which 
installed 1.3 MW serving 4,696 households. And a wind project, designed to demonstration commercial feasibility, 
performed below expectations and was not replicated. Recently, a new IFC project, PADGO, has begun to promote 
decentralized energy, including combined heat and power fueled by biomass.
Challenges for further expansion of renewable electricity include an inadequate grid; decreasing quality of 
 remaining hydropower sites; wind sites that are remote and can support only small turbines; and an increas-
ingly bureaucratic plant licensing process that now requires two years. Demand-side management and energy 
 efficiency have also been less successful than hoped. However, a 30 percent increase in electricity tariffs in 2009 
(that preserved lifeline tariffs) should increase the attractiveness of both renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
Source: IEG background study.
bOx 2.5 On-Grid and Off-Grid Renewable energy in Sri lanka
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eValUaTIoN HIGHlIGHTS
Effi  cient lighting may oﬀ er very high economic • 
returns and signifi cant GHG reductions.
Reducing technical losses in transmission • 
and distribution oﬀ ers high returns and large 
scope for investment.
There are large energy effi  ciency opportunities • 
in the building sector, where market failures 
abound; this represents a largely untapped 
area for WBG intervention.
Guarantees have stimulated lending by banks • 
to enterprises with poor collateral but have 
not been transformative in reducing banks’ risk 
aversion.
By screening existing clients for cleaner pro-• 
duction opportunities, IFC found projects with 
good projected returns but small absolute 
levels of energy and CO
2
 savings.
There remains a tremendous need to under-• 
stand what works and what does not in this 
still-evolving fi eld.
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Energy Efficiency
The first phase in this evaluation series (IEG 2009) assessed projects related to 
 demand-side efficiency policy and to energy pricing. It highlighted the importance 
of  removing poorly targeted energy subsidies as a win-win policy that can promote 
energy  efficiency, poverty reduction, fiscal balance, and GHG reductions.
Since then, the Bank has codirected a G20 study to examine 
policies to reduce energy subsidies (IEA and  others 2010). 
The previous evaluation also urged increased attention for 
the  intersection  between efficiency investments and pric-
ing reform. Such attention is now evident in the Vietnam 
Power Sector Development Policy Operation (2010).
Energy Efficiency in the First Phase 
Evaluation
District heating was one area of World Bank activity re-
viewed in the Phase I report. Concentrated mostly in 
Eastern Europe, this has been a large area of energy ef-
ficiency emphasis. Over the period 1991–2008, there were 
41 projects with $2.1 billion in commitments. Of the 25 
closed projects, about three-quarters had outcomes that 
IEG rated moderately satisfactory or better. To a large 
 extent these were “engineering” projects focusing on sup-
ply-side efficiency improvements. However, some included 
policy elements such as tariff reform. Some ongoing 
Chinese projects are combining supply-side interventions 
with promotion of far-reaching reforms that provide con-
sumers with the means and incentive to reduce excessive 
energy use.
In its review, IEG found 34 projects initiated over 1996–
2007 that had policy content that related (under a broad 
definition) to end-user efficiency. These included nine that 
supported the creation of appliance or building standards. 
Although the projects were successful in supporting adop-
tion of codes, there was been less attention over this period 
to sustained support for implementation and enforcement, 
and very little monitoring and evaluation of impacts. There 
were about a dozen projects that supported demand-side 
management, usually through a utility. 
Complementing the earlier volume, this chapter reviews 
several energy efficiency business lines that are large in 
volume or have potential for scale-up: transmission and 
 distribution (T&D) loss reduction, financial intermediar-
ies, direct IFC investments in industrial energy efficiency, 
and promotion of efficient light bulbs (table 3.1 puts this in 
the context of all low-carbon investments from 2003–08).
Using Financial Intermediaries to Overcome 
Barriers to Energy Efficiency Investments
In China, Eastern Europe, and Russia, a history of com-
mand economies and low energy prices had fostered 
 industries and housing that were wasteful of energy. Start-
ing in the 1990s, the World Bank and IFC moved in par-
allel to equip financial intermediaries to promote energy 
efficiency in these regions. These efforts were mostly sup-
ported by GEF and had GHG reduction as a goal. This sec-
tion reviews 11 such projects (table C.4, which includes 
all but two of the energy efficiency financial intermediary 
projects initiated by 2005).1
Diagnosis of barriers
The projects had similar diagnoses of energy efficiency 
 barriers:
Banks do not understand energy efficiency financing. In •	
this view, banks either did not understand that the sav-
ings flow from energy efficiency improvements could 
back a loan or did not know how to appraise that flow 
or the exaggerated the risk of these loans.
End users—factory or housing owners—do not under-•	
stand their energy efficiency savings potential or how 
to realize it. 
Although the World Bank and IFC had 
similar diagnoses of barriers to  energy 
 efficiency, they arrived at different 
 prescriptions.
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Table 3.2 IFC and World bank approaches to energy efficiency Financial 
Intermediation in China and eastern europe
 IFC World bank
 China  Guarantees 
Technical assistance for banks
ESCO demonstration 
Technical assistance for ESCOs  
Guarantees for ESCOs
eastern europe Guarantees 
Technical assistance for banks 
On-lending (Russia)
Dedicated energy funds 
Technical assistance for funds
Source: IEG. 
Note: ESCO = energy service company.
Table 3.1 energy efficiency Interventions by Type in the low-Carbon Investment Portfolio 2003–08  
(with overlap)
Type of energy efficiency Component cost 
(millions)
Percent of 
low carbon
Number of 
components
District heating and combined heat and power $573 7.2 25
End user energy efficiency, government and municipal $484 6.1 22
End user efficiency: industrial energy efficiency $1,128 14.1 47
End user energy efficiency residential and commercial $572 7.2 40
End user efficiency: multiple or unspecified user types $370 4.6 19
Supply side efficiency: thermal power rehabilitation $656 8.2 15
Supply side efficiency: Reduced transmission, distribution or system losses $916 11.5 37
Supply side efficiency: other or unspecified $340 4.3 12
Energy efficiency in transport $23 0.3 2
Energy efficiency multiple, unspecified, or unknown $449 5.6 24
Source: World Bank. 
Note: Individual components may appear in multiple categories, so column totals are not meaningful.
IFC and the World Bank arrived at different prescriptions. 
Both hoped for a transformative impact (see table 3.2). IFC 
focused on the presumed risk aversion and inexperience of 
commercial banks and therefore prescribed a  combination 
of technical assistance and loan guarantees. Technical assis-
tance would train banks to appraise and structure energy 
efficiency loans and to fill a pipeline of future projects. 
GEF-subsidized loan guarantees would act like training 
wheels. Once the banks realized that risks were low, the 
guarantees could be removed. Success of the participating 
banks would spark emulation, and energy efficiency lend-
ing would spread.
would provide both finance and technical know-how to 
their clients (box 3.1). Because ESCOs were unknown 
in  China and therefore highly risky, the Energy Conser-
vation Project used GEF funds to help capitalize three 
companies to test and popularize the idea, which was 
expected to provoke spontaneous replication. Later, the 
Bank used GEF- supported loan guarantees to back ESCO 
financing, again with the presumption that this would be 
a temporary measure to overcome banks’ unfamiliarity 
with energy  efficiency  finance. In Romania and Bulgaria, 
the Bank used GEF grants to set up dedicated, revolv-
ing energy efficiency funds as an alternative to banks and 
a complement to  ESCOs, which had already arrived in 
Europe. 
In China, the World Bank prescribed energy service 
companies (ESCOs) to overcome these barriers. ESCOs 
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Pity the poor small factory owner. Busy running her business, she thinks there may be opportunities to save on 
energy expenses, but does not think it a good gamble to invest time and money in an energy audit. What if there 
are no savings? Or suppose the auditor recommends replacing old motors or boilers. Where will the proprietor, 
already at her borrowing limit, find funds? And how can she be sure that the investment will pay off?
Enter the ESCO. Part consultant and part banker, the ESCO offers to reduce the factory’s energy costs by a specified 
amount, splitting the gains with the owner. To do this, the ESCO will finance, purchase, and install any required 
equipment, carrying the loan on its own balance sheet. The owner need merely collect the savings.
This arrangement is called energy performance contracting and is the canonical form of ESCO. It requires reliable 
enforcement of contracts in order to work, given the complicated interdependence of lender, ESCO, and client. 
Other, simpler, arrangements are also possible.
Source: IEG, based on Taylor and others 2008.
box 3.1 eSCos and energy Performance Contracting
In China, collateral requirements are onerous. Hence, guar-
antees were important for credit access by cash-strapped 
 ESCOs and small and medium enterprises. Although 
 Chinese banks welcomed the guarantees, they were not 
obviously critical to improved credit access by larger en-
terprises. In CHUEE, which catered to larger firms, 91 per-
cent of a sample of borrowers said they could have financed 
their energy efficiency investment without the project and 
its guarantee, though perhaps more slowly (IEG 2010b).
In IFC’s European projects, the guarantees, although at-
tractively priced, were generally not appealing to banks for 
their small and medium enterprise (SME) or municipal 
lending. These were familiar markets, and the banks were 
comfortable bearing the risk of lending to these clients. 
Guarantees were more successful with new or unconven-
tional types of projects and borrowers, such as retrofitting 
apartment blocks by homeowner associations in Hungary 
and renewable energy projects in the Czech Republic, when 
the regulatory framework and feed-in tariffs were still un-
tested and uncertain.
It is noteworthy that almost none of the guarantees have 
been called. This experience may convince IFC to become 
less risk averse. In the CHUEE project, the IFC’s $207 million 
guarantee was not at serious risk, buffered by a GEF-funded 
first loss guarantee. The first loss was much smaller in the 
case of Hungary’s OTP Schools Energy Efficiency project 
(see next page).
Guarantees helped less creditworthy 
 borrowers but did not trigger market 
 transformation.
In sum, the guarantees were useful for less-creditworthy 
borrowers in underdeveloped financial markets. But they 
did not have a large transformative effect on reducing com-
mercial banks’ risk aversion and are likely to be a perma-
nent rather than temporary measure.
Prescription: ESCOs
The Energy Conservation Project’s introduction of  ESCOs 
(called energy management companies, or EMCs, in  China) 
had significant direct effects. The three pilot companies re-
alized an average financial rate of return of 18 percent, with 
assets growing from $20 million in 1999 to $91 million in 
2006. The total ERR (including benefits to the EMC’s cli-
ents) was calculated by IEG at 50 percent without CO2 ben-
efits, or 58 percent with CO2 at $6/ton of CO2. Total claimed 
energy and CO2 savings were 6 million tons of coal equiva-
lent and 18.6 million tons through 2006—below appraisal 
Prescription: Guarantees
The barrier diagnosis was partially flawed, so the guaran-
tees were less transformative than hoped. The assumption 
was that banks practice project finance—in other words, 
they will finance a factory to set up a new assembly line, 
weighing the cost of the equipment against the return it 
provides. But, the diagnosis continued, the banks don’t 
know how to appraise energy efficiency projects, which 
generate a cash flow from energy savings rather than from 
increased sales. 
In reality, most banks in these countries simply do not do 
practice project finance, because there is no way to en-
sure that they will get returns from that particular piece 
of equipment. They are concerned with getting repaid and 
therefore look beyond the project at borrowers’ overall 
balance sheets and collateral. So for many banks the core 
constraint is their borrowers’ lack of creditworthiness, not 
the novelty of energy efficiency. However, a better under-
standing of energy efficiency did help banks market loans 
to their more creditworthy customers. And the China 
 Utility-Based Energy Efficiency project (CHUEE) has 
helped banks structure efficiency loans as project finance, 
putting savings into escrow accounts which substitute for 
fixed collateral.
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estimates but still substantial. Note that these are unverified 
ex ante estimates. 
The introduction of ESCOs had  significant 
direct effects in China and spurred 
 development of an energy management 
industry.
The project also spurred the development of an EMC in-
dustry. As pilots, the EMCs immediately encountered a 
regulatory obstacle: Should they be regulated as financial 
institutions, leasing companies, or sales outlets? The Bank 
and the government worked to address the ambiguities, fa-
cilitating entry of other EMCs. This is a good example of 
how pilot projects can reduce the costs of followers. 
In addition, the EMCs participated in training programs 
and opened their doors to would-be domestic and foreign 
investors. GEF funding was crucial in motivating this open-
ness to dissemination. In part because of these efforts and 
in part to an ASTAE training program, an industry associa-
tion of EMCs was formed and grew to at least 400 member 
companies by 2007, with a core of 40–50 practicing energy 
performance contracting.
However, the ESCO prescription required adaptation in 
China, and it has limits. First, the Chinese ESCOs did not 
write contracts based on measured savings, a practice that 
requires a high degree of reliance on contract enforcement 
and on sophisticated measurement of outcomes (box 3.1). 
The three original EMCs have largely relied on agreed ex 
ante estimates of energy savings, or they simply became 
equipment leasing companies. Few of the emerging EMCs 
take a systemic approach to improving process efficiency, 
but rely instead on promoting specific kinds of energy 
 efficiency equipment. Second, there are limits to the abil-
ity of ESCOs to provide financing. The original EMCs had 
the advantage of substantial capital at concessional terms. 
The new ones are generally small and even more credit-
 constrained than their clients.
Chinese ESCOs adopted a basic model of 
operation akin to equipment leasing.
In Hungary, the OTP Schools Project (OTP being the Hun-
garian bank involved) supports Caminus, an ESCO that 
won an umbrella contract for school heating and lighting 
upgrades. The umbrella contract is a noteworthy policy 
innovation, because it drastically reduced the transaction 
costs for small municipalities (they do not have to organize 
individual tenders) and engages economies of scale for the 
winning ESCO. Caminus finances all the investments except 
for the 20–25 percent paid from European Union grants 
and is therefore taking the credit risk for  municipalities. 
However, the scope of work does not include insulation, 
which means that potential cost and CO2 savings may be 
untapped.
Prescription: Technical assistance
In Central Europe (Commercializing Energy Efficiency 
Finance Program) and Russia (Sustainable Energy Fi-
nance Program), IFC used donor funding to hire a large 
in-house team that provided free services to local banks; 
there is a move now to increase cost recovery. Banks that 
IEG interviewed confirmed that they benefited significantly 
from the technical assistance program, especially training 
on technologies and appraisal of energy efficiency projects. 
It is difficult to assess whether the services provided were 
cost-effective. (In some cases, projects are unable to track 
precisely the use of technical assistance resources.) Some 
banks have decided to build on and consolidate this learn-
ing by creating dedicated in-house units for energy effi-
ciency projects. Staff cuts as a result of the financial crisis 
threaten the sustainability of these changes but may aid in 
diffusion of knowledge through the industry if staff are re-
hired elsewhere.
Banks benefited from IFC technical 
 assistance.
Prescription: Information dissemination
The China Energy Conservation Project also sponsored an 
information center, developing energy efficiency case study 
examples and technical guidelines and building outreach 
networks. An internal evaluation found that 6.2 percent of 
a random sample of 10,000 enterprises attributed energy ef-
ficiency investment to the information center’s influence. 
The claimed impact was 27 million tons of coal equivalent 
of energy and 71 million tons of CO2. These are extraor-
dinary numbers, dwarfing the Energy Management Com-
pany Association’s direct impact. Likely, other factors were 
at work, including policy pressure for energy efficiency 
improvements. However, even if overestimated by a factor 
of 10, these impacts would represent a good return on the 
$10 million invested in the centers. 
Outcomes
Economic returns, energy savings, and emissions 
 reductions. Impacts have varied substantially across 
projects. As noted, the Energy Conservation Project in 
China racked up high economic and carbon returns at 
the subproject and project level. For CHUEE, which has 
been analyzed in more depth, subproject and project lev-
el returns diverge. By June 2009, the guarantee program 
had supported $512 million in loans for $936 million in 
projects, associated with a claimed GHG reduction of 
14 million tons. However, as noted earlier, CHUEE may 
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that specifically targeted energy efficiency or renewable 
energy financing. With significant input from the finance 
program’s technical assistance team, two banks have cre-
ated dedicated internal units and developed products 
specifically for the energy efficiency/renewable energy 
markets. With the expiration of the subsidized guarantee 
programs, however, some of the banks involved in the 
energy finance program have discontinued lending for 
street lighting and residential energy  efficiency or have 
reverted to previous collateral requirements. 
The catalytic impact of the WBG projects on the broader 
energy efficiency finance market is difficult to evaluate be-
cause of the impact of the financial crisis, because monitor-
ing and evaluation was not generally set up to track dif-
fusion, and because rising energy prices throughout the 
region (figure C.1) would be expected to encourage energy 
conservation regardless of WBG intervention. The Russia 
Sustainable Energy Finance Program does have as an indi-
cator adoption of energy efficiency lending by nonpartner 
banks and reports three instances. Observers of Hungarian 
banking find it difficult to pinpoint diffusion impacts of the 
IFC projects.
In Russia, joint IFC-IBRD technical assistance and ana-
lytic work, including an enterprise survey, highlighted the 
tremendous scope for profitable energy efficiency in the 
 Russian economy. This work estimated that up to 40 per-
cent of energy consumption could be cost-effectively re-
duced. WBG analytic efforts provided key inputs to the 
Russian government as it drafted a new energy efficiency 
law, recently adopted. The impacts of the law will depend 
on yet-to-be-adopted implementation regulations. 
Direct Investments in Energy Efficiency
IFC’s energy efficiency emphasis has been on the use of fi-
nancial intermediaries, but it also makes direct investments 
associated with energy efficiency. Often energy efficiency is 
incidental to plant modernization or expansion. In other 
cases, energy efficiency is the main goal, as in installation of 
waste-heat recovery equipment.
Mainstream investments 
In 2005, IFC began to review projects to determine whether 
they could be claimed as having energy efficiency content. 
Over the period fiscal 2005–08, 48 such projects were iden-
tified. IFC assigned a notional proportion of each invest-
ment to energy efficiency. In total, $392 million of IFC’s 
$1.96 billion investment (in projects valued at $3.96 bil-
lion) was considered to be energy efficiency. Ten projects 
accounted for more than 80 percent of the notional energy 
efficiency investments. 
IFC has supported some CO2-intensive cement and steel 
companies in replacing obsolete, inefficient production 
have had limited causal impact on these reductions. The 
large client firms enjoyed good credit and were respond-
ing in part to China’s vigorous pursuit of energy efficien-
cy goals in the Five-Year Plan. Still, if CHUEE counted 
all its project costs, but counted as beneficiaries only the 
minority of clients who said they had no other potential 
lender, CHUEE’s overall ERR was 38 percent (about half 
of which was carbon emission reductions, valued at $19/
ton of CO2). 
Economic and financial returns from 
 subprojects are not consistently monitored.
Economic and financial returns from subprojects are not 
consistently monitored across projects. The energy efficiency 
projects in Bulgaria and Romania, unlike the others, moni-
tor ex post results. In Romania, where most projects were 
industrial, financial returns ranged from 15 to 87 percent. In 
Bulgaria, which had a more diverse portfolio, returns ranged 
from 13 to 37 percent. The Russian project (still in progress) 
reports a mean ratio of annual energy cost savings to project 
cost of 20 percent, but this value is problematic, reflecting an 
abstruse but crucial methodological issue.2 
Projects with energy savings targets are 
 falling short of those targets.
All the projects with energy savings targets are falling short 
of those targets, often by a large margin. Croatia stands at 
3 percent, Bulgaria energy efficiency at 6 percent, and OTP 
at 19 percent. (Note, however, that these projects are still 
ongoing through 2010 or 2011, and final outcomes may dif-
fer as experience progresses and data are reexamined.) The 
shortfall is evident even after allowing for the low disburse-
ment rate of some projects. 
Appraisal of potential GHG savings appears to have used 
inconsistent and, in some cases, erroneous values relating 
CO2 to energy. Reported achievements of CO2 savings are 
roughly commensurate with actual energy savings, except 
for the Bulgaria project. There the implied CO2 saving/en-
ergy saving ratio appears to be unusually high. Overall it 
is difficult to reconcile high financial rates of return with 
underachievement of energy targets. Further investigation 
into monitoring and appraisal methodologies is needed.
Post-project sustainability and catalytic impacts. The 
clearest case of sustainability is in Russia, where some 
participating banks have begun to make loans without 
IFC resources, using IFC’s energy efficiency Calculator 
Tool. For Central Europe the case is less clear. Before 
IFC’s Commercializing Energy Efficiency Finance Pro-
gram started operation in 2003, there was no bank in 
markets like the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Slovakia 
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lines. Some of the companies involved emit more than 
10 million tons of CO2 annually—more than some coun-
tries—so effi  ciency gains could have global signifi cance. 
Four cement projects replaced old wet process equipment 
with more effi  cient dry process production lines. Govern-
ment policies, together with cost savings, motivated the 
phase-out of old facilities, and these companies likely had 
good access to credit, so IFC’s additionality is not clear. 
Two investments in an Eastern European steel company 
supported replacement of open-hearth furnaces with mod-
ern blast furnaces. In this case, the combination of diffi  cult 
credit, low energy prices, and an IFC environmental and 
social action plan makes it plausible to attribute the effi  -
ciency gains to IFC’s intervention.
In other cases, the basis for allocating investment amounts 
to energy is unclear. Two investments, totaling $55 million, 
supported airlines in modernizing their fl eets. Th ese invest-
ments were entirely classifi ed as energy effi  ciency, although 
they conferred other benefi ts, such as safety, comfort, and 
reliability.
In many cases, it is not clear if IFC’s direct 
investments have led to improvements in 
energy effi  ciency.
and CO2 emissions, so it is impossible to quantify energy 
or GHG savings. Some of the projects were initiated before 
GHG monitoring was required. But even where required, 
compliance with monitoring is imperfect. 
The cleaner production initiative
Approved in January 2007, the three-year, $20 million Clean-
er Production Lending Pilot is a proactive initiative to seek 
and promote energy, water, and materials effi  ciency oppor-
tunities within IFC’s existing clientele. Th e program focused 
on clients with good credit standings and environmental per-
formance, enabling IFC to signifi cantly reduce loan prepara-
tion time and eff ort. Projects were identifi ed either directly 
with clients or via optional donor-funded energy audits. 
In 2009, the pilot was scaled up to a $125 million, three-
year Cleaner Production Lending Facility, covering all real 
 sector investments. To complement the loan funds, a 
$5 million Global Cleaner Production Facility (GEF-funded 
via the Earth Fund) will cofi nance Cleaner Production 
 audits. Clients will bear half the audit costs. 
Th e $20 million Cleaner Production Lending Pilot was fully 
committed to eight projects, with an average loan size much 
smaller than the IFC norm. Th ree of the projects employed 
the donor-funded energy audits; in other cases, the clients 
identifi ed energy effi  ciency savings. Th e projects’ projected 
In one case, IFC invested in an American-owned distribu-
tion utility in an Eastern European country, with an explicit 
goal of reducing technical losses, which stood at 12.6 per-
cent. Five years aft er the initial investment, the goal had not 
been achieved: technical losses had actually increased to 
15 percent. Had the company reduced losses to 8 percent 
(a conservative target), it could have cut CO2 emissions by 
180 thousand tons per year. 
Most of these ex post identifi ed energy effi  ciency projects 
lack baseline and monitoring data on energy effi  ciency 
returns to investment were 22–117 percent (with a median 
of 36 percent) and are projected to yield 1–19 kilograms 
of CO2 per year per dollar invested (or roughly an addi-
tional 1–19 percent to the return on investment if carbon 
is valued at $10/ton of CO2), with carbon returns mostly 
proportional to fi nancial ones. 
Total annual CO2 savings are estimated at 136,613 tons. But 
a single company accounted for half those savings. Th us, sig-
nifi cant resources are devoted to small loans that yield CO2 
savings of just a few thousand tons of CO2 per year. Ex post 
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Reducing the illegal or unpaid consumption known as •	
nontechnical losses (emissions are reduced if consum-
ers, confronted with a bill for electricity, reduce their 
consumption).
Reducing losses
Losses vary widely across regions and countries because 
of utility performance. A survey of 12 African utili-
ties found total loss rates ranging from 6 to 35.3 percent 
(Pinto 2010). In these utilities, transmission losses ranged 
from 3 to 6.6  percent, distribution losses ranged from 
2.4 to 20.5 percent, and nontechnical losses ranged from 
3.6 to 17.5 percent. 
Technical losses in transmission and 
 distribution remain high in many regions.
Technical losses can be reduced through direct investment 
in hardware and network management and by increasing 
the institutional capacity of utilities to plan, fi nance, and 
maintain their networks. Opportunities for very large eco-
nomic returns from T&D projects exist largely because 
many power utilities have lacked the capacity, funds, and 
incentives to undertake optimal network management. Un-
less performance of utilities is improved, there is a risk that 
T&D projects may not yield their expected economic and 
emission reduction benefi ts. 
Nontechnical losses are usually caused by a combination 
of faulty or inadequate metering, collusion between utility 
employees and power consumers, and theft . Nontechnical 
loss reduction entails collecting money from customers 
who were previously receiving power at no cost, provoking 
opposition from entrenched interest groups.
Advanced metering infrastructure technology allows 
 meters to be read remotely (using mobile phone networks), 
which reduces much of the scope for collusion and theft . 
Signifi cant reductions in the price of advanced metering 
infrastructure components has made their widespread 
adoption economically feasible (Antmann 2009). Prelimi-
nary evidence from Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and 
Honduras demonstrates their eff ectiveness in reducing 
nontechnical losses. 
Advanced metering infrastructure 
 technology has demonstrated eff ectiveness 
in reducing nontechnical losses.
Nontechnical losses are oft en ascribed to poor people, but 
a signifi cant portion of those losses comes from  major 
 users, and targeting these users is oft en key to reducing 
losses. For example, a loss-reduction eff ort in North Delhi 
 successfully reduced total losses from 53 percent in 2002 to 
measurement of achieved economic returns is lacking, under-
cutting the Lending Pilot’s ambition to use program results to 
convince other clients to invest in cleaner production.
Th e Cleaner Production Lending Facility 
funded small loans with a median projected 
rate of return of 36 percent, but most had 
CO2 savings of just a few thousand tons 
per year.
An early lesson from the audits was the necessity of cost-
sharing. Initially, clients were only required to cover 10 per-
cent of the cost but committed to reimburse the grant if 
audit recommendations were implemented. Th is created an 
incentive not to disclose implementation plans and not to 
borrow from IFC. Aft er full cost sharing was implemented, 
the three sponsored audits successfully identifi ed cost-
 saving measures with one- to four-year paybacks. 
Th e audit costs were small relative to the client’s projected 
returns. But the audit costs were relatively large compared to 
IFC’s potential returns from lending. Hence,  IFC-funded 
audits are not likely to be sustainable for small-scale proj-
ects in the absence of concessional funding, though the 
 audits themselves are potentially cost-eff ective. 
Transmission and Distribution
Electricity T&D projects provide a potentially cheaper al-
ternative to construction of new generation in countries 
with high technical losses. Th ey also off er major potential 
for reducing carbon emissions. Such projects can increase 
supply security and reduce outages and can be important for 
improving access. Th ey can reduce carbon emissions by—
Connecting renewable power to the grid•	
Reducing technical losses (dissipation of electricity as •	
waste heat) 
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lighting constitutes 74 percent of power consumption for 
a typical household that has electricity access (Maurer and 
Nonay 2009). Because lighting demand is concentrated in 
the early evening hours, utilities must build additional gen-
eration capacity that is only used during this period. 
Switching from standard incandescent lamps to CFLs re-
duces energy consumption (saving fuel costs) and capac-
ity costs while mitigating CO2 emissions. CFLs draw only 
20–30 percent as much power as equally bright incandes-
cent lights and last much longer. Households benefit from 
lower energy consumption, and CFL adoption can pay for 
itself in 2–14 months. Utilities benefit from lower power 
sales (when generation cost exceeds supply cost) and from 
reduced capacity costs. 
Replacement of all of Sub-Saharan  Africa’s 
incandescent lights would effectively 
boost power availability by 23 percent, 
at a  fraction of the cost of peaking diesel 
 generators.
A recent ESMAP review (ESMAP 2009) finds that a “rep-
resentative” CFL program, under optimistic assumptions, 
would have a benefit-cost ratio of nearly 28:1, based on en-
ergy and capacity savings, or nearly 30:1 if CO2 abatement 
were valued at $10/ton. A Bank study for Sub-Saharan 
 Africa (de Gouvello, Dayo, and Thioye 2008) estimated that 
regionwide replacement of all 476 million inefficient lights 
(60 percent of these are in South Africa) with CFLs would 
reduce peak power demand by 15,200 MW, represent-
ing about 23 percent of installed capacity for the region. 
Recent estimates of CFL bulk purchase projects (ESMAP 
2009) suggest that one-shot replacement can be achieved 
at roughly $2 per bulb. Although full phase-out for Africa 
could cost $950 million, significant gains could be achieved 
with a much smaller investment targeting residential users 
or countries with high emission factors, expensive power, 
or supply shortages. 
Barriers and interventions
Despite the large benefits, private households have been 
slow to adopt CFL technology. Where electricity prices are 
artificially low due to subsidies, consumers have low incen-
tive to adopt. Other adoption barriers include the higher 
upfront price of CFL bulbs, distaste for the color or qual-
ity of the illumination, skepticism about the bulbs’ lifespan, 
and poor consumer knowledge. 
Although the potential benefits are large, 
households have been slow to adopt CFL 
technology.
18.5 percent in 2008. This was done primarily by using 
 advanced metering infrastructure for the 30,000 major 
consumers, who collectively represent 3 percent of the cus-
tomers but 60 percent of the power sales (Antmann 2009).
WBG portfolio, 2003–08
The Bank has a long history of investment in T&D proj-
ects. Over 2003–08, the WBG committed $3.45 billion to 
44 T&D projects that are expected to lead to significant car-
bon reduction benefits or technical loss reductions, though 
emission reduction was not an explicit goal for many of 
them. (Table C.2 summarizes impacts and appendix D 
presents lessons from completed projects).
The Bank’s portfolio demonstrates recognition of the im-
portance of improving the financial state of utilities in or-
der to improve long-term impacts. Among the low-carbon 
T&D projects, 60 percent addressed nontechnical losses, 
and 82 percent of projects that specifically aimed at loss 
reduction included nontechnical loss-reduction measures. 
 Projects have been aimed at the regions with the highest 
power losses (particularly Europe and Central Asia and 
South Asia). 
Projected economic gains from these projects are often 
large. Many projects calculate high ERRs on a large invest-
ment base (often 20–60 percent; see tables C.1 and C2). 
Projected benefits are even higher if the project is expect-
ed to boost access or reduce outages. One project in the 
 Dominican Republic projects a net present value of $428 
million on a $122 million investment.
The projected economic gains from these 
projects are often very large, but the 
 disparate methodologies used make it 
 difficult to validate or compare projections.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to validate or compare these 
ex ante projections, because Bank projects do not use a 
common methodology when valuing loss reduction, out-
age reduction, or other benefits. It is not always apparent 
whether loss reduction forecasts come from formal engi-
neering studies or are rough estimates. Many projections 
are contingent on assumptions that loss reductions will 
be sustained across many years after project completion, 
presuming successfully institutionalized change in mainte-
nance and operations. 
Efficient Light Bulbs
Electric lighting represents 19 percent of global electricity 
consumption (IEA 2006). In many developing countries, 
lighting is the largest use of power in the residential sec-
tor, particularly in the poorest countries, where households 
have few electrical appliances. For example, in Ethiopia, 
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not fully sustained, as the project lacked eff ective mecha-
nisms to sustain quality levels (GEF 2006a).
Based on results from these projects, IFC undertook the 
GEF-supported Effi  cient Lighting Initiative (ELI), which 
carried out market-based programs in Argentina, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Peru, the Philippines, and South 
Africa. ELI supported public education, targeted subsidies, 
demand-side management programs, and the development 
of standards and labeling for CFLs.
Aft er a lull, there was a surge in World Bank projects in 
2007–09. Many of these were emergency projects to address 
drought-induced hydropower shortages in Africa. Most of 
these new projects are bulk-purchase and distribution for 
residential CFLs. Bulk-purchase projects have become fa-
vored because of their ability to reduce unit costs of bulbs 
through bulk discounts, their substantial and immediate 
reductions in peak electricity demand, and the ability to ac-
cess carbon fi nancing. 
Economic, CO2  , and environmental impacts
CFL project appraisals are generally back-of-the-envelope 
exercises that calculate savings based on assumed num-
ber of bulbs, wattage of new versus old bulbs, and hours 
used per bulb. Th ese ex ante calculations suggest ERRs in 
the hundreds of percent together with more modest CO2 
 savings.
Few of the WBG-supported projects 
have applied rigorous monitoring and 
 evaluation.
Well-developed methodologies exist for monitoring these 
outcomes and calculating impacts, as a result of decades 
of demand-side management programs in developed 
countries (Vine and Fielding 2006). However, few WBG-
 supported projects to date have applied rigorous  monitoring 
and evaluation methods. ELI mounted a large monitoring 
and evaluation eff ort, but long-term impact monitoring was 
not undertaken, and the interim results were never pub-
licly released. Most other projects have undertaken limited 
 ex-post monitoring, and few attempt to compare project 
versus control group areas. Hence, the impact assessments 
(table C.3) must be read with great caution.
Early projects claimed positive impacts but faced barriers 
to sustainability: commercial prices of CFLs remained high 
and quality oft en low. Yet in Sri Lanka, despite a high bulb 
failure rate, a subsidy demonstration project with 100,000 
bulbs led to a successful follow-up where 511,000 bulbs 
were purchased at commercial rates. Survey results found 
that 58 percent of customers thought the utility’s endorse-
ment of CFLs was important or very important in deter-
mining their decision to purchase CFLs (SRC 1999).
Since the early 1990s, public entities, utilities, and devel-
opment agencies have use several (overlapping) design fea-
tures to encourage CFL adoption: subsidizing bulbs, using 
bulk procurement, imposing quality standards, off ering 
certifi cation, and mounting advertising campaigns.
WBG portfolio
Since 1994, the WBG has supported residential CFL pro-
grams in more than 20 countries; the Bank has covered 
some 50 million CFLs primarily through bulk distribu-
tion or market-based projects. Many projects have received 
GEF or carbon fund support, though many recent projects 
aimed at rapid crisis mitigation have been implemented 
without GEF assistance.
Th e WBG has supported residential CFL 
programs in more than 20 countries.
In the early 1990s, WBG-GEF projects supported CFL 
distribution in Jamaica, Mexico, Poland, and Th ailand. In 
 Poland, though CFL sales increased and signifi cant power 
savings were attained, market transformation eff ects were 
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CFL projects have also been a cost-effective response to en-
ergy emergencies, saving both costs of providing additional 
capacity and the fuel cost of running diesel generators. For 
example, during a 2007 power crisis in Ethiopia, $5 million 
was spent on 4.6 million CFLs, which were expected to save 
315 GWh per year for 4 years. Meeting the same demand 
for 4 years using leased diesel generators would have cost 
$20–$115 million in leasing costs and $152 million in fuel 
costs (EEPC 2009) and resulted in about 750,000 tons of 
additional CO2 emissions.
Unlike incandescent lights, standard CFL bulbs contain a 
small amount of mercury (about 0.001–0.025 grams, com-
pared to 0.5–3.0 grams in a mercury thermometer.3 By 
some calculations, use of incandescent bulbs triggers more 
mercury release into the atmosphere because of the mer-
cury content of coal. Mercury concerns have not played a 
major part in CFL project design. These projects typically 
trigger environmental category B for safeguards,4 but on 
the basis of other, larger, power sector components. Most 
CFL projects do not explicitly mention mercury issues, but 
the most recent Bank CFL projects (Rwanda 2008, Senegal 
2008, Benin 2009, and Mali 2009) incorporate designs for 
collection or disposal mechanisms. Bank projects in Ethiopia 
(2006, 2007) are studying CFL disposal options for Sub-
Saharan Africa.
Coordination with policy reform
The first phase of this climate evaluation (IEG 2009) 
pointed to the potential to combine electricity pricing re-
form with promotion of CFLs and other efficiency devices 
as a way of cushioning the transition to environmentally 
and financially sustainable pricing. Although many re-
cent energy projects include both CFL distribution and 
tariff reform (for example, in Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, 
and Togo), this has tended to occur because both CFLs 
and tariff reform are practical responses to power supply 
shortages. In these cases, CFLs have been “sold” as a peak 
load reduction tool, rather than as a tool to mitigate tariff 
increases. Thus the potential for policy coordination re-
mains unexplored.
The potential for combining CFL 
 distribution with tariff reforms remains 
largely unexplored.
Incentives for staff and managers
These projects offer high returns, but they may not be at-
tractive to Bank staff and management in an environment 
that measures results by volume of disbursements. As an 
example, compare a $5.7 million GEF-funded energy ef-
ficiency project in Vietnam that included a $1.8 million 
component for a residential CFL component to a $335 mil-
lion hydropower generation project in Ethiopia, funded in 
ELI deployed a variety of tools to encourage commercial-
ized use of CFLs, combining limited-term subsidies, stan-
dards and labeling, public education, and targeted credit 
schemes. Although the credit schemes were generally un-
successful, the $15 million project claimed direct reduc-
tions of 2,590 GWh and 1.9 billion tons of CO2. The project 
claims also to have catalyzed reductions in CFL prices. It 
is not possible to validate these claims—for instance, there 
are no statistics on CFL prices and diffusion in comparison 
countries—but the project would have a high return even if 
these impacts are overstated by a factor of 10. 
In a follow-on project, the Bank and IFC, with GEF fund-
ing, commissioned the China Standard Certification Cen-
ter to operate the ELI Quality Certification Institute, which 
develops quality standards and licenses manufacturers who 
comply to use the ELI label. Some Bank projects use ELI 
standards for procurement practices; so far the impact of 
ELI standards on commercial markets is unclear.
The best-documented completed Bank project was 
 undertaken by Electricity of Vietnam over 2004–07, with 
GEF funding. The project included a CFL component that 
distributed 1 million bulbs to rural customers at a cost 
of $1.8 million, along with other energy efficiency activi-
ties. Bulbs were purchased using bulk supply contracts at 
an average price of $1.07 per lamp and sold to customers 
by Electricity of Vietnam at an average price of $1.56 per 
lamp. In comparison, existing retail prices were $2.00–
3.00 per lamp. Many utilities lack incentive to participate 
in programs that reduce electricity sales, but Electricity of 
Viet Nam was strongly motivated because it is mandated 
to serve low-income and peak-hour customers at prices 
below its cost (average marginal revenue from power sales 
was 4.5 cents/kWh as opposed to average marginal cost of 
8 cents/kWh).
The best-documented CFL project resulted 
in energy savings of 46 GWh per year at a 
cost of $1.8 million.
An ex post evaluation (IIEC 2006) found a peak load reduc-
tion of 30.1 MW, energy savings of 45.9 GWh per year, and 
expected lifetime energy savings of 243 GWh. Average cus-
tomer power bill savings were estimated to be 15.2 percent. 
Failure rates of CFLs were relatively low (0.5 percent), and 
the utility replaced failed lamps. A substantial subsequent 
rise in CFL sales was attributed to an accompanying public 
education and CFL promotion campaign. The benefits from 
increased private sales potentially exceed the benefits from 
the primary distribution campaign. Although this market 
transformation impact is difficult to validate, it is plausible 
given the extremely large increase (80 percent and 150 per-
cent increases in first-year sales for the two largest sellers). 
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of market failures, these buildings are likely to be energy 
inefficient and carbon intensive, and they will stand for de-
cades. At the same time, demand for energy-intensive appli-
ances such as televisions, refrigerators, and air conditioners 
is growing rapidly. As noted in Phase I of this evaluation, 
there is large scope for supporting policies for building and 
appliance efficiency. 
The WBG has modestly supported policy formulation but, 
with the notable exception of two Chinese projects, has not 
been deeply involved in implementation. There is consider-
able scope here for public-private coordination. The World 
Bank could support policy implementation, and IFC (fol-
lowing the precedent of ELI) could work with manufactur-
ers to promote more efficient and cost-effective products 
and practices. 
Overcoming barriers to adoption and diffusion
Many of the barriers to energy efficiency lending are in fact 
barriers to general lending: lack of liquidity, inability to 
make long loans, and inability to rely on contracts. Hence, 
guarantees have been useful not as a temporary device to 
overcome banks’ unfamiliarity with energy efficiency, but 
rather the means to convince them to lend to enterprises 
with poor collateral. Future use of guarantees should be 
more tightly focused on these targets. Technical assistance 
does appear to have helped some banks identify and market 
energy efficiency lending opportunities. 
Energy efficiency policies loom large as complements to 
finance. China’s vigorous push for energy efficiency was a 
motivator for industrial investments. Hungary’s innova-
tions in municipal finance opened cost-saving, emissions-
reducing opportunities. As noted in first phase of this 
 evaluation, cost-reflective prices are important motivators 
for efficiency.
Growing but largely unevaluated experience with CFL dis-
tribution projects suggests that public policies can over-
come household barriers to adoption. Carbon finance 
would be another possible mechanism to pay for light bulb 
distribution, because the carbon returns are large relative 
to CFL costs. Further analysis is needed to determine when 
a one-time subsidized distribution of CFLs is sufficient to 
trigger follow-on adoption and diffusion. 
IFC could use its direct investments to promote energy ef-
ficiency at three levels. First, just as it has encouraged client 
banks to market energy efficiency solutions to their own 
clients, IFC itself could proactively seek new markets with 
large impacts. These could include, for instance, develop-
ers of large commercial buildings and residential develop-
ments that are interested in pursuing low-energy building 
concepts, including nascent proposals for “eco-cities.” 
Second, within its current client base, IFC could prioritize 
the attention of energy efficiency staff to projects with the 
part with a $198 million IDA credit. The hydropower plant 
 contributes 35 times as much to a tally of Bank disburse-
ments but costs the Bank only 3.8 times as much in prepara-
tion and supervision. Overall, the hydropower project cost 
58 times as much as the energy efficiency project and 183 
times as much as the CFL component. Yet it generated only 
about 20 times as much power and provided only about 
4.5 times as much capacity. This is not to suggest these two 
particular projects were substitutes or were inappropriate. 
Rather it serves to illustrate the order of magnitude of Bank 
costs, client costs, and client benefits in energy efficiency 
and renewable projects; it also suggests why preparation of 
small energy efficiency projects has relied on trust funds 
rather than Bank budget.
The Way Forward for Energy Efficiency
Economic and GHG returns to energy efficiency 
investments
Efficient lighting may offer extraordinarily high economic 
returns, with substantial GHG reductions as a by-product. 
Promotion of efficient lighting may have large catalytic or 
demonstration effects. A concerted, multinational effort to 
pursue incandescent phase-out could lead to economies of 
scale in production and distribution. Such an effort might 
require considerable WBG staff time for preparation and 
coordination but relatively low loan or grant amounts. Re-
duction of transmission and distribution losses also offers 
apparently high returns and scope for large investments.
Scattered information from industrial energy efficiency 
intermediation projects suggests that SMEs can achieve 
attractive rates of return through retrofits. But there may 
also be high returns in large, greenfield companies. Many 
companies operate at the state of the art in efficiency, but 
not all do. A recent study in China found that large cement 
companies investing in new facilities failed to incorporate 
technologies that would have financial returns greater than 
35 percent (not taking into account carbon benefits) (Price 
and others 2009). Globally, cement and steel account for 
15 percent of energy-related GHG emissions, about three-
quarters as much as coal burning, so this is an important 
target for improved efficiency.
Studies project large energy efficiency 
 opportunities in the building sector, where 
market failures abound, representing a 
largely untapped area for WBG intervention.
Studies project large energy efficiency opportunities in 
the building sector, where market failures abound. Rapid 
urbanization during the coming decades will result in the 
construction of billions of square meters each year. Because 
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Th ere remains a tremendous need to 
 understand what works and what does not 
in the evolving fi eld of energy effi  ciency.
Th ere remains a tremendous need to understand what 
works and what does not in this still-evolving fi eld. Finan-
cial returns to energy effi  ciency are poorly and inconsis-
tently measured. A lack of monitoring information on the 
state of T&D losses weakens power planning and makes it 
more diffi  cult to locate high-return investments. And there 
is a desperate need for applied operations research in effi  -
cient lighting programs to understand which consumer and 
producer barriers are most salient and which interventions 
are most eff ective.
Th e fi rst phase of this evaluation stressed the importance 
of developing indicators for energy effi  ciency to set targets 
and assess progress. Learning is critical, because energy 
effi  ciency promotion is less well understood than renew-
able energy promotion. However, current project-level 
 methodologies are haphazardly applied, oft en lack ex post 
measurement, and are inconsistent in their treatment of 
projects that combine retrofi ts with capacity expansion. 
Th e United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 
however, has documented that it is possible to set up infor-
mation networks that facilitate benchmarking and sharing 
of infromation on effi  ciency performance. At the national 
level, several countries are beginning to assemble sectoral 
information on energy effi  ciency, as a recent ESMAP-
sponsored workshop showed. “Bottom-up” indicators, for 
example, for particular industry sectors or for power distri-
bution losses, would be more useful for the purposes dis-
cussed here than national level indicators.
highest potential for savings. Currently, IFC has devoted 
staff  attention to small loans off ering only a few thousand 
tons per year of CO2 savings, and in at least one case (the 
above-noted distribution utility) failing to follow up on a 
project off ering energy and CO2 savings a hundred times 
greater. IFC has just hired an expert in building energy 
 effi  ciency—how should this expert’s scarce time be allocated 
for maximum impact? Th ird, IFC could encourage bench-
marking of performance among its smaller direct clients 
and among clients of fi nancial intermediaries, preparing 
standardized audit services and loan products for them.
Systems issues
Energy effi  ciency can off er a cost-eff ective alternative to 
new generation, but this may be overlooked in the ab-
sence of a view of the entire power system. Similarly, the 
congestion impacts of new generation on transmission can 
be overlooked. A systems view is important to address the 
degree to which energy effi  ciency provokes “snap-back”—
increased consumption of electricity as its eff ective price 
drops. 
Learning and feedback
Most of the fi nancial intermediation projects had a ratio-
nale of promoting diff usion of fi nancial technologies—that 
is, the techniques of appraising and structuring energy ef-
fi ciency loans. However, this was most eff ective in China, 
where the Bank’s Energy Conservation Project (especially) 
and IFC’s CHUEE Program (to a lesser extent) sought to 
build networks and disseminate information throughout 
the fi nancial and end-user industries. In contrast, most 
other projects did not create explicit channels for diff usion, 
and banks had little motivation for sharing their learning 
with competitors.
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Bus rapid transit systems oﬀ er good returns • 
in reduced travel time, congestion, and air 
 pollution, with carbon cobenefi ts.
Targeting, price-setting, and fi nancial sustain-• 
ability are major challenges for forest projects 
using payments for environmental services.
The BioCarbon Fund has helped cata-• 
lyze the forest carbon market but has had 
 implementation problems.
Protected areas have been eﬀ ective in reduc-• 
ing tropical deforestation, especially where 
sustainable use is permitted; indigenous areas 
are even more eﬀ ective. 
IFC investments in the Amazon did not • 
 catalyze deforestation, but neither did they 
catalyze widespread changes in industry 
practice.
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Beyond Energy: Low-Carbon Paths  
in Cities and Forests
The futures of cities, urban transport, and growth are intertwined. Urban agglomera-
tions have the potential to provide a high-productivity, integrated labor market if 
urban services, especially transportation, work efficiently. Once urban layouts have 
been established, they can persist for decades, even centuries, shaping circulation 
 patterns (Shalizi and Lecocq 2009). So avoiding lock-in is important for urban efficiency 
(and lower emissions) in those countries that are still urbanizing. 
Since the adoption of the SFDCC, the WBG has launched 
new analytic and  collaborative activities to promote effi-
cient cities, including the Eco2 Initiative and ESMAP’s En-
ergy Efficient Cities Initiative. 
Urban Transit
This section examines bus rapid transit (BRT), for which 
there is a longer track record. Invented in the city of Curiti-
ba, Brazil, in the 1960s, this is emerging as the single largest 
line of WBG action within urban transportation. 
BRT refers to a range of options (FTA 2003). At a mini-
mum, it involves moving buses out of mixed traffic into bus 
priority lanes or into exclusive bus lanes as a way to ap-
peal to passengers who put a premium on time savings. At 
the high end, it includes bus rapid transit systems (BRTS). 
A low-budget version of a metro system, BRTS use artic-
ulated buses on dedicated roadways, allowing the system 
to move more people more quickly than traditional buses 
on shared, clogged roadways. The capital costs (per kilo-
meter of line) of a BRT can be a quarter to a third of the 
cost of building a comparable tramway and 5–10 percent 
of the cost of a metro system. (Nonetheless, metros may be 
cost-effective in certain high-density locales, and the World 
Bank continues to support them.) 
Transport, development, and climate
In the non-OECD countries, GHG emissions from trans-
port nearly doubled from 1990 to 2006, and transport’s 
share of emissions rose from 5.6 to 12.8 percent.1 If these 
countries emulate developed countries, transport emissions 
will continue to grow rapidly. At the global level, within the 
transport sector, the land transport subsector accounted for 
85 percent of all energy consumed in 2009. To make a dent 
in CO2 reduction in the transport sector, the primary focus 
will have to be on road transport, both within and between 
cities.
In already urbanized regions such as Latin America, public 
transport typically accounts for at least half of public trips. 
There is an opportunity for developing countries to main-
tain this high share for public transport if they can avoid 
the death spiral found in developed countries. In that spi-
ral, a burgeoning middle class abandons poor-quality pub-
lic transport for autos, imposing congestion and pollution 
costs on everyone. With ridership declining, public tran-
sit is forced to raise fares or further reduce quality, driv-
ing away more passengers, with a share declining to 10 or 
20 percent.
Developing countries may be able to avoid 
the spiral of declining public transport 
quality, rising fares, and declining market 
share that some developed countries have 
experienced.
The consequences of this spiral are dire for developing 
country cities because of their lack of road capacity. In 
many developing countries, the circulation system in cities 
accounts for 10–20 percent of the urban area, in contrast to 
35–50 percent in developed countries. Squeezing more cars 
onto limited roadways generates congestion and height-
ened CO2 emissions.
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The WBG urban transport portfolio (2003–08) 
Th e IEG review of the overall transport portfolio (IEG 
2007) noted that the number of urban transport operations 
is small relative to the scale of the problem. It suggested 
that the limited activity may refl ect the complexity of these 
projects, but nonetheless it recommended that this subsec-
tor of activity should grow. Since then the WBG Transport 
Business Strategy for 2008–12 has identifi ed climate change 
as one of its fi ve strategic objectives. 
Bus rapid transit projects, many with 
 carbon objectives, multiplied at the Bank 
aft er 2002.
During 2003–08 there were 36 World Bank urban trans-
port operations, versus 37 in the previous fi ve-year period 
1998–2002. However, average Bank commitments per year 
declined from $713 to $611 million. Th e decline in part re-
fl ects a complete lack of new operations in South Asia in 
2003–08. However, a post-2008 upsurge may signal a par-
tial reversal of trends.
During 2003–08, there was a clear shift  toward BRT. Th ere 
were 19 such operations (11 for full BRTS), compared with 
6 in 1998–2002 (only one of which was for a BRTS). Th e 
new operations were concentrated in Latin America and 
East Asia.
Attention to carbon has been increasing. During 2003–08, 
39 percent of the urban transport operations had formal 
or informal2 carbon reduction goals, versus 19 percent in 
the prereview period. As many as 10 operations in 2003–08 
had components to monitor carbon reduction (compared 
to only 1 in the previous period), 6 of which involved GEF 
fi nancing to develop the components. 
Barriers and interventions to reducing congestion and 
CO2 emissions
BRTSs face a number of barriers:
Conﬂ icting demand for road space.•  Establishing dedicated 
bus lanes can displace other road users, creating resis-
tance to the loss of circulation space and leading to spill-
over of traffi  c to neighboring roads. Demand manage-
ment and parking restrictions are potential responses.
Institutional problems.•  Th e real benefi ts of mass public 
transportation are only realized with a multicorridor 
trunk route system that is linked to a series of feeder 
routes. Scaling up to such a system puts a premium on 
coordinated planning in multi-jurisdictional metropol-
itan areas and on sustained long-term political commit-
ment to routes and land use zoning. 
Opposition by taxi and minivan owners.•  BRT achieves 
pollution, congestion, and carbon emissions reductions 
largely by substituting for existing fl eets of minibuses. 
Such fl eets are highly polluting and unsafe but employ 
thousands of drivers, who tend to oppose change. Th is 
process has proven to be politically contentious in many 
cities; responses include fi nding ways to integrate the driv-
ers into the new system or otherwise compensate them. 
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Without an explicit goal to reduce CO2 emissions, the World Bank has been financing urban transport projects in 
Bogota since the mid-1990s and has contributed to the development of Bogota’s TransMilenio BRT system. One of 
the earliest programs of Bank support for a BRTS, this is an example of learning by doing. 
Under the first Bank-funded Urban Transport Project, the World Bank helped finance traffic management systems 
along existing bus ways and connecting roads to improve the traffic throughput to an existing BRT corridor. 
This project also funded background studies that led to the development of a better parking policy for the city. 
According to the project completion report, this effort more than doubled average bus speeds, boosting them 
from an initial 12 kilometers per hour to 27 kilometers per hour post-project. 
The second project, the $130 million Bogota Urban Services, was designed to help implement the second 
corridor in the BRTS and promote nonmotorized traffic (an extensive network of bike paths). A third project, the 
$757 million Integrated Mass Transit System, was designed to support the critical second (post-demonstration) 
phase of Bogota’s BRTS as a citywide integrated trunk-and-feeder system with 14 additional corridors and 
an integrated fare system, and to introduce a number of transport demand-management initiatives. Most 
importantly, the Integrated Mass Transit System expanded BRTSs to five other cities, replicating the experience 
of Bogota but tailoring it to specific conditions of those selected cities.
By 2004, Bogota’s BRTS already consisted of 58 kilometers of dedicated bus ways and 309 kilometers of feeder 
routes and moved more than 800,000 passengers per day. According to Wright (2004), carbon emissions reduction 
has been achieved through a combination of improved public transport and the introduction of complementary 
transport demand management policies to discourage the use of private vehicles and roadway space. The 
20 percent increase in gasoline taxes, 100 percent increase in parking fees, and restriction on private car travel 
during peak hours are said to have reduced car traffic by 40 percent per day. 
Wright and Fulton (2005) list the key factors contributing to emission reduction:
Replacing four to five smaller buses with larger articulated buses and requiring the destruction of four to •	
eight older buses for every new articulated vehicle introduced into the system; articulated buses are more fuel 
efficient per passenger-kilometer traveled. 
Increasing the vehicle load factor to approximately 80–90 percent by implementing global positioning system-•	
controlled management of the fleet, allowing the optimization of demand and supply during peak and nonpeak 
hours.
Enforcing emission standards, requiring buses to be EURO II emission level–compliant.•	
Increasing the share of public transport ridership in total transit. By 2002, the share of private car and taxi trips in •	
total trips was said to have been reduced from 19.7 to 17.5 percent and the share of public transit trips increased 
from 67 to 68 percent (Karekezi, Majaro, and Johnson 2003).
One of the main barriers to system expansion was resistance to expansion of the BRT from current bus owners—an 
issue endemic to BRT implementation. The two corridors of Phase I of the TransMilenio BRT were designed to 
meet only about 10 percent of the public transportation demand, with the remaining 90 percent being met 
Box 4.1 The TransMilenio BRTS
The challenges to bus rapid transit include 
competing demand for road space, lack of 
coordination between neighboring cities, 
and opposition by taxi and private minibus 
owners.
The BRT experience
Among WBG-supported programs, the BRTSs that are 
most developed are those of Bogota and Mexico City. In 
both cases, the WBG worked with willing clients, who had 
already concluded that BRTS was a desirable  alternative. 
In Bogota (box 4.1), a sequence of learning-by-doing 
loans totaling $887 million (together with non-Bank car-
bon revenues) supported expansion of BRT corridors and 
their integration into a citywide trunk and feeder sys-
tem, with attention to bikeways and pedestrians. System 
expansion was complemented with serious demand-side 
measures, including doubling parking fees, boosting the 
gasoline tax, and restricting car travel during peak hours. 
Cooperatives were formed to offer employment to the for-
mer bus drivers as part of the new feeder routes. Compa-
nies participating in the new routes were required to scrap 
four to nine old buses for each new articulated bus added 
to the system. 
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However, even as the old buses are scrapped and their driv-
ers assimilated into the system, it has been difficult to ex-
clude new entrants who import additional second-hand 
buses. Although the system was initially successful in at-
tracting riders, there are signs of an incipient rising fare/
declining ridership cycle; concerns about passenger safety 
are also eroding ridership, and public sentiment is shifting 
toward new metro lines (Gilbert 2008). Overall, however, 
the system is viewed as having demonstrated BRTS feasibil-
ity, and the Bank has actively facilitated visits to the project 
by potential foreign emulators. Current projects seek to add 
eight more BRT lines to the Bogota system and replicate it 
in five other cities.
The most developed systems were initially 
successful, but the future is uncertain.
In Mexico City, the BRTS was largely financed domesti-
cally, but the World Bank had two catalytic interventions. 
First, a $6 million GEF-funded Bank project supported 
 institutional development for implementing the system. 
Second, a World Bank–financed carbon project arranged 
for $2.4 million in carbon credit purchase. This is a small 
portion of the total $49.4 million project cost, but the pro-
ponents claim that the association with carbon has helped 
popularize the project. In addition, the project was respon-
sible for developing the second CDM-approved method-
ology for assessing GHG reductions in public transport, 
opening the way for CDM finance of BRTS elsewhere.
Impacts
Dedicated bus lanes (precursors to BRTS) have been shown 
to increase travel speeds for bus passengers by 20–60 per-
cent, based on completion reports (for example, from 
21.4 to 30 kilometers per hour in the Liaoning project in 
China, 15.6 to 25 kilometers per hour in the Shijiazhuang 
project in China, and 15 to 22 kilometers per hour in the 
Dhaka project in Bangladesh). The Dhaka urban transport 
air-quality project also showed a dramatic drop in local 
air pollutants (31 percent decrease in PM10, 59 percent in 
hydrocarbons, 28 percent in carbon monoxide) after three 
wheelers with highly polluting two-stroke engines were 
 removed, generating $25 million per annum in health ben-
efits for the city. 
by conventional transport systems, in particular a number of small bus owners competing with each other for 
passengers. Hence, the first phase did not displace many bus owners. The subsequent phases (with an additional 
14 corridors), however, were designed to increase the share of BRT in total public transit to 70 percent and could 
drastically reduce the role of the remaining small bus owners. 
The solution to this has been to form cooperatives or holding companies that would employ many of the 
bus owners/drivers (the balance being placed in alternate jobs through financial transfers). The difficulties in 
implementing this solution are ongoing but declining. 
A related problem has been the difficulty in enforcing the phase-out of old buses. This phase-out affects the 
expected reduction in externalities determined at appraisal—particularly GHG reductions. Despite a monitored 
scrapping program in which the low-quality minibuses were exchanged for higher-quality articulated buses at 
the prescribed exchange rate and their destruction supervised, the total number of minibuses in the city did not 
decline as expected. The inability to enforce regulations, such as licenses and routes for minibuses, resulted in new 
entrants and the use of secondhand mini-buses. It also generated congestion in other parts of the city. The hoped-
for reduction in CO2 emissions from scrapping buses will be frustrated if other old buses are pressed into service 
and increase their annual mileage.
Maintaining and increasing ridership is also a challenge. Gilbert (2008) points to contractual arrangements that 
necessitate raising fares when ridership projections are lower than anticipated. That creates a spiral of decreasing 
ridership caused by higher prices and leading to new rounds of price increases and the inability to ensure safety 
on the new lines, which also contributes to ridership loss. In addition, the cost differential between extending the 
BRTS and extending the metro is declining as the system expands into more difficult terrain. As a result of all of 
this, the middle class (whose rate of BRT usage is highest relative to the lower income and higher income groups) 
has started voicing support for new metro lines at the expense of the BRT network. 
The Bogota experience has piqued global interest in BRTSs. The Bank and other donors have facilitated visits by 
officials from other countries to see the experiment in Bogota. In fact, many other countries are learning from 
this experience and are now designing or implementing their own systems. However, the program is not yet fully 
implemented, and it is too early to judge whether it will realize the full benefits anticipated from expansion to a 
multiline, citywide, integrated system.
Sources: Wright 2004, Gilbert 2008, TransMilenio PDD 2004.
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Dedicated bus lanes have been shown to 
increase travel speeds.
In Bogota, CDM validation reports showed annual CO2 
savings rising from 56,000 tons of CO2e in 2006 to 79,000 
in 2009. Ridership increased from 346 to 449 million. The 
proportion of passengers attracted from private cars and 
taxis fell from 9.8 to 6.9 percent. 
BRTSs offer attractive economic returns in 
fuel and time savings, reduced congestion, 
and reduced air pollution.
In Mexico, the $47 million project is estimated to yield 
 annual noncarbon savings of $15.42 million (Schipper and 
others 2009). About a third is from fuel and time savings of 
bus riders, and the remainder is external benefits from re-
duced air pollution, congestion, and fuel expenditure by oth-
ers. Annual CO2 reductions were measured at 39,870 tons 
of CO2 for 2007–08. At current CO2 prices, these benefits 
are small relative to the local economic benefits.
Conclusions
Based on limited evidence, BRTSs offer attractive economic 
returns to cities as a whole in time savings, fuel  savings, re-
duced pollution, and reduced congestion; the savings do 
not go directly to the implementing agency. The short-run 
reductions in GHG generate carbon credits that are mod-
est in value compared to the direct local benefits. Single-line 
BRTSs have little impact on overall urban CO2 emissions—
for instance, the reductions in Mexico city are less than 0.25 
percent of urban emissions from transport (Schipper and 
others 2009). In other words, these investments make a lot 
of sense as development interventions with CO2 cobenefits; 
they would never be chosen solely as means to reduce CO2. 
In the medium run, there are likely to be declining returns 
as the number of corridors increases within a city; but cu-
mulative emissions reductions for the system as a whole 
could increase, to 250,000–400,000 tons of CO2e per year. 
Long-term impacts could differ substantially; BRTSs could 
be a contributing component in the construction of efficient 
cities with low carbon footprints, if they are able to retain 
their share of passenger trips. Demand-side management 
will be an important part of such a scenario.
Efficient transport planning will require a systems view for 
planning and monitoring. Installation of a BRT corridor 
causes ripples throughout the entire transport network as 
people change trip patterns and vehicles enter the system. 
Indirect impacts could magnify or counteract the corridor-
level benefits; these need to be anticipated and tracked. 
 Although CDM projects have the tremendous benefit 
of tracking ridership and fuel use, they typically do not 
 monitor systemwide travel patterns. This requires system-
wide travel surveys, which are expensive but informative.
As the World Bank embarks on sponsoring BRTSs around 
the world, it should take the opportunity to promote har-
monized monitoring of impacts. The Clean Technology 
Fund or other concessional funds could be used to mount 
regular, consistent travel surveys. This would allow correct 
measurement of impacts and could stimulate south-south 
sharing of experience and drawing of lessons. 
Forests
Deforestation accounts for roughly one-fifth to one-sixth of 
human-caused GHG emissions. Emissions result as forests 
are cleared and burned to make way for farms and ranches 
and to a lesser extent from damage caused by careless log-
gers. Most emissions are from tropical moist forests, where 
deforestation rates are high and biomass is dense.
At CO2 values of $10–$20 per ton, forests are worth much 
more as living carbon storage than as sites for farms or for 
cattle ranches. Forests have additional value as havens for 
biodiversity, and they play a role in regulating water flows. 
Nevertheless, forests are cut. Where land and forest tenure 
is well defined, landowners face strong incentives to liqui-
date standing forests (rather than patiently harvest them 
over rotations of 30–100 years) and replace them with cash 
crops, cattle, or fast-growing trees. In many forests, tenure 
is poorly defined, and people may use deforestation as a 
mechanism to claim land as the approach of roads or mar-
kets causes it to appreciate in value (Chomitz 2007).
Forests can be worth more as living  carbon 
storage than as sites for farms or cattle ranches.
In principle, landholders or nations would reduce defor-
estation if they were compensated for the local and global 
benefits their forests provide. This has motivated the REDD 
agenda, an element of ongoing negotiations on the interna-
tional climate regime. REDD seeks to mobilize global funds 
to reward developing countries for reducing emissions. 
Countries would use these funds to implement programs 
and policies to promote sustainable land use.
How, exactly, would that work? Although the forest carbon 
agenda is new, the forest conservation and management 
agenda is not, and World Bank experience provides some 
parallels for potential future REDD actions. 
After briefly reviewing the World Bank forest strategy and 
portfolio, this section reviews three kinds of projects that 
may offer lessons for REDD. By far the largest set of projects 
with an explicit goal of forest conservation is protected area 
projects. A novel approach that closely resembles REDD is 
payment for environmental services, a category of projects that 
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include the forest carbon projects of the BioCarbon Fund. Fi-
nally, the durability and acceptability of forest conservation 
may depend on the sustainable intensification of agriculture, 
to provide the food, timber, and jobs that  motivate deforesta-
tion in the first place. IFC has supported agribusiness at the 
forest frontier with the goal of encouraging sustainability.
The Bank’s 1991 Forest Strategy  mainly 
 focused on environmental issues, 
 particularly protecting tropical forests.
The Bank’s forest strategy and portfolio
The Bank’s 1991 Forest Strategy recognized the role that for-
ests could play in poverty reduction and the importance of 
policy reforms in containing deforestation. However, it main-
ly focused on environmental issues, particularly protecting 
tropical moist forests. It reflected rising international con-
cern about the rate of tropical deforestation through adopt-
ing a “do no harm” approach of not financing commercial 
logging in primary tropical moist forests. Yet as the revised 
strategy attests, this emphasis on safeguarding forests did 
little to help countries actively manage their natural forests, 
especially in the tropics, and left the Bank scant opportunity 
to harness the poverty-reduction potential of forests. Termed 
a “chilling effect” by the IEG (2000) forest strategy review, the 
strategy and associated safeguards prevented Bank staff from 
engaging the sector in proactive ways to improve economic 
and environmental management of tropical forests. 
The 2002 Strategy refocused around 
 poverty reduction, economic management, 
and environmental protection, expanding 
to all forest areas.
The revised 2002 Strategy expanded the Bank’s forest policy 
to include all forest areas; it refocused the strategy around 
three pillars of engagement aligned with the Bank’s mission: 
poverty reduction, economic management (including gov-
ernance), and protection of environmental services and val-
ues. The revised strategy also recognized that the 1991 Strat-
egy did not clearly define implementation mechanisms, but 
rather set out a menu of approaches that could be pursued. 
To harness the potential of forests to reduce poverty, 
the revised strategy recommended strengthening the rights of 
forest-dependent people—especially marginalized groups—
by promoting community forest management and agrofor-
estry. To achieve progress on the second pillar, the  integration 
of forests into sustainable economic development, the Bank 
would help governments improve forest governance by as-
sisting with legal and institutional reforms and encouraging 
investments that catalyze production of forest products. 
The protection of local and global environmental  services 
and values, the third pillar, would be achieved by  continuing 
to support the creation and expansion of  protected  areas, 
improving forest management outside these areas, and 
 developing options to build markets and finance for 
 international public goods such as biodiversity and carbon 
sequestration, that would include payments for forest eco-
system and environmental services. 
A forest portfolio review conducted for this study found 
that investment lending in forests has declined since the 
adoption of the 2002 Forest Strategy (see figure 4.1). The 
portfolio composition has changed, with a shift from 
 investment  projects to Development Policy Loans3 and 
 increased prominence of GEF-funded projects with global 
environmental goals. 
Investment lending in forests has declined 
since adoption of the 2002 policy.
Of the 124 forest-related projects in the 2002–08 portfolio, 
46 had objectives or components related to protected areas, 
and 10 had connections with payment for environmental 
services. Of the 17 projects for which forests were designated 
as the leading sector, 11 contained components related to 
community forest management.
Payment for environmental services
The World Bank has supported roughly a dozen projects 
over the past decade that have incorporated some form of 
payment for environmental services (PES) scheme,  mainly 
in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. PES 
schemes reward landholders for growing or conserving for-
ests, which provide services such as watershed  protection 
and carbon storage. Payment is based on compliance with 
agreed conditions. Because the forest holder is typically not 
able to exclude particular beneficiaries, funds are typically 
raised through a levy on beneficiaries, or through taxation, 
though there are also voluntary payments and market-
based schemes. PES schemes could be one model for imple-
mentation of REDD at the national level.
PES schemes provide one model for imple-
mentation of REDD at the national level.
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provide. This runs into scientific and political difficulties. 
First, the services themselves may be poorly understood and 
measured. A strong folk belief holds that forests generate wa-
ter, while in fact forests typically are net consumers of water. 
Second, cost-effectiveness would require targeting pay-
ments toward forestholders most likely to be dissuaded 
from deforestation, with payment levels tied to the expected 
benefits of conservation. This may conflict with notions of 
equity that favor uniform payment rates (as occurred in 
Mexico and Costa Rica) and favors payments to owners 
who are not inclined to deforest. Third, there is pressure to 
target PES payments to poor people, thus combining social 
and environmental goals. However, poor people may own 
relatively little forest, and the transactions cost of dealing 
with many smallholders is a barrier to including them. 
Targeting and price-setting are major 
 challenges for PES programs.
Econometric analyses of the early experience of the Costa 
Rica and Mexico programs found that they were dispro-
portionately targeted toward lands with little risk of defor-
estation. In the first four rounds of the Mexican program, 
 52–72 percent of PES contracts were in forests in the bottom 
two quintiles of deforestation risk. However, 72–83 percent 
were located in communities in the two highest quintiles of 
economic marginality (Muñoz-Piña and others 2008). 
However, one study (Alix-Garcia, Shapiro, and Sims 2010) 
found that the program may have reduced the probability 
of deforestation by about 10 percentage points. An  analysis 
Costa Rica has led the way in the design and piloting of 
market-based instruments to enhance the provision of for-
est environmental services. The World Bank has been a 
partner in this effort since the mid-1990s. By the end of 
the second phase of Bank support for Costa Rica’s PES pro-
gram, the country will have put in place some 288,000 hect-
ares of land with environmental service contracts (equal to 
approximately 5.6 percent of Costa Rica’s land area), half of 
which will be financed by funding from service users. The 
program showed that PES schemes could be accomplished 
at relatively low administrative costs. A GEF-commissioned 
independent review (Hartshorn, Ferraro and Spergel 2005) 
found that the program had achieved its output goals. But 
it also found that the program had not set up a monitoring 
program adequate to determine impacts.
The need for sustainable, long-term financing mechanisms 
is one of the main lessons that has emerged from the pilot-
ing of PES systems in Latin America. In Costa Rica, the bulk 
of funding for the PES program comes from an earmarked 
fuel tax subject to political decision making; most of the 
payments are for limited duration, leaving no  incentive 
for continued forest care. New financing mechanisms are 
needed to increase the long-term sustainability of the pro-
gram. For instance, the second phase of Bank support for 
the PES program in Costa Rica involves a water tariff that is 
expected to generate $5 million a year in support of water-
shed conservation.
Specifying whom to pay, and how much, is a major challenge 
for these programs. The economic logic of the programs re-
quires rewarding landholders according to the services they 
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The GEF/IBRD Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Approaches to Ecosystem Management Project (2002–08)—
implemented in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua—was designed to test the effects of payment schemes on 
the adoption of conservation practices on cattle farms. The project, the outcome of which IEG rated as highly 
satisfactory, identified a range of technical approaches in each country and tested four main categories of 
silvopastoral systems: forest plantations with livestock grazing; live fencing, wind protection shields, biological 
corridors, and shade for animals; managed succession within silvopastoral systems; and intensive systems for cattle 
and other animal species.
The implementation of these systems resulted in a large body of learning, including 70 reports, refereed journal 
articles, and books about how to induce farmers to adopt biodiversity-friendly, carbon-fixing land uses. In some 
cases, technical assistance and credit are sufficient. In other cases, short-term payments are needed to cover 
farmers’ initial investment costs, but not thereafter. However, land use changes that represent an ongoing 
opportunity cost for farmers require mid- to long-term payments for the environmental services being produced; 
those services could include watershed protection or secondary forest recovery in degraded pastures. 
Different combinations of silvopastoral practices have proven to yield varying internal rates of return; economic 
analysis conducted in Esparaza, Costa Rica, revealed rates from 14 percent for a system with natural pasture and 
a fodder bank to 37 percent for a system with improved pasture and low tree density. Based on the attractiveness 
of a system to an individual farmer, some farmers may be willing to adopt certain systems even in the absence of 
short-term PES incentives. 
Lines of credit for scaled-up silvopastoral system implementation are now being made available through Costa 
Rica’s Cattle Ranchers Association, Nicaragua’s Local Development Fund, and the Ministry of Agriculture in Colombia. 
However, it is unlikely that most farmers will be able to afford the high initial costs of introducing a new land use 
system or that credit will be able to be tapped across all farm households across varying silvopastoral applications. 
Additional and recurrent finance will be especially needed to promote investments in silvopastoral systems that 
generate a high level of public environmental services compared to a more attractive private rate of return.
Source: IEG.
Box 4.2 The Silvopastoral Project: A Successful Demonstration
for Costa Rica for the period 2000–05 found that only 
0.4 percent of targeted landholdings would have experi-
enced deforestation in the absence of the program; similar 
findings were found for earlier periods (Sánchez-Azofeifa 
and others 2007; Pfaff and others 2009). Sills and others 
(2008) find that PES recipients did not reduce deforesta-
tion, but increased reforestation.4 It is possible that the PES 
scheme worked at a political level rather than at the plot 
level, by reinforcing decisions to stiffen penalties for defor-
estation and to market Costa Rica as an ecological tourist 
destination. Costa Rica’s deforestation rate declined to very 
low levels by the late 1990s.
Early programs targeted lands with little 
risk of deforestation, but program designs 
have since improved.
In both countries, ongoing World Bank–supported pro-
grams are contributing to better targeting. One lesson 
learned has been the need to incorporate better up-front 
design for monitoring and evaluation in PES programs to 
allow more timely and reliable impact analysis. The  Regional 
Silvopastoral Project (see box 4.2) is an exemplary use of 
experimental determination of the impact of  alternative 
payment schemes and agroforestry approaches on carbon, 
biodiversity, and farm profits.5
BioCarbon Fund
Launched in 2004, the BioCarbon Fund provides carbon fi-
nance for projects that sequester or conserve GHGs in for-
ests and agro- and other ecosystems. The BioCarbon Fund 
is mostly oriented to forest projects creditable under the 
Kyoto Protocol: afforestation and reforestation. But it also 
pays for credits generated from reduced deforestation and 
from soil carbon, which are not recognized under Kyoto. 
It is thus a prototype of REDD and other post-Kyoto pro-
posed systems.
The BioCarbon Fund has helped catalyze 
the forest carbon market.
The BioCarbon Fund has helped catalyze the forest carbon 
market by contributing to the development of 3 of the 12 
approved afforestation/reforestation methodologies. The 
BioCarbon Fund accounts for 5 of the 13 forestry projects 
registered with the CDM to date. 
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The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
is designed to pilot approaches that might 
be used in a future REDD regime.
A follow-on to the BioCarbon Fund, the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility is designed to pilot approaches that 
might be used in a future REDD regime. It has supported 
the development of readiness plans, broadly outlining plans 
for accomplishing and measuring deforestation reduction, 
in 37 forested countries. It will eventually purchase emis-
sions reductions from countries with approved plans. In-
vestments to implement the plans will be funded via the 
Climate Investment Fund, a separate facility.
Protected areas
The World Bank, combined with finance from GEF, 
has made a significant contribution to creating and 
 strengthening protected areas worldwide. According to the 
GEF  Secretariat, GEF assistance—since it began  operations 
in 1991—has supported more than 1,600 protected  areas 
covering 360 million hectares (GEF 2009). Protected 
 areas now cover more than a quarter of the remaining 
tropical forest, an area equivalent to Argentina and Bolivia 
combined (Nelson and Chomitz 2009).
The World Bank, together with GEF, has 
made a significant contribution to the 
 creation and strengthening of protected 
areas worldwide.
This review identified a population of 114 World Bank 
protected area projects, approved between 1988 and 2000, 
that are located in humid tropical forests. (With high 
 deforestation rates and high biomass, these forests account 
most forest carbon emissions.) Seventy-four percent of 
these projects have been rated satisfactory by IEG (receiv-
ing an outcome rating of moderately satisfactory or higher); 
however, these ratings do not necessarily reflect the effec-
tiveness of the protected area sited, because the protected 
area in many cases is a component of a larger project. Like-
wise, although only 56 percent of this portfolio was rated 
sustainable (likely or highly likely or an equivalent thereof), 
these risk ratings are composite ratings affecting the project 
as a whole.
In fact, despite 20 years of effort in creating protected areas, 
systematic information is lacking on their impact on bio-
diversity, on carbon storage, and on the welfare of people 
who live in and around them. Hence, there is also no reli-
able information on what external and internal factors are 
conducive to positive impacts. 
The BioCarbon Fund has signed emissions reduction pur-
chase agreements (carbon offset purchase agreements) with 
19 projects, originally for a total of $26 million. Focusing 
on poor and rural communities, the fund’s first tranche is 
25 percent invested in Africa. This is a far higher proportion 
than the African share of other carbon funds at the Bank or 
of the CDM as a whole. In its first phase, the fund invested 
heavily in plantations and community reforestation (repre-
senting 34 and 31 percent of the technical distribution of 
the portfolio, respectively), in addition to other activities 
such as environmental restoration, assisted regeneration, 
and agroforestry. 
The Fund has struggled at the project level with implemen-
tation issues that are also encountered in the World Bank’s 
forest operations. However, it has built a comprehensive 
monitoring system, allowing closer scrutiny of perfor-
mance than is possible for many noncarbon projects. As 
of June 2009, 12 of 19 tranche 1 projects were expected to 
deliver less than half of contracted emissions reductions. 
In five of the projects, the contracted amount had already 
been revised downward. 
The BioCarbon Fund has underdelivered 
carbon reductions.
There are several reasons for underdelivery. In Costa Rica 
and Honduras, suitable CDM-eligible land was grossly 
overestimated, and carbon payments were not competi-
tive with other land uses; thus, these projects were scaled 
back by 80 percent or more. Inadequate up-front financing 
constrained planting area in several projects. The  project 
 implementer’s capacity has been low in several cases, 
one factor behind low seedling survival rates in some proj-
ects. Unexpectedly bad weather has hampered projects in 
China and Kenya. 
Given these risks, the Bank has increased supervision to 
try to improve expected delivery from the portfolio. But 
average supervision budgets for these projects already 
exceed the average for the PCF, which has much larger 
projects. 
Preliminary reports show success in the Humbo As-
sisted Natural Regeneration Project in Ethiopia, the first 
large-scale African forestry project to be registered with 
the CDM. This project has adapted techniques demon-
strated in West Africa to promote natural regeneration 
of woodlands and has restored more than 2,700 hectares 
of degraded land. The regeneration project has report-
edly resulted in increased production of honey, fruit, and 
fodder. Further study is needed to assess the economics 
of the project: the labor costs, the impacts on income, 
and the generation of local hydrological and biodiversity 
benefits. 
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They found that protected areas were on average effective in 
reducing deforestation (table 4.1). Multiple-use protected 
areas—those that permitted some forms of  sustainable use 
by local populations—were at least as effective as strictly 
protected areas. Areas that had been returned to  indigenous 
control were most effective of all. Similar results were found 
in a sample restricted to World Bank-supported projects. 
These effects have been obscured in studies which did not 
allow for the possibility that some protected areas are pref-
erentially sited in regions of low deforestation pressure 
(because there are no politically powerful claimants on the 
land) or high pressure (because of the perceived impor-
tance of conservation). 
In Costa Rica and Thailand, protected areas 
have reduced poverty rates.
A recent study (Andam and others 2010) that also used 
controlled comparisons shows that protected areas have 
reduced local poverty rates in Costa Rica and Thailand. 
Again, this impact had been obscured by the tendency for 
protected areas to be located in impoverished regions. 
After 20 years of effort, systematic 
 information is still lacking on the impact 
of  protected areas on biodiversity, carbon 
storage, and the welfare of forest-dependent 
people.
Limited information is available from the Bank’s World 
Wildlife Fund Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool, 
a simple checklist that describes management elements 
but lacks outcome measures. For projects financed partly 
or fully with GEF funding, the GEF Secretariat requires 
tracking reports at inception, mid-term, and completion. 
Compliance with the latter two submissions is imperfect, 
and the Bank does not compile Management Effectiveness 
Tracking Tool reports from its projects. The latest overall 
evaluation of the GEF (GEF Evaluation Office 2010), rec-
ognized the limitation of the tool and called for greater 
reinforcement of it by including indicators for progress to-
ward impact and integrating these systems into the overall 
results based management system of the fifth replenish-
ment of the GEF. 
IEG reviewed 34 protected area projects in forest ecosys-
tems (approved between fiscal 2006 and 2008) for this 
study and found severe limitations in monitoring. Only 
six of the projects included indicators that could track the 
financial sustainability of the targeted protected area—
indicators such as revenue generation, park income, per-
sonnel budgets, or fund-related information. And only 
two projects included baseline measurements of vegeta-
tion cover and species count, although quantitative targets 
(usually in percent terms) for increased cover and greater 
species resilience are often targets set in protected area 
projects.
In the absence of good information, controversy persists 
about the effectiveness of protected areas. Some deride 
 protected areas as ineffectual “paper parks.” Others fear, 
TABle 4.1 impact of Protected Areas in Tropical Forests on Forest Fire incidence
Area Mean fire incidence Mean reduction from 
strict protected areas
Mean reduction from 
multi-use protected areas
Mean reduction from 
indigenous areas
Latin America and the Caribbean 7.4 2.7–4.3 4.8–6.4 16.3–16.5
3.8–7.7 6.2–7.5 12.7–12.8
Africa 6.1 1.0–1.3 (0.1)–3.0 Not applicable
4.4–4.5 Not calculated
Asia 5.5 1.7–2.0 4.3–5.9 Not applicable
2.9–3.1 6.7–5.1
Source: Nelson and Chomitz 2009. 
Note: Table reports percentage point reduction in forest fire incidence, a proxy for deforestation over the entire period 2000–08. Figures in italics 
are for protected areas established 1990–2000; in plain text, all pre-2000 protected areas. 
to the contrary, that these areas are too effective, excluding 
 local people from access to land and forest resources.
As part of this evaluation, Nelson and Chomitz (2009) 
sought to fill the evaluation gap by assessing the global 
impact of all pre-2000 tropical forest protected areas on 
deforestation over 2000–08. They used spatial data on the 
location of protected areas and of forest fires, an indicator 
of deforestation, and controlled for potentially confound-
ing influences such as terrain and remoteness. 
Protected areas have been effective in 
reducing tropical deforestation,  especially 
where sustainable use is permitted; 
 indigenous areas have been even more 
 effective.
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demonstrate that chain-of-custody tracing was reliable and 
feasible, and that verifi ably sustainably produced products 
command a market premium, other agriprocessors might 
“green” their own supply chain. Th is could drive unsustain-
able producers out of business. 
But the conditions for this scenario are stringent. Th e pro-
cessors need to be able to trace the purchases to the point 
of origin—which is diffi  cult because cows and soy can be 
“laundered.” Th en the processors have to verify that the 
originating farms are in compliance with the law, a task 
normally undertaken by government. To motivate these ac-
tions, the processors would have to face a market in which 
a signifi cant proportion of buyers will pay a premium for 
sustainably produced goods. And it has to be possible to 
sustainably intensify production on farms and ranches 
that comply with the law. If any of these conditions fails, 
new investments at the forest frontier could end up simply 
 increasing pressure on the forest.
Outcomes. IFC and Amaggi succeeded in  ensuring that 
no new deforestation occurred on the  company’s own 
farms or on those of prefi nanced suppliers. Th e company 
used a combination of satellite imagery, digital mapping, 
and fi eld visits to verify the behavior of those suppli-
ers. Development of this sophisticated monitoring sys-
tem served the fi rm’s own quality control and fi duciary 
 purposes in addition to satisfying IFC requirements. 
However, a signifi cant proportion of the company’s soy 
purchases were from the third parties that were out-
side the conditions of the loan agreement and for which 
Amaggi had no capacity to identify the farm of origin.
IFC’s agribusiness investments did not 
catalyze deforestation, but neither did they 
catalyze widespread changes in industry 
practices.
Little was accomplished under the environmental cov-
enants of the agreement with the beef producer. Bertin had 
agreed to develop an environmentally sustainable supply 
chain, including 100 percent traceability of its cattle from 
farm to fi nal product , and to make 600 suppliers compli-
ant with labor, land acquisition, and environmental leg-
islation. Although some progress was made with ranches 
receiving direct support from IFC advisory services, many 
supplier were noncomplant. Th e company also purchased 
slaughterhouses close to the Amazon biome in breach of 
IFC’s requirements, without fi rst ensuring the sustainabil-
ity of their supply chains. Th is noncompliance with IFC’s 
social and environmental standards was in eff ect when IFC 
 decided to disengage from the project.
IFC wagered its reputation that these loans would tame, 
rather than encourage, deforestation. On one hand, both 
Agribusiness at the forest frontier 
Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is largely driven 
by conversion to pasture and soy. Over the period 2002–
07, IFC made three loans in the Brazilian Amazon: two 
to a soy processor (Amaggi) and one to a beef processor 
 (Bertin). Th e projects aimed to demonstrate sustainable 
agribusiness practices in the sector by building clients’ en-
vironmental management capacity. Both loans attempted 
a “law abidance” strategy—that is, to bring the respective 
fi rms and their suppliers into compliance with Brazilian 
environmental, social, and land tenure legislation, thereby 
 reducing deforestation in the Amazon. 
Under the IFC loan, the soybean processor commit-
ted to  ensuring that all soybeans grown on its farms and 
all  soybeans purchased from prefi nanced suppliers meet 
 Brazilian and IFC environmental and social regulations. 
With the beef company, IFC sought to ensure compliance 
with Brazilian legislation for all Bertin suppliers, as well 
as to develop a chain of custody system to track animals 
throughout the supply chain.
IFC loans to agriprocessors in the  Brazilian 
Amazon attempted to bring fi rms and 
suppliers into compliance with Brazilian 
environmental law.
Th e law abidance/chain of custody strategy, if successful, 
would ensure that IFC was not directly associated with de-
forestation. And, with the right conditions, it might have 
a market transformation eff ect. If the companies could 
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The success of the Soy Moratorium is based on three  factors. 
It is a policy of zero new deforestation, which bypasses the 
question of the Legal Reserve and land ownership and 
therefore is simple to monitor. Second, as an industrywide 
action, it avoids leakage and achieves economies of scale in 
monitoring. Third, Greenpeace’s participation as an inde-
pendent monitor lends credibility to the enterprise. 
Beef. In June 2008, Greenpeace launched Slaughtering the 
Amazon, an international campaign exposing the market-
ing of beef and leather products from illegally deforested 
Amazonian areas. Shortly thereafter, the federal prosecutor 
of Pará and the Brazilian Environmental Agency brought 
action against 21 ranches and more than 13 slaughter-
houses that purchased cattle from these ranches, includ-
ing IFC’s client. Following warnings that they would be 
subject to prosecution if they continued to purchase from 
these slaughterhouses, 35 supermarkets and wholesalers 
suspended contracts with the offending meat processors. 
Subsequently, four meat processors (including the client) 
agreed not to purchase cattle from ranches that are embar-
goed by the Brazilian Environmental Agency or that engage 
in unlicensed new deforestation in the next two years. 
Success in the beef sector is being won through a strategy 
that depends heavily on government enforcement and the 
comprehensive use of remote sensing and georeferencing 
technologies. In February 2008, the national monetary 
council in Brazil began embargoing the economic use of 
lands illegally deforested, as well as making all agents in 
the productive chain co-responsible for deforestation from 
these areas. The Brazilian Environmental Agency published 
a “dirty list” consisting of municipalities in which most 
 illegal deforestation is occurring and an Internet site listing 
properties embargoed due to deforestation. 
In addition, the 2008 resolution required that all farmers 
wishing to receive credit in the Amazon biome present 
documents (issued by the state environmental agencies) 
demonstrating compliance with Brazilian environmental 
legislation. Mato Grosso and Pará have begun to create 
rural environmental cadastres that register land for envi-
ronmental compliance purposes, sidestepping the complex 
issue of regularizing ownership. 
Finally, the Brazilian government has built on an existing 
cattle-tracking system to control the spread of hoof- 
and-mouth disease. Environmental compliance of land-
holders is now also tracked, incorporating the deforestation 
borrowers have demonstrated the ability to raise funding 
far in excess of that provided by IFC, so IFC’s financing per 
se was not catalytic of deforestation. On the other hand, 
neither did IFC catalyze the kind of widespread change in 
industry practice that would redeem its endorsement of soy 
and beef production at the forest frontier. 
Alternative approaches to ensuring supplier compli-
ance with environmental rules. IFC’s strategy was to hold 
buyers responsible for the legality of their supply chain, 
tracing the chain of custody to the original  producer 
and verifying that producer’s compliance with the law. 
Without significantly strengthened supporting institu-
tions, this strategy was unviable. First, without effective 
institutions and infrastructure to create traceability, non-
compliant farmers could potentially launder their sales 
through “complying” farms. Second, being “out of com-
pliance” was difficult to define. Cases of land invasion, 
rural violence, and forced labor in the Amazon remain in 
legal limbo for decades. Third, an effective, comprehen-
sive georeferenced land registry was required to enforce 
the requirement that landholders keep 80 percent of their 
property under forest cover (the legal forest reserve). But 
no such registry exists. And finally, the commitment of 
the beef purchasers lacked credibility.
Although IFC’s strategy had limited success in the Amazon, 
alternative strategies have shown more success. These rely 
on a combination of external pressure on buyers and the 
use of simple but geographically comprehensive approaches 
to monitoring compliance.
The Soy Moratorium and government 
 enforcement to restrict deforestation for 
cattle development have shown more 
 success in reducing deforestation pressures 
Soy. In the soy sector, industry groups announced in July 2006 
a moratorium on the purchase of soybeans planted in the 
 Amazon in areas deforested after that date. This closely fol-
lowed Greenpeace’s report “Eating up the Amazon” (Green-
peace 2006) and its subsequent international campaign. 
Industry and nongovernmental organizations joined to im-
plement the Soy Moratorium, which continues to date. This 
monitoring system uses existing remote sensing data from 
the Brazilian Space Agency, supplemented by aerial flyovers. 
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areas where land and forest tenure is well defi ned. Project 
experience shows that countries can manage the logistics 
of enrolling, monitoring, and paying service providers. En-
suring sustainable fi nance has been a problem, but REDD 
may solve this. More challenging is devising targeting 
mechanisms and payment schedules that are socially and 
 politically acceptable as well as cost-eff ective in providing 
carbon storage and other environmental services.
Chain-of-custody tracing was an ineffi  cient 
way to monitor environmental compliance: 
if trees are what you care about, it is cheaper 
to watch the forest than to follow the cows 
on their long journey to the market. 
Promotion of sustainably intensifi ed agriculture is the fl ip 
side of forest conservation. If more forest is to be conserved, 
farms, ranches and tree plantations must be intensifi ed on 
existing, perhaps degraded lands, to meet the demand that 
is driving deforestation. Chain-of-custody certifi cation 
of forest-competing products has been seen as a way of 
 shift ing private sector incentives to sustainability, without 
relying on oft en-ineff ective government enforcement. But 
a private-sector-only strategy is also problematic, and that 
chain-of-custody tracing is diffi  cult and expensive. 
A combination of nongovernmental organization- triggered 
pressure on buyers, an independent governmental advo-
catefor environmental enforcement, and  government sanc-
tions has been eff ective. A key technical feature has been 
the use of wide-area remote sensing rather than chain-
of-custody tracing. If trees are the focus of conservation, 
it is cheaper to watch the forest than to follow the cows 
and beans on their long journey to market. Th is experience 
could have important implications for palm oil,  timber, 
and other markets.
monitoring system. Th e cattle-tracking system has been 
modifi ed to track “lots” of animals rather than individuals. 
Th roughout, the quasi-independent public prosecutor has 
been an important catalyst of action.
Deforestation has fallen steadily from 25,000 square 
kilo meters in 2003 to 7,000 square kilometers in 2009; 
 deforestation from September 2009 to February 2010 fell 
more than 50 percent relative to the same months in the 
previous year. It is too early to tell the degree to which this 
is due to enhanced enforcement versus a decline in beef and 
soy prices. 
Conclusions
If the REDD agenda succeeds, countries, donors, and in-
vestors will put up massive funds in hopes of conserving 
forests and fostering sustainable land management in a so-
cially acceptable way. Guidance is needed for these large, 
novel, and complex ventures, which will take many years 
to implement. Unfortunately, the Bank’s long experience in 
relevant areas is not well documented. However, some les-
sons emerge from this review.
Protected area creation has been eff ective, on average, in 
reducing deforestation. Creation of large protected areas 
in remote areas where deforestation is currently low has 
been a farsighted strategy that could reduce future defor-
estation as roads and markets expand. Evidence suggests 
that sustainable-use protected areas are compatible with 
reduced deforestation and that indigenous areas (at least in 
Latin America) are extremely eff ective in preventing defor-
estation. Together with recent fi ndings that protected areas 
may reduce local poverty, this points to the compatibility of 
REDD with sustainable development and suggests greater 
attention on the maintenance and expansion of protected 
and sustainable use forest areas is necessary.
Payment for environmental services schemes could con-
stitute one element of a REDD strategy, appropriate for 
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EVALuATioN HigHLigHTS
Over 2003–08, almost all WBG support for coal • 
has been in IBRD countries.
WBG support for coal power had no impact • 
on technology choice; in one case it may 
have accelerated diﬀ usion of more eﬃ  cient 
 technology.
Rehabilitation of old coal plants proved more • 
diﬃ  cult than anticipated.
Technology transfer projects succeeded only • 
when they planned well for demonstration, 
learning, and diff usion.
Private recipients of technology trans-• 
fer are  reluctant to share technology with 
 competitors.
The World Bank’s Carbon Finance Unit was • 
important in catalyzing the emergence of the 
carbon market.
The World Bank has largely not realized • 
 synergies between operations and carbon 
fi nance.
A sequence of mostly unsuccessful GEF-• 
 fi nanced, IFC-implemented projects has 
 supported small-scale renewable energy 
enterprises.
The Bank moved into pilot areas of the carbon • 
market as planned, but did not exit estab-
lished parts of the market.
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Special Topics
WBG stakeholders are polarized about the organization’s role in supporting coal-fired 
power plants. Coal is the most CO
2
-polluting of fuels and a major contributor to climate 
change. Environmental nongovernmental organizations argue forcefully for the WBG to 
devote its resources and moral authority to finding alternatives. But some  developing 
countries see no affordable alternative to power their aspirations for growth.  Without 
the WBG’s support for coal, “it is the cheaper, dirtier type of coal plants that will 
 proliferate,” argues its chief economist.1
Efficiency in Coal-Fired Generation
In response, the SFDCC sets out criteria for WBG sup-
port for coal-based generation. The WBG can support cli-
ent countries in developing new coal power projects if it 
contributes to energy security, reduced power shortages, 
or increased access; if it is least cost, taking environmen-
tal impacts into account; if it uses best “appropriate avail-
able technology”; and if no donor financing is available for 
lower-emission alternatives.
To assess the costs and benefits of the WBG’s involvement 
with coal power, this chapter of the evaluation examines five 
of the six greenfield or rehabilitation coal power plants in the 
2003–08 portfolio2 and addresses the following questions:
Were there alternatives that were both lower cost and •	
less GHG intensive?
Did WBG involvement improve efficiency or reduce •	
pollution at the plant level?
Does the intervention promote or retard diffusion of •	
higher efficiency technologies? 
Global context and the WBG’s role in power sector 
finance
Barring revolutionary technological developments, coal will 
be in use through mid-century and beyond. International 
Energy Agency projections (OECD-IEA 2009) show that 
under a scenario where the world meets a stringent 450 ppm 
goal for atmospheric CO2, coal will still provide 7,300 tera-
watt hours (TWh) in 2030 (24 percent of global generation), 
down from 8,200 TWh in 2007 (42 percent). Even in this 
450 ppm scenario, coal generation in non-OECD countries 
will be higher in absolute terms in 2030 (5,608 TWh) than 
in 2007 (4,194 TWh). The Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology Future of Coal study (MIT 2007) projected that in an 
active mitigation scenario,  energy from coal over 2000–50 
grows 12 percent in the United States, declines 11 percent in 
China, and grows about 30 percent elsewhere. Coal plants 
have a typical lifespan of 40 years, and many existing plants 
are decades old. Thus even stringent climate scenarios fore-
see new coal plants as part of the mix. 
The WBG is too small to have a large direct impact on 
global power plant construction. New power plants (across 
all fuels) with 607 GW capacity became operational over 
2003–08 in countries eligible for Bank borrowing (IDA/
IBRD/Blend), but WBG-supported projects approved over 
the period contribute only 28 GW.3 Total 2003–08 WBG 
commitments of $5,768 million constitute, as an order of 
magnitude, less than 1 percent of the cost of capacity in-
stalled in borrower countries over this period. 
The WBG is too small to have a large direct 
impact on global power plant  construction, 
but it has a significant role in new 
 generation in the poorest countries.
The WBG does play a significant role in new generation 
in the poorest countries. New generation installed in IDA 
countries over 2003–08 was 21.8 GW, whereas new genera-
tion planned in these countries with some WBG involve-
ment was 6.2 GW, or 29 percent. However, over 2003–08, 
WBG support for coal-fired generation was much more 
prominent outside IDA countries (figure 2.6).
Over 2003–08, almost all WBG support for 
coal has been outside IDA countries.
In sum, substantial developing world investment in coal 
appears to be inevitable over the coming half century. 
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 Consequently, the efficiency with which new or renovated 
plants burn coal will affect global CO2 emissions. The scale 
of that investment for non-IDA countries dwarfs the WBG’s 
financial resources, so any significant WBG influence on 
coal investment or efficiency would have to be primarily via 
other channels, including policy, technical assistance, and 
demonstration effects.
Assessment of WBG support for five coal plants
In Turkey, the World Bank offered support for the rehabili-
tation of the Afsin-Elbistan A thermal power plant to rem-
edy power supply shortages. The plant runs on lignite coal, 
which is plentiful in Turkey but CO2 intensive. The plant’s 
thermal efficiency fell from its design rate of 37 percent 
to 27 percent as a result of poor operations. Rehabilita-
tion seemed an obvious, cost-effective way to boost power 
supply. One would expect CO2 reduction as a side benefit, 
though this was not a project objective. However, this proj-
ect was cancelled after two efforts at procurement failed to 
attract qualified bids, an indication that rehabilitation can 
be complicated.
Power generation from natural gas—a lower-carbon 
 alternative—would have been economically competitive 
with the rehabilitation project, if planning had attached 
a  shadow price to the local air pollution damages from 
coal use. A shadow price of $5/ton of CO2 would also 
have made gas cheaper; this may possibly be monetizable 
 depending on Turkey’s role in a future climate regime. 
However, energy security considerations might put a strong 
premium on diversification away from gas.
In Kosovo, IDA provided a grant totaling $10.5 million in 
technical assistance to help bring in new investments in 
the energy sector and attract private investors to develop 
 Kosovo’s lignite mines and increase capacity for lignite-
fired power generation. Kosovo’s 11.5 billion ton reserve of 
easily accessible lignite constitutes one of this poor coun-
try’s main assets, for both internal consumption and export 
as electricity. The technical assistance was broad, including 
an assessment of carbon mitigation options (including op-
tions to leave space for a carbon capture and storage plant) 
as well as policies for promoting renewable energy in the 
country. The economic analysis for the new plant includ-
ed costs of decreased air quality from plant emissions of 
air pollutants. A systemwide analysis indicated that a new 
lignite-based plant in Kosovo is the least-cost option even 
when carbon prices (or carbon credits) are of the order of 
€10/ton of CO2.
MIGA has issued guarantees for the construction of a 
 660-MW lignite coal power plant in Bulgaria against risks 
of expropriation, war, and civil disturbance. The new plant 
is designed to meet European Union environmental stan-
dards and replaces 500 MW of older, more polluting ca-
pacity (MIGA 2008). MIGA claims that its support was 
essential for the project to mobilize long-term commercial 
bank financing. Alternative sources of power for Bulgaria 
include nuclear, which has lower conventional pollutants 
and would potentially allow Bulgaria to sell CO2 allow-
ances. Nuclear has, however, costs of debated magnitude, 
related to safety and waste disposal.
IFC invested $8 million as equity in the 660-MW Lanco 
Amarkantak coal-based power plant project in Chhattis-
garh, India. IFC’s investment is a small portion of the overall 
cost of the project, which is expected to be about $578 mil-
lion. The financial closure for both units was achieved by 
September 2006—prior to IFC’s approval of equity support 
in June 2007. 
IFC’s support played a marginal role in improving the social 
impact assessment from the power plant and improved the 
environmental design standards of the plant. The plant’s de-
sign efficiency and GHG emissions are at business-as-usual 
levels, and IFC cannot be credited with supporting any 
technological improvements. The environmental impact 
analysis discusses the possibility of cofiring the plant with 
biomass, which would reduce net emissions. Given IFC’s 
relatively small investment, it remains to be seen whether 
any of the proposed social and environmental improve-
ments will be implemented.
In April 2008, the IFC Board approved a $450 million debt 
investment in the Tata Mundra Ultra Mega Power Plant in 
Gujarat, India. The 4-GW project is IFC’s largest coal-fired 
project and IFC’s largest financing to date. The Indian gov-
ernment promoted the development of this plant as critical 
in meeting the power needs of a number of Indian states 
through transmission of power on regional and national 
grids. The plant is currently under construction.
IFC’s support for this project probably resulted in improved 
design standards for environmental performance. IFC did 
not have a role in the technology choice, as the  Indian 
government preselected the supercritical technology. 
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However, to the extent that the plant displaced subcritical 
coal plants, it may result in emissions reductions of about 
10 percent—significant, but far less than the 40 percent dif-
ferential relative to the existing coal fleet average that IFC 
cites in the project’s Environmental and Social Review. 
It is likely that IFC’s funding was required for the plant 
to  secure financing, and its successful closure has helped 
 reduce doubts within the domestic banking industry about 
the  viability of such large competitively bid projects. Thus 
it is plausible that the project may help catalyze the Indian 
 power sector’s movement away from subcritical to more 
 efficient supercritical technologies. This provides a clear 
demonstration of the WBG dilemma: the investment has 
supported what will be one of the largest point sources of 
CO2 on the planet, but may well have reduced them incre-
mentally compared to a scenario without IFC involvement.
Appendix tables E.1 and E.2 summarize the five cases.
The WBG had little direct impact on technology choice. 
Kosovo was the only case in which the WBG supported ex 
ante planning, but a definitive technology recommendation 
was not made. In the other cases, technology was largely 
or entirely predetermined by project sponsors before WBG 
involvement. Hence, the main potential channel of WBG 
involvement was through the decision on whether to sup-
port the project—and whether that decision was critical to 
the fate of the project. This was likely in the case of Tata 
Mundra and possible for Maritza. There was no impact in 
the cases of Lanco (which would have taken place anyway) 
or the Afsin-Elbistan A thermal power plant in Turkey.
The WBG has little direct impact on 
 technology choices.
Did the WBG explore cost-effective alternatives to these 
plants? (All these plants were appraised before the SFDCC. 
However, the IFC plants were subject to Performance Stan-
dard 3, which requires investigation of alternatives.) The 
best case is that of Kosovo. The Kosovo analysis and the re-
lated southeast Europe analyses explicitly considered dam-
ages from local air pollution and the systemwide impacts of 
a shadow price on CO2. 
Nonetheless, a recent World Bank study points to very low 
electricity tariffs in Kosovo, and high rates of nonpayment 
by customers, with the result that “35–60 percent of the to-
tal final energy consumption in households is technically 
or economically lost” (Renner and others 2009). Techni-
cal losses alone are estimated at 18 percent. So there could 
be cost-effective ways to reduce excess demand, in part 
through increased technical efficiency or by boosting prices 
and collections to financially sustainable levels. In the case 
of India, the government reports that overall transmis-
sion and distribution system losses are 27 percent (though 
lower in the areas served by the plant under construction). 
The scope for efficiency improvements in India appears to 
be large and likely insufficiently tapped.
Kosovo and southeast Europe analyses 
demonstrate an approach for  considering 
damages from local air pollution and 
 incorporating the shadow price of CO2.
Do plant-level efficiency improvements, such as those argu-
ably achieved in India, promote or undermine systemwide 
levels of energy intensity and CO2 intensity? It is difficult 
to answer this question quantitatively, but the channels of 
impact can be sketched out and in some cases the level of 
impact indicated. 
First, as seen in the case of the Indian power plant, WBG 
support could help reduce perceived risk of a new technol-
ogy in a new setting, catalyzing its adoption and reduc-
ing CO2 emissions against a business-as-usual scenario at 
some plants. Second, such support could in theory reduce 
the price of coal power relative to gas or hydropower. This 
could induce a country to shift, at the margin, to greater 
investment in coal, counteracting the new technology’s 
 efficiency gains. 
However, this risk appears to be implausible in the case of 
a shifts to supercritical, ultrasupercritical, or Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle coal technologies. These 
technologies save fuel costs relative to subcritical coal, but 
have higher capital costs and so, on balance, produce power 
at about the same cost. Promotion of these technologies 
would therefore be expected to reduce emissions but not to 
appreciably induce shifts from gas or hydropower to coal.
Most difficult to assess is the symbolic or leadership impact 
of the WBG in supporting or disengaging from coal power. 
However, there are analogies in other sectors. The WBG has 
supported global phase-out of leaded gasoline, prohibition 
of project support for tobacco, and phase-out of gas flaring 
and venting. The leaded gasoline phase-out has had consid-
erable success. Tobacco and lead control offer large domes-
tic benefits, facilitating acceptance of the WBG role. The 
gas flaring initiative also potentially offers domestic benefits 
and has nominal support from many country partners.
Does the WBG have a compelling role in support for mak-
ing coal power plants more efficient? It is clear that “retail” 
WBG support makes little difference, one way or the other, to 
global generating capacity because of the vast scale  involved. 
It is conceivable that such support might be essential to 
 particular low-income countries with poor credit and no 
alternative power sources. It is conceivable also that support 
for regulatory changes or pilots that promote  efficient coal 
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technologies could accelerate diffusion of those technolo-
gies within particular middle-income countries,  possibly 
with high leverage in reducing CO2 emissions.  Recently 
approved World Bank projects to rehabilitate  Chinese and 
Indian coal generators use this rationale. 
Choices at the country level—whether financed by the WBG 
or not—would be illuminated by systemwide analyses of ex-
pansion options. Such assessments would consider efficien-
cy options, assign costs to domestic pollution, and explore 
different shadow prices for CO2. Such analyses would clearly 
show when there are no domestically affordable alternatives 
to coal power and would help to defuse controversy. This 
approach is consistent with that of the SFDCC, but with an 
emphasis of the additionality of WBG support in effecting 
poverty reduction or technology diffusion benefits.
Decisions about coal should use 
 systemwide analyses that consider 
 efficiency alternatives, local pollution costs, 
and shadow prices of CO2.
Technology Promotion and Transfer
Great hopes are pinned on technology, a cornerstone of 
both the Bali Action Plan and the SFDCC. Developing 
countries hope not only to acquire hardware—such as wind 
turbines and solar panels—but also to gain the capability to 
manufacture and innovate, sparking industrial growth.
At the global level, new technologies are conventionally un-
derstood to follow a path from laboratory research, through 
piloting and technical demonstration, to commercial dem-
onstration, and finally widespread deployment and diffu-
sion, with continual improvements and innovations along 
the way. With increasing cumulative production, firms 
learn and costs decline, tracing a learning or experience 
curve. This reflects the solution of technical problems and 
the advantage of economies of scale (box 5.1).
There is debate about where to draw the line between 
public and private support and between coordination and 
competition. There is general agreement, however, that ex-
pensive basic research, such as that underpinning nuclear 
fusion, must be government supported. Public sponsor-
ship of pilot or demonstration plants, with data provided 
to all in the industry, also makes sense as a public good. 
The existence of a declining cost curve suggests that there 
are increasing returns to concentrating resources in a few 
technologies—a “big push” could produce a competitive 
product. However, many worry that public sector groups 
are ill equipped to pick winners in this manner.
There is debate about where in the 
 technology development cycle to draw the 
line between public and private support.
Similarly, there has been a vigorous debate about the role 
of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in energy and cli-
mate technologies. What is the proper balance between 
 rewarding innovators and accelerating access to new ideas? 
A growing literature on this topic notes that patents, or 
even trade secrets, are only one facet of technology transfer 
and typically represent only a small proportion of energy 
technology costs. Possibly more important are transfer of 
tacit knowledge and learning by doing.
Complementing the global technology development cycle is 
the process through which technologies diffuse across and 
within nations. The WBG has been active in this technol-
ogy transfer process. It encompasses piloting, where glob-
ally available technologies are tested against and adapted 
to local conditions; demonstration, to convince producers, 
 investors, and users of the technology’s reliability and cost 
Many studies have shown that manufacturing costs decline with an industry’s cumulative production. The reasons 
include debugging and refinement of processes and economies of scale. 
Learning rates are expressed as the percentage decline in unit costs with each doubling of cumulative industry 
production. According to a review by Neij (2008), learning rates in renewable energy range from 2.5 percent for 
geothermal and 5 percent for biofuel to 15 percent for wind and 20 percent for solar photovoltaics. 
These statistical results are useful for summarizing experience, but they do not tell us how learning works. Costs 
can decline as a result of true learning as manufacturers tune their equipment and procedures, research and devel-
opment, economies of scale, or increased competition among producers or component suppliers. The rate of cost 
decline is not predetermined, but can be influenced through these different channels.
Source: Neij 2008.
Box 5.1 Technology Learning (or Experience) Curves
At the global level, technology costs decline 
with increasing production.
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In 1996, the GEF’s Scientific and Technical Advisory 
Panel identified CSP as a promising target for technology 
promotion under the GEF’s new Operational Program 7 
(OP7). At the time, although a subsidized CSP plant had 
been operating in the United States since the 1980s, no 
new plant had been constructed anywhere since 1991; the 
technology’s high cost was unsupportable, especially as 
electricity deregulation progressed. Support for CSP was 
in line with the goal of OP7, that “through learning and 
economies of scale, the levelized energy costs (of renew-
able technologies) will decline to commercially competi-
tive levels” (GEF 2003). 
In April 1997, the GEF approved a grant of $47 million to 
India for a CSP project and subsequently approved requests 
for projects in Egypt, Mexico, and Morocco. The projects 
went to the Bank for development and execution. The India 
project was dropped; the others proceeded slowly.
A fundamental source of project delay was a mismatch 
between project goals and design. The projects’ intent was 
to drive the technology down the learning curve. How-
ever, the total planned capacity of 120 MW was only a 
fraction of the amount needed to yield real cost reduc-
tions. Moreover, a learning goal would have been more 
efficiently served by clustering the plants in the same 
country or region. This would have allowed manufactur-
ers and developers to more easily assemble the necessary 
skills and build manufacturing for components in large 
quantity locally—activities that can help drive costs down 
more quickly. 
Project delays were in part due to mismatch 
between project goals and design.
From the host countries’ viewpoint, these plants were an 
unproven and potentially unreliable source of power. To 
address host countries’ concerns about power reliability, 
the plants were designed as hybrids, incorporating much 
larger gas-fired generators. This greatly complicated project 
design and procurement. In India, it proved economically 
infeasible to build a gas pipeline to the project, which was 
dropped. 
Bidding the hybrids was problematic. An integrated ap-
proach to project contracting carried the risk that there 
would be little competition or that contractors would be un-
willing to guarantee performance of the novel system. The 
alternative approach—separate contracts for gas, solar, and 
for systems integration—is complex to manage and could 
lead to disputes in the case of poor performance. Both ap-
proaches have now been employed. A retrospective on this 
experience, when complete, could provide useful guidance 
for future WBG work on integrated systems—for instance, 
in potential work on carbon capture and storage.
Spectrum of Technology Support
Commercial
demo
CSP Fuel cells Photovoltaic Boilers
Scale-up Diffusion
Source: IEG.
Note: CSP = concentrated solar power.
FigurE 5.1
The concentrating solar power experience 
In 1997, the GEF approved the first of four World Bank-
executed projects designed to accelerate the diffusion of 
concentrated solar power (CSP). CSP, which uses focused 
sunlight to drive a steam turbine or heat engine, is at-
tractive to the developing world. It can take advantage of 
high levels of insolation in arid and semi-arid areas such 
as northern Africa, the Middle East, western India, south-
ern Africa, and northeastern Brazil. It is steadier than wind 
power, providing power throughout the day and even into 
the night, using molten salt to store heat. And it is based 
on relatively low-tech components—mirrors and pipes—
potentially within the manufacturing capabilities of many 
developing countries. 
An effort to accelerate concentrated solar 
power technology bogged down.
Yet this effort to accelerate technology bogged down.  After 
13 years, 2 of the projects are finally under construction, 
1 is out for bid, and the last was cancelled. What are the 
lessons of that 13-year experience for WBG technology 
policy? 
effectiveness; and diffusion and scale-up, to reduce local 
costs toward the global minimum and to help stimulate 
supply and demand. 
WBG support for technology transfer 
can help reduce local costs towards global 
levels.
To bring concrete experience to these sometimes abstract 
debates, we review here some of the largest and most prom-
inent examples of WBG support for energy technology pro-
motion and transfer, across the spectrum from  upstream 
to downstream. These are roughly depicted along an up-
stream-downstream spectrum in figure 5.1.
However, this evaluation uses the term “technology” to re-
fer any kind of know-how or innovation that can advance 
development and GHG mitigation. For instance, ESCOs, 
chain-of-custody tracing of beef, and BRTSs all qualify as 
technologies. 
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air pollution and crop-damaging acid rain. Th e report sug-
gested that better boiler designs could yield 10–20 percent 
effi  ciency gains.
Consequently, a 1997 GEF-funded, Bank-executed project 
sought to spur Chinese capacity to build effi  cient industrial 
boilers, complementing government effi  ciency policies. Th e 
project’s objectives were to reduce GHG emissions and lo-
cal air pollution through the development and deployment 
of “aff ordable, energy-effi  cient and cleaner” boilers through 
design and policy reform. Most of the $32 million grant was 
spent on acquiring technology (IPRs) for new or upgraded 
boiler designs and auxiliary equipment (such as grates) and 
transferring the technology to domestic manufacturers. 
Procurement was protracted and diffi  cult 
because few companies were interested in 
selling the technology. 
Two problems were encountered during implementation. 
Both related to the project’s strategy of picking winners, that 
is, precisely specifying the boiler types to be transferred. 
First, procurement was protracted and diffi  cult. A combi-
nation of small contracts, tightly specifi ed technologies, and 
a two-step (technical/fi nancial) bidding process, together 
with concerns about IPR security, deterred participation by 
foreign technology suppliers. Only one package had mul-
tiple bidders, and two had none. Th en, “once contracts were 
awarded, contract negotiations proved diffi  cult in some 
cases, due to diffi  culties in meeting commercial terms and 
performance criteria using Chinese coals. Coupled with 
misunderstandings concerning Chinese and international 
contracting procedures, all of these factors contributed to 
delays in fi nalizing technology transfer contracts” (World 
Bank 2004). Th is process delayed implementation by at 
least two years. Meanwhile, evolving environmental regula-
tions banned the deployment of some of the smaller boilers 
selected for the project. 
Th e project concluded in 2004. A follow-up survey com-
missioned for this evaluation found that the benefi ciary 
companies produced a total of 7,414 tons per hour of new 
boilers in 2009, accounting for 3.3 percent of the national 
market against an anticipated 35 percent. 
A 1997 project transferred technology 
licenses for effi  cient industrial boilers to 
Chinese manufacturers.
Firms had divergent experiences. Two companies were 
highly successful in producing and marketing the new 
 boilers. Th ese well-run companies invested in their own re-
search and development, improving the designs and keep-
ing costs nearly competitive with the older, less-effi  cient 
A second issue, inherent to any advanced technology 
 project, has to do with cost uncertainty and paucity of sup-
pliers. When a technology is new, there will be few experi-
enced suppliers, and cost information will be uncertain and 
closely held by those few. In the case of the GEF-Bank CSP 
projects, initial cost estimates were grossly underestimated. 
Actual bids came in well above the estimates, but the GEF 
grant amounts were already fi xed. Hence the size of the CSP 
plants had to be scaled back, a process that incurred rene-
gotiation and delay. In addition, procurement staff  had to 
wrestle with the problem of few qualifi ed bidders. Although 
procurement rules exist for this circumstance, its relative 
novelty led to a cautious and protracted process. 
A further obstacle was the Bank’s initial insistence that 
the CSP plants be operated by private sector independent 
 power producers (IPPs). Th ere was great enthusiasm for 
IPPs in the Bank at the time, but they were not present in 
the CSP host countries even for traditional power plants. 
Th e IPP requirement thus complicated a technological 
innovation by overlaying an institutional one. Moreover, 
the IPP approach held no attractions for the state utilities, 
whose cooperation was essential. 
During the long gestation period of the three surviving 
projects, much changed at GEF and in the power indus-
try at large. Disenchanted with OP7, the GEF eliminated 
it. Meanwhile, CSP experienced a renaissance, driven by a 
Spanish policy of generous feed-in tariff s and renewed in-
terest in the United States. (Th e GEF projects, according to 
some industry observers, may have helped maintain inter-
est in CSP in the meantime.) Costs appear to have declined, 
and several diff erent technologies became available. 
Buoyed by these changes and the advent of the Clean 
Technology Fund, and subjected to vigorous external criti-
cism for prioritizing coal over CSP, the WBG is planning 
a $750 million investment in a $5.6 billion, 900-MW set 
of CSP projects in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and 
 Tunisia. A project is also planned for South Africa. Unlike 
the modest original investment, these new projects would 
potentially increase cumulative global capacity by a signifi -
cant proportion and would be geographically concentrat-
ed. So there is a greater potential for advancing the global 
learning curve. Th e imminent completion of the CSP proj-
ects in Morocco and Egypt may help inspire interest in and 
support for the wider new venture.
China Eﬃ  cient Industrial Boiler Project
In the early 1990s, GEF-funded World Bank-Chinese anal-
ysis (NEPA and others 1994) found that industrial boilers 
consumed 350 million tons of coal annually (more than 
the power sector) and accounted for 30 percent of China’s 
energy-related CO2 emissions. Th e boilers were also re-
sponsible for a large proportion of health-damaging urban 
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REDP spurred manufacturer  capabilities 
through quality-contingent output 
 subsidies.
REDP used a combination of technical assistance, incen-
tives, and subsidies to boost the capabilities of the small-
scale SHS manufacturers. SHS manufacture is a relatively 
low-tech assembly business carried out in small workshops. 
A nascent industry already existed, including spin-offs of a 
former government research institute in Xining. But manu-
facturing costs were high and SHS reliability low. 
REDP offered a $1.50/Wp subsidy for manufacturing, con-
tingent on meeting quality standards including component 
quality. To help companies meet those standards, it provid-
ed partial funding for company proposals to improve finan-
cial management, quality control, and marketing practices, 
and to adapt and develop technologies. The technologies 
involved were modest but crucial. For instance, some com-
panies developed improved charge controllers—the appa-
ratus that prevents batteries from being overcharged and 
is thus essential for SHS life and performance. These were 
adapted to operating conditions typical of the high plateaus 
where customers lived.
The project resulted in lower costs for 
larger systems, growth of firms in size and 
 competence, and improved technology.
The combination of financing, incentives, and technical 
 assistance was effective. 
SHS costs declined for larger systems•	 . The project im-
proved firms’ quality control, reducing wastage; may 
have contributed to greater scale economies at the firm 
level; and reduced mark-ups as competition increased.
Firms grew.•	  Employment in monitored companies more 
than doubled over 2002–07, and sales increased 363 
percent.
Firms became more competent, and quality improved.•	  All 
but two of the 17 participating firms received ISO 9001 
certification. Seventy-four component suppliers were 
REDP certified.
Technology improved.•	  The technology improvement pro-
gram supported 197 proposals, with an average grant of 
$17,500. The project reported that among 81 audited 
projects, 95 percent achieved their objectives.
As in the case of the Efficient Boiler Project, project-
 supported technologies became proprietary and were not 
shared among companies. This might spur technological 
competition but may sacrifice opportunities for industry-
wide advancement. The REDP model is now being applied 
to the more expensive and technologically sophisticated 
boilers. They also launched effective marketing campaigns. 
In contrast, the other six companies abandoned or deem-
phasized the new boilers, for a variety of reasons. They were 
less able to keep costs down, and customers were not will-
ing to pay a 20 percent premium for the new boilers, being 
distrustful of the promised three-year payback. As noted, 
the markets were increasingly restricted by environmental 
rules. And finally, some companies found more lucrative 
markets, such as waste heat recovery, in a rapidly changing 
market.
Two successful technology recipients 
improved the designs and reduced costs; 
six others abandoned or deemphasized the 
boilers. 
At appraisal, the project’s intention was that “[t]echnolo-
gies that are proven to be technically and commercially 
successful will be disseminated to other boiler producers 
in China” (World Bank 1996), a key avenue of technology 
diffusion. However, an IEG survey found that none of the 
manufacturers deliberately licensed or retransferred their 
technologies to other firms, fearing competition. The most 
successful firm reported the existence of unauthorized cop-
ies of their designs, so some informal diffusion may have 
occurred, but the quantity and efficiency of the copies are 
not known. 
Data are lacking on the performance of the auxiliary equip-
ment manufacturers. However, one of the grate manufac-
turers has been successful, because the new grates are not 
much more expensive than traditional ones but offer sig-
nificant fuel savings.
None of the manufacturers licensed or 
retransferred their technologies to other 
firms, limiting the overall impact.
Meanwhile, the government has imposed new mandatory 
standards for boilers, effective 2010, that are somewhat less 
stringent than the boiler project’s design standards.
Renewable Energy Development Project
The Chinese REDP (1999–2008) provides an interesting 
counterpoint to the Efficient Boiler Project. Another large 
technology transfer project, REDP emphasized support for 
domestic research and development and manufacturing 
competence rather than licensing of foreign IPRs. With $40 
million from an IBRD loan and a GEF grant, the project 
focused primarily on establishing a sustainable market for 
rural solar home systems (SHS). It aimed to do so by over-
coming barriers to commercialization: inexperience of lo-
cal manufacturers, poor quality products, and high market 
prices.
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emphasis has shift ed from SHSs to support for manu-
facturing of solar modules.
In 2001, IFC loaned $1 million to a private company •	
to invest in sustainable energy SMEs, especially those 
that off ered electricity to unelectrifi ed households, pro-
vided back-up energy sources to companies, or lacked 
access to fi nancing and technical advice. Th e company 
fully disbursed the $1 million loan to eight sustainable 
energy SMEs in Latin America and Africa to fi nance in-
vestments in fi xed assets and working capital. Projects 
funded include solar water heaters, photovoltaic power, 
natural gas power, hydropower, and energy effi  ciency 
improvements. 
Th e Solar Development Group•	 , a $41 million initiative 
funded by IFC and GEF, was initiated in 1999 with the 
goal of increasing the delivery of SHS to rural house-
holds in developing countries. Th e group was comprised 
of two separate entities: Solar Development Capital, a 
private equity fund for private solar photovoltaic and 
solar photovoltaic-related businesses, and the Solar De-
velopment Foundation, a nonprofi t entity that provided 
grants for business development assistance. Th e Foun-
dation raised $12 million and disbursed $2.2 million in 
technical assistance to 63 projects. Solar Development 
Capital disbursed only $660,000 and was liquidated 
(IFC 2007). Overall, the project did little to meet the 
objective of accelerating the growth of solar photovol-
taic installations and closed in 2004.
Environmental Opportunities Facility.•	  In 2002, IFC es-
tablished this facility to provide catalytic funding for 
innovative ventures with the potential to increase 
 environmental sustainability and the need to overcome 
goal of promoting wind turbine improvements, under the 
China Renewable Energy Scale-Up Project.
IFC support for technology transfer and deployment
Over the past 15 years, IFC has mounted a number of initia-
tives to invest equity, technical assistance, or both in start-up 
or early-stage clean technology ventures. Mostly funded by 
the GEF, these initiatives have targeted both precommercial 
and commercial technologies. Th ese high-risk ventures have 
fi t uneasily within IFC’s generally conservative, risk-averse 
culture and indeed many have had a disappointing record. 
A sequence of mostly unsuccessful  projects, 
fi nanced by GEF and implemented by 
IFC, has supported high-risk, small-scale 
 renewable energy enterprises.
A sequence of mostly unsuccessful GEF-fi nanced projects 
has supported small-scale renewable energy enterprises. 
Th ese include the following:
Th e IFC-GEF Small and Medium Enterprise Program.•	  
In 1995, a $20 million initiative funded by GEF to in-
crease the markets of SMEs in the areas of climate change 
mitigation. Th e program provided loans of $500,000 to 
$1 million to various intermediaries and private compa-
nies for on-lending to SMEs. Th ough the program was 
not designed specifi cally to target the solar photovoltaic 
sector, it included six solar photovoltaic-related invest-
ments. Although solar photovoltaic proved to be too risky 
for most fi nancial intermediaries, the SME program was 
able to place funds in other technologies and sectors. 
Renewable Energy and Energy Eﬃ  ciency Fund.•	  In 1997, this 
fund was designed to place equity and debt investments 
in projects using renewable energy and energy effi  ciency 
technologies. But it had diffi  culty developing a project 
pipeline, failing to meet modest targets. Developed as a 
consortium, the division of responsibility among partici-
pant companies was unclear. Having made only one in-
vestment, the project was restructured in 2006 and folded 
into the Sustainable Energy Facility (see below). 
Photovoltaic Market Transformation Initiative.•	  In 
1998, IFC launched the $30 million Photovoltaic 
Market Transformation Initiative to provide conces-
sional  fi nance and grants. Th e program was designed 
to accelerate the sustainable commercialization and 
fi nancial viability of solar photovoltaic technology 
in India, Kenya, and Morocco. Early Initiative eff orts 
took too long to materialize and required extensive 
documentation that proved to be too burdensome for 
small  investments. In addition, the photovoltaic SMEs 
were operating with thin margins. Th e project was 
 restructured in 2004 and aimed at industry-level rather 
than project-level capacity building. Results have been 
poor in  Kenya and Morocco (IFC 2007). In India, the 
Ph
ot
o 
by
 T
re
v
o
r 
Sa
m
so
n,
 c
ou
rte
sy
 o
f t
he
 W
o
rld
 B
an
k 
Ph
ot
o 
Li
br
ar
y.
CI Change Chapter 05.indd   69 11/3/2010   10:16:26 AM
70 | Climate Change and the World Bank Group
that are proven elsewhere in the world; it is prepared to take 
some risks for prospectively high returns. At the same time, 
an investment in one of the developing world’s first large 
grid-connected solar photovoltaic power plants also stresses 
working with a well-qualified company, and the project 
provides for the construction of a “knowledge platform” to 
share project results.
A fresh approach emphasizes transfer 
of well-proven technologies and creation of 
knowledge platforms to share results.
Demonstration and piloting in recent low-carbon 
energy projects
Technology transfer can occur through piloting and dem-
onstration. Existing technologies face new challenges when 
put in a new context. For instance, biomass technologies 
may require technical, logistical, contractual, and regula-
tory adjustments to adapt to a novel location with untried 
feedstock. An effective pilot project will have a coherent 
logical framework for demonstration. So, for instance, if 
the goal was to demonstrate the technical and financial vi-
ability of a biomass technology so as to induce spontane-
ous replication, the project should specify the technical and 
financial indicators that will be collected at the plant level, 
the target audience, how the results will be communicated, 
and how uptake of the technology will be tracked.
Recently initiated pilot projects had good 
plans for monitoring internal project 
 outcomes.
To gauge the extent and practice of such projects, IEG did 
a desk survey of low-carbon energy projects over 2007–09 
for this evaluation. It found 21 projects that contained ei-
ther pilot or demonstration in their project objectives, with 
total commitments of roughly $1.4 billion (see table H.1). 
Eleven of these projects were GEF supported; eight had 
solely GEF support. Nearly all project designs contained 
good plans for monitoring internal project outcomes, but 
only eight projects displayed a strong logical framework 
for demonstration; few project designs contained any mea-
surement of external demonstration effects. Although the 
three carbon finance project designs included excellent in-
ternal outcome measures (through the CDM), they lacked 
a coherent mechanism for demonstration and contained no 
measurement of demonstration impacts.
Only 8 of 21 projects had strong  logical 
frameworks for demonstration, and 
few contained any measurement of external 
demonstration effects.
significant  barriers, such as entering new markets and 
applying new technologies and new business  models. 
The facility provided technical assistance grants and 
 investment funding to projects with significant environ-
mental benefits or projects that led to cleaner  production. 
As of 2009, only 4 projects have been committed, and 25 
received technical assistance grants. High cost, low buy-
in from bilateral donors, unfocused strategy, and resource 
limitations led to under achievements in placing funds. 
As a pilot facility, the program aimed to demonstrate the 
 viability of early-stage cleaner production projects. How-
ever, case studies and dissemination workshops appear 
to have had little impact on technology diffusion.
Sustainable Energy Facility with E•	 &Co. In 2005, IFC 
 established the Sustainable Energy Facility Project. The 
project consists of $14 million of investment  capital 
and up to an additional $ 2.6 million for technical 
 assistance and capacity building. Based on a mid-term 
 self- evaluation, this facility appears to have learned the 
lessons of its predecessors, incorporating greater flex-
ibility in technology and attention to making sure prod-
ucts are demanded by markets. Like some of its prede-
cessors it combines technical assistance and investment, 
taking a quasi-venture capital approach. 
One of IFC’s furthest ventures into upstream tech-
nologies is its GEF-supported Fuel Cell Initiative, initi-
ated in 2001. The pilot phase was expected to support 
three companies with different fuel cell technologies 
and help increase their supply of fuel cells, reduce their 
manufacturing and installation costs, and demonstrate 
the  viability of the technology. The target market was 
backup and remote-location power for telecom compa-
nies. The program was supposed to close in December 
2008, but to date only about 85 systems have been in-
stalled, against a target of 400. There was no demand for 
the remote-location fuel cell.
In sum, IFC’s GEF-funded projects seem to have suffered 
from a persistent set of design flaws. They have often sup-
ported companies with the double handicap of inexpe-
rienced management and technology that is not locally 
 familiar. They have supported products that are too ad-
vanced or expensive for the target market. And they have 
sometimes presumed overoptimistically that providing 
technology to specific firms would lead to spontaneous 
 diffusion of that technology.
IFC’s GEF projects have suffered from 
 persistent design flaws.
There are, however, indications of a fresh approach that 
recognizes these past shortcomings. A new initiative on 
early-stage clean-tech venture capital is led by staff who 
were involved in IFC’s high-risk but ultimately high-return 
investments in African telecom. The new approach seeks to 
support experienced management in adopting  technologies 
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Technology transfer projects face a number 
of barriers and disincentives.
Addressing these barriers requires a host of instruments. 
Th e prominence of GEF and donor funding points to con-
cessional funds as one way to overcome borrower risk 
aversion and to support higher preparation and supervi-
sion costs. Staff  and management incentives need to be 
 addressed—at the very least, by ensuring that pilot and 
demonstration projects are assessed as pilots, with recog-
nition of the benefi t of informative “failures.” Th e WBG 
should consider setting up a physical or virtual  technology 
unit as a resource for project teams. Th e unit could provide 
advice on procurement, IPRs, diff usion mechanisms, and 
monitoring. It could also advise on the advantages and risks 
of engaging with less-mature technologies.
Th e WBG should be cautious about trying to advance tech-
nologies at the global level. It has little direct experience 
with upstream technology development. Th ere is, how-
ever, an a priori argument for research and development 
support for technologies that reduce poverty and are easy 
to replicate—meaning that there is little private sector in-
terest in them. Th ese might include, for instance, farming 
 techniques such as biochar (which increase soil fertility and 
sequester carbon), improved cookstoves, and techniques 
for reducing urban heat island eff ects. 
To make a global diff erence at the scale-up stage—push a 
technology down the cost curve at the global level—the 
scale of intervention needs to be large relative to cumulative 
global production. For instance, WBG and Clean Technol-
ogy Fund resources are large enough, if leveraged, to signifi -
cantly increase the global capacity of CSP but are small com-
pared to the global investment needed to advance carbon 
capture and storage. And such eff orts require weighing the 
relative merits of a purely country-based approach with one 
based on global procurement. For example, there are poten-
tial advantages and disadvantages of a single global tender 
for CSP plants (resulting in a standardized design, with 
economies of scale and competition) versus a series of sepa-
rate smaller tenders in diff erent countries (developing more 
technology paths, but not moving far along each one). 
Th ese choices involve some degree of “picking winners,” 
which requires balancing risks against rewards. If the WBG 
gets involved in these activities, it needs to develop (or co-
ordinate with others) a clear technology map with goals 
and exit criteria.
Carbon Finance at the WBG
Th e UNFCCC, to which virtually all countries subscribe, 
has the goal of stabilizing atmospheric GHGs to head off  
dangerous climate impacts. Th e carbon market, a creation 
Conclusions
Th e WBG’s eff orts to promote technologies have oft en foun-
dered. Th ere is a recurrent set of factors in these  failures:
Th e projects oft en did not set out a clear logical frame-•	
work linking interventions to technological progress. 
Eff orts to support upstream technologies have been far 
too small by themselves to advance those technologies 
along a global learning curve.
New technologies inherently have few suppliers and •	
poorly known costs. Th e World Bank’s procurement 
system is not well adapted for these situations.
A combination of inexperienced entrepreneurs and un-•	
familiar technology constitutes a double set of hurdles. 
REDP, however, shows that it is possible to address both 
challenges.
“Demonstration” projects fail if private companies, un-•	
derstandably, want to keep technologies proprietary.
Successful projects, in contrast, planned well for demon-
stration, learning, and diff usion. REDP supported techno-
logical progress in many competing fi rms, stimulating the 
industry’s growth. Th e Energy Conservation Project intro-
duced the institutional technology of energy performance 
contracting and arranged for benefi ciary fi rms to partici-
pate in demonstration, while they adapted the practice to 
local conditions. It also disseminated 75 specifi c techniques 
for industrial energy conservation. 
Th e Regional Silvopastoral Project rigorously documented 
and publicized its achievements in boosting farm produc-
tivity and sustainability, which facilitated scale-up. Th ere 
are signs that some of these lessons are being incorporated 
in new eff orts. Th e GEF Evaluation Offi  ce cites a United 
Nations Development Programme energy effi  ciency proj-
ect that was carefully designed for replication and success-
fully did that (NCSTE 2009).
Successful projects planned well for 
 demonstration, learning, and diff usion.
Technology transfer projects face a number of barriers and 
disincentives. Smaller (more pilot-like) projects may have 
disproportionately high costs of preparing and supervis-
ing, including eff ective design and monitoring of diff u-
sion impacts. Borrowers—and country directors—may 
perceive (correctly or not) that these projects are risky. 
Projects that involve less-commercial technologies may 
run into procurement issues beyond the expertise of most 
staff . Projects may also involve complex issues of intellec-
tual property rights. 
Should the WBG support the development of technologies 
proprietary to individual companies? Under what circum-
stances should publicly supported technologies be provided 
open source, as a public good, to an entire industry?
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of the Kyoto Protocol, is supposed to reduce the cost of 
achieving that goal, making it easier for countries to agree 
on what to do and how to pay for it. It does this by requiring 
developed countries to limit their emissions, but allowing 
them to meet that limit by paying to reduce emissions (buy-
ing carbon credits) abroad rather than at home. Developing 
countries face no caps but can sell carbon offsets—reduc-
tions of emissions compared with emission levels from do-
ing business as usual.
There are cheaper opportunities to reduce 
emissions in transition and developing 
countries than in developed ones.
The carbon market, inspired by successful market-based 
schemes to reduce acid rain, was attractive for several rea-
sons. The atmosphere does not care where the CO2 comes 
from—the impact on climate change is the same. Compared 
with developed countries, transition and developing coun-
tries have cheaper opportunities to reduce emissions, the 
former through replacing a legacy of energy-wasting infra-
structure and industry and the latter by installing efficient 
Carbon offsets are a peculiar commodity. They are defined as the difference between the number of tons of GHG 
you emit and the number of tons you would have emitted had you not been paid not to emit them. In an idealized 
example, the offer of carbon payments might induce a utility to build a geothermal power plant (with no emis-
sions) rather than a cheaper diesel plant (which would have emitted 100,000 tons per year). The offset would then 
be 100,000 tons per year.
Actual emissions can be measured with instruments, but quantifying counterfactual, business-as-usual emis-
sions is difficult. Both sellers and buyers have an incentive to claim offsets for a project that they were going to do 
anyway—projects that are not “additional.” But if many people did this, then these bogus offsets would be used by 
purchasers to increase their emissions above agreed limits, frustrating the goal of the Kyoto Protocol.
This is the heart of the additionality dilemma. The CDM has set up an elaborate system for determining additional-
ity for each proposed project. The project proponent must argue that carbon funding is critical to project bank-
ability or helps to overcome other kinds of barriers. Methodologies for demonstrating additionality are developed 
at some cost by the first people to undertake a specific kind of project. Then, if approved by the CDM, that meth-
odology is available to others, accelerating project approval. The CDM uses private third-party verifiers to validate 
additionality claims and to verify annual reports of emissions reductions. 
In sum, the carbon offset commodity is in effect an impact evaluation, and an elaborate institutional mechanism 
has been set up to conduct that evaluation. Few other development projects attract the same degree of scrutiny 
on impacts. 
However, the additionality screening process has been widely criticized as ponderous, costly, and ineffective. 
Environmentalists press for stricter screening, investors for more streamlined procedures. The current system may 
combine the worst of both worlds: high transaction cost with substantial nonadditionality. A growing consensus 
views determination of additionality as quixotic at the project level. An alternative would be to set up technology-
specific crediting rules, creating a system akin to a feed-in tariff premium for renewable energy or energy efficien-
cy, with higher credits for less-competitive technologies. 
Source: IEG.
Box 5.2 Carbon offsets—A Peculiar Commodity
new equipment to meet rapidly growing energy demands. 
The carbon market can provide money and technology for 
developing country infrastructure. Because carbon credits 
are a priced commodity, developing countries can realize 
profits if they can produce them cheaply. Having a price on 
carbon emissions may motivate research and development 
for low-carbon technologies. Finally, some view the carbon 
market as a more reliable means of raising funds from de-
veloped countries (which are historically responsible for 
current levels of GHGs) than the competing alternative: di-
rect annual appropriations from those countries’ individual 
national budgets.
In contrast, the carbon market faces significant practical 
obstacles. The logic of the system requires that emissions 
reductions must represent a new, additional effort so that 
the developed country’s extra emissions are exactly offset 
by reductions elsewhere. Otherwise, buyers and sellers 
might collude and claim bogus carbon credits, and total 
emissions would increase. To prevent this, an elaborate 
project-by-project validation system has been set up under 
the auspices of the CDM to certify the additionality of car-
bon credits (box 5.2).
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Carbon funds at the WBG
The World Bank carbon funds were conceived when the 
Kyoto Protocol was under discussion and the concept of 
carbon markets was being explored. The WBG’s carbon 
funds were intended as a “proof of concept” for the car-
bon market and as a pilot device for testing practical ap-
proaches to the novel challenges of defining, creating, and 
trading the carbon commodity, and integrating it with 
development goals. Building on a precursor program, Ac-
tivities Implemented Jointly, the Bank began consultations 
on carbon in 1997. The first carbon fund was approved 
in 1999 and launched in 2000. It was followed by several 
more (table 5.1).
By May 2010, the World Bank’s Carbon Finance Unit 
(CFU) had $2.358 billion under management and signed 
purchase agreements for a total of 228 million tons of CO2 
of carbon credits, with total value of $1.84 billion (implying 
an  average price of $8.07 per ton). Pipeline projects rep-
resented, notionally, an additional 53 million tons worth 
$208 million. However, not all tons may be delivered be-
fore Kyoto-driven carbon market provisions expire in 2012; 
TABLE 5.1 Carbon Funds at the World Bank
Fund Year established Currency Capital % Private
Kyoto Funds      
 Prototype Carbon Fund 2000  $ 219.80 57.6
 Danish Carbon Fund 2005  € 90.00 78.0
 Community Development Carbon Fund 2003  $ 128.60 45.1
 Spanish Carbon Fund Tranche 1/Tranche 2 2005/2008  € 220/70 22.7
 BioCarbon Fund Tranche 1 2004  $ 53.80 51.0
 Umbrella Carbon Facility 2006  € 799.1a 75.0
 Netherlands CDM Facility 2002  $  — 0.0
 BioCarbon Fund Tranche 2 2007  $ 38.10 47.0
 Netherlands European Carbon Facility 2004  $  — 0.0
 Carbon Fund for Europe 2007  € 50.00 20.0
 Italian Carbon Fund 2004  $ 155.60 30.2
New facilities      
 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 2008  $ 155.00 3.2
 Carbon Partnership Facility     
Source: World Bank data.
Note: — = not publicly available. 
a. Includes €224.54 million total participation of Prototype Carbon Fund, Netherlands CDM Facility, Italian Carbon Fund, 
Danish Carbon Fund, and Spanish Carbon Fund.
Goals and operation of the funds
The World Bank carbon funds are trust funds managed by 
the Bank’s CFU. The participants are developed countries 
and companies seeking to acquire carbon credits to fulfill 
their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. The CFU so-
licits carbon project proposals from the general public and 
writes purchase agreements for selected projects’ emissions 
reductions. Typically it pays for offsets on delivery, with 
limited up-front payments. 
The CFU and its operations are entirely funded by the par-
ticipants, rather than through the Bank’s own budget. Al-
though CFU staff act as “deal managers,” the CFU engages 
regional Bank staff for project preparation. The CFU has 
grown large, with 68 staff and 72 consultants.
the carbon funds allow for some post-2012 purchase, but 
the market is limited.4
In May 2010, the World Bank’s Carbon 
Finance Unit had $2.358 billion under 
management and purchase agreements for 
carbon credits worth $1.84 billion.
Since 2002, IFC has managed carbon funds on behalf of the 
Netherlands government. The funds have contracted to buy 
$135 million in carbon credits from more than 40 projects. 
In addition, IFC has marketed a carbon delivery guaran-
tee,  booking guarantees for 2.2 million certified emission 
reductions (CERs) in three projects. 
MIGA insured a landfill gas project against breach of con-
tract, including governmental failure to honor the CDM-
related Letter of Approval. There has been no a replication 
of this CDM-related insurance provision to date.
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Ensure that there is a value added from carbon purchase, •	
for instance, through the application of Bank safeguards.
Achieve greater integration of carbon finance into the •	
mainstream of Bank lending operations.
Reach out to other international finance institutions •	
and entities.
Improve pipeline of carbon finance projects.•	
Inherent tensions among the various strate-
gic and fiduciary goals have been resolved 
in part through differentiation of funds.
In addition to these overarching goals, the CFU wanted to 
fully use its funds on behalf of participants, to support sus-
tainable development in client countries, and to ensure an 
equitable division of benefits between participants and host 
countries. 
There are inherent tensions among the various strategic and 
fiduciary goals:
Demonstration versus volume.•	  Demonstration or pilot 
projects tend to be risky and demanding in preparation. 
Under UNFCCC regulations, first-of-a-kind projects 
require large fixed costs in methodology development. 
If, as is likely, these demonstration projects are small, 
the preparation cost per ton of CO2 will be high. So 
there is a trade-off between demonstration (which ben-
efits a global community) and maximization of carbon 
credits (which benefits fund participants and recipient 
projects).
Established versus less-established country locations.•	  This 
is the same kind of trade-off. “Frontier” projects in 
countries with less CDM experience are costlier to pre-
pare but promote the geographic growth of the carbon 
market to poorer countries. 
Stringent versus less-stringent additionality determina-•	
tion. As was recognized from the outset of the CDM, 
both buyers and sellers benefit from lax baselines—that 
is, funding of projects that are not really additional. But 
additionality is difficult to determine, and screening 
for additionality has led to burdensome bureaucratic 
procedures. So for the CFU there is a potential tension 
between setting high standards for additionality dem-
onstration and maximizing carbon credit transaction 
volumes. 
High versus low CO•	 2 price; agent of buyers or sellers. 
In the early years of the PCF, the carbon market was 
very thin or nonexistent. Without an objective means 
of price discovery, determination of a “fair” price was a 
challenge for the PCF. 
These conflicting pressures were resolved in part through 
differentiation of funds. The PCF was launched as a 
Catalytic or demonstration impacts were 
stressed in the publicly stated goals of the 
Prototype Carbon Fund.
Catalytic or demonstration impacts were stressed in the 
publicly stated goals of the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) 
(World Bank 2001): 
Show how project-based greenhouse gas emission re-1. 
duction transactions can promote and contribute to sus-
tainable development and lower the cost of compliance 
with the Kyoto Protocol.
Provide the parties to the UNFCCC, the private sec-2. 
tor, and other interested parties with an opportunity 
to learn by doing in the development of policies, rules, 
and business processes for the achievement of emis-
sion reductions under Joint Implementation and the 
CDM.
Demonstrate how the World Bank can work in partner-3. 
ship with the public and private sector to mobilize new 
resources for its borrowing member countries while 
it addresses global environmental problems through 
market-based mechanisms.
In 2005, the Bank’s Board endorsed a revised approach to 
carbon finance, with three general objectives:
“To ensure that carbon finance contributes to sustain-•	
able development
To assist in building, sustaining, and expanding the in-•	
ternational market for carbon emission reductions
To further strengthen the capacity of developing coun-•	
tries to benefit from the emerging market for emission 
reduction credits” (World Bank 2006). 
In 2005, the Bank Board endorsed a revised 
approach that articulated more specific 
goals for the CFU.
In addition, there were specific goals:
Continue to align carbon finance more closely with •	
poverty alleviation and locally sustainable develop-
ment, ensuring that smaller, poorer countries benefit 
from carbon market development.
Expand the technology frontiers of the carbon market •	
to ensure that carbon finance and carbon trade support 
energy infrastructure and technology transfer.
Expand the Bank’s role in helping developing countries •	
develop and market portfolios of carbon assets directly 
to OECD buyers, as a “lead buyer” that helps develop 
a project but purchases only a fraction of its emission 
reductions.
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 demonstration initiative. The Community Development 
Carbon Fund and the BioCarbon Fund have strong, explicit 
demonstration goals. The other Kyoto Funds are strongly 
oriented toward helping developed countries secure carbon 
credits for compliance purpose. The newer initiatives, the 
Carbon Partnership Facility and Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility, return to the pioneering mode in seeking to dem-
onstrate novel kinds of carbon transactions not yet recog-
nized under Kyoto. 
The new facilities also feature equal representation of donor 
and host countries in fund governance. In contrast, earlier 
funds were governed by a committee of the participants 
(donors), though in consultation with host countries.
Catalytic impact on the carbon market
The CFU played an important role in catalyzing the emer-
gence of the market. Although there had been earlier 
 carbon transactions (including Costa Rica’s pioneering sale 
of forest carbon credits), observers point to the PCF’s early 
mobilization of funds and private sector investors as galva-
nizing the realization that carbon markets were workable. 
The PCF invested heavily in developing monitoring and 
verification tools and in the legal apparatus for transact-
ing offsets, which were diffused among practitioners in the 
emerging market.
The CFU was important in catalyzing the 
emergence of the carbon market and active 
in developing methodologies for carbon 
offset measurement.
The CFU was active in developing methodologies for car-
bon offset measurement, though not uniquely so. As noted 
in box 5.2, development of a validation methodology is a 
kind of public good: it cuts the development time, risk, and 
cost for all subsequent projects that use the same technol-
ogy. In the first five rounds of the CDM’s Methodological 
Panel, the WBG was responsible for 12 of the 44 submitted 
methodologies and for 6 of the 22 that were approved. 
Altogether, for large scale energy and transport technologies, 
the CFU has been involved in the preparation of 45 method-
ologies, of which 16 were eventually approved. Those meth-
odologies have been used so far in registered energy and 
transport projects that are expected to produce 137 million 
tons CO2e, or about 10 percent of the CDM total for these 
categories. The CFU has also proposed most of the accepted 
forestry methodologies, though there have been few other 
users of these and many small-scale methodologies. Current 
work on the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and Carbon 
Partnership Facility aims at facilitating the development of 
radically new approaches to the carbon market that work at 
scales much larger than site-specific projects. 
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FigurE 5.2
From the beginning, there was concern about whether the 
Bank’s carbon funds would spur private sector participation 
or crowd it out—especially given the Bank’s perceived clout. 
UNFCCC statistics show that, using registered projects or 
tons as a measure, the Bank’s market share rapidly dwin-
dled (figure 5.2). There was a surge of project registrations 
when the Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005, so that by 
2005 the World Bank comprised only a small share of the 
market. That being so, one could question the relevance of 
the 2005 goal of helping countries to market carbon credits, 
as a vibrant market was already emerging at the time. 
The World Bank’s market share of CDM 
projects dwindled rapidly over time as a 
vibrant market emerged.
One way to assess the CFU’s demonstration effect on addi-
tionality is to compare its relative success in securing CDM 
registration. Registration is a measure of a project’s quality, 
including its stringency in determining additionality. The 
CFU’s ratio of problematic to registered projects is smaller 
than that of the CDM at large (table 5.2). 
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TABLE 5.2 Comparative Success at registration 
of CDM Projects, WBg versus other 
Sponsors and Purchasers
 WBg other
Registered projects, Oct 2009 69 1,765
Ratio of rejected to registered 0 0.07
Ratio of validation negative, terminated or 
withdrawn to registered
0.26 0.34
Ratio of in process to registered 0.65 1.58
Source: IEG tabulation, UNEP Risoe center as of October 2009.
Note: CDM = Clean Development Mechanism; WBG = World Bank 
Group.
TABLE 5.3 Carbon Projects with Signed Purchase Agreements
 PCF CDCF BioCarbon Fund National + umbrella Total
Total project cost,a ($ millions) 975 781 265 5,246 7,266
ERPA volume, million tons CO2e 23  9 7 168 208
Total volume, million tons CO2e 60 17  70  515 663
ErPA tons breakdown by country group (%)
China 34 15 12 84 73
JI (transition countries) 13 0 0 5 5
Low income 2 42 35 0 3
Lower middle income 25 41 38 6 11
Upper middle income 26 3 14 5 8
Total 100 100 100 100 100
 Total tons breakdown by country group (%)
China 55 10 3 81 69
JI (transition countries) 10 0 0 7 7
Low income 1 49 74 0 9
Lower middle income 12 36 21 5 8
Upper middle income 22 5 2 5 7
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: World Bank CFU data. 
Note: CDCF = Community Development Carbon Fund; CO
2
e = carbon dioxide equivalent; ERPA = emissions reduction purchase agreement; 
PCF = Prototype Carbon Fund. Totals are not exact due to rounding. 
a. “Total project cost” refers to the investment cost of establishing the project, not to the purchase amount of carbon offsets.
Poverty focus 
As noted, the 2005 objectives called for ensuring that 
 smaller, poorer countries benefited from the carbon mar-
ket. This was inherently difficult, because these countries 
have very low levels of energy-related emissions to abate, 
but their deforestation and agriculture-related emissions 
are ineligible under Kyoto rules. 
This mission was carried out largely by the BioCarbon 
Fund and Community Development Carbon Fund, 
which comprise 8 percent of the overall portfolio. These 
have placed 39 percent of their purchases in low-income 
countries, as opposed to 0.3 percent for the other carbon 
funds (table 5.3). However, these demonstration-oriented 
funds experienced high preparation and supervision 
costs, along with implementation problems. Outside the 
low-income countries, some projects (such as Jepirachi 
Wind Farm) provided benefits to indigenous or low-
 income communities. 
The BioCarbon Fund and Community 
Development Carbon Fund put 39 percent 
of their purchases in low-income  countries; 
the other funds put 0.3 percent into 
 low-income countries.
The CFU has been more successful in 
 securing CDM registration than other 
 non-WBG applicants.
However, like previous observers, this evaluation finds that 
the size and timing of carbon credit purchases is far too 
small, in many cases, to plausibly constitute a make-or-break 
influence on the decision to undertake a project. Instead, 
carbon funds constitute a mild additional inducement to 
investors that, statistically over the set of projects involved, 
may have contributed to some additional  reductions.
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have borne the cost or simply have been reimbursed for it, 
analogously to the Montreal Protocol6 (Wara and Victor 
2008). There was also concern that companies might en-
ter the refrigerant business merely to profit from HFC-23 
destruction, because destroying the by-product pays more 
than creating the refrigerant. For this reason, UNFCCC 
rules were put in place to exclude new entrants from claim-
ing emissions reductions.7
Implementation and benefits
For most projects, the production of carbon offsets is pro-
portional to the production of local benefits such as elec-
tricity or regrown forest volume. CDM monitoring reports 
allow comparison of planned versus actual issuance of 
offsets. Looking at CDM-wide statistics, biogas, methane 
recovery, cement, and transportation have performed far 
below expectations; for other technologies, there is wide 
dispersion in planned versus actual performance. 
Chapter 2 discussed the performance of the 12 WBG 
carbon-financed hydropower projects for which formal 
monitoring information is available. Information is avail-
able also on 12 other WBG carbon projects (table A.6). Two 
landfill gas projects have fared very poorly, with issuance 
yields below 10 percent of planned levels (see box 2.2 on 
why landfill gas plans were too optimistic). Four other proj-
ects had yields below 65 percent. The remainder performed 
as designed or better. Internal tracking of BioCarbon Fund 
projects shows that reforestation and afforestation are pro-
ceeding more slowly than anticipated.
Biogas, methane recovery, cement, and 
transportation have performed below 
 expectations, and for other technologies 
there is wide dispersion in planned versus 
actual performance.
Integration with Bank activities 
The World Bank has largely not realized synergies between 
operations and carbon finance in the Kyoto Funds. Only 10 
of the 108 agreements are associated with Bank operations. 
For the operational part of the Bank, mainstreaming of car-
bon finance is seen as too much trouble, because of the time 
and hassle of arranging for project registration. In contrast, 
four proposed operations under the Carbon Partnership 
Facility are grounded in existing Bank projects.
Knowledge transfer and capacity building
The carbon funds have supported CF Assist, a capacity-
 building program that advises countries on carbon 
 regulation, sponsors a range of training, helps identify car-
bon projects, and sponsors carbon trade fairs and expos. 
The annual carbon trade fair has been cited as an impor-
tant contribution to information diffusion. Over 2006–09, 
Impacts on technology transfer 
The 2005 goals called for the CFU to “expand the technol-
ogy frontiers of the carbon market to ensure that carbon 
finance and carbon trade supports energy infrastructure 
and technology transfer.” Energy technology constitutes 
a minority of total CERs under contract. The largest en-
ergy subsectors are hydropower at 6 percent of the over-
all  post-2004  portfolio, landfill gas (6 percent), energy 
 efficiency (4  percent), and methane avoidance (3 percent). 
Biomass, geothermal, and wind are about 1 percent each. 
The degree of emphasis on technology transfer varies. 
The CFU has had an active role in the diffusion of landfill 
gas technology. The Jepirachi Wind Farm Project was the 
first grid-connected wind farm in Colombia; its operation 
provided useful lessons on adapting turbine operations to 
the coastal region’s distinctive climate conditions (Pinilla, 
 Rodriguez, and Trujillo 2009). In contrast, hydropower 
was already well established in Chile and China before the 
Bank’s carbon projects arrived in those countries.
CDM project proponents must note technology transfer in 
their project design document. Seres and Haites (2008) re-
viewed these documents for all CDM projects in the pipe-
line as of June 2008. IEG reviewed the categorization of the 
59 WBG-sponsored projects in their database. Nineteen 
specifically mentioned technology transfer, a slightly small-
er proportion than the 36 percent in the overall sample. Of 
the 19, there were 6 landfill gas, 5 wind, 4 energy efficiency, 
2 biogas, and 2 industrial gas projects. Eight cases involved 
equipment transfer only, 7 knowledge only, and 4 equip-
ment and knowledge. Nepal was the only low-income 
country in this group. 
Almost two-thirds of the CERs under contract were for 
Chinese reductions of HFC-23, a highly potent, industrially 
generated GHG. HFC-23 is a by-product of refrigerant pro-
duction and can be abated at very low cost. This purchase 
generated a large pulse of offsets at a time when there was 
increasing pressure on the Bank to deliver them. Globally, 
HFC-23–based offsets accounted for half of all CERs vali-
dated in 2006, enabling the creation of a secondary market 
and allowing CER-short companies to meet immediate car-
bon obligations. 
Almost two-thirds of carbon offset purchases 
were for Chinese reductions of HFC-23, a 
by-product of refrigerant production.
However, HFC-23 offsets provoked concerns. As permit-
ted by the CDM, the refrigerant companies realized a large 
profit on these transactions, subsequently taxed by China 
at a 65 percent rate for development purposes.5 However, 
critics say that carbon finance was unnecessary and inef-
ficient for this purpose, suggesting that the industries could 
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relatively small. CFU staff  claim that the cachet of involve-
ment with the Bank’s carbon fund has attracted investors 
to Bank-supported projects. To the extent that this is true, 
there may be other, less complicated ways to put the WBG’s 
prestige to use.
Th e CFU has spent much of its creative 
energy grappling with the perplexities of 
establishing additionality and dealing with 
the CDM apparatus.
On market exit, the 2005 Strategy statement put it this way:
To the degree that carbon markets thrive, the Bank 
will exit from the carbon market. Th e Bank as trustee 
of carbon funds will increasingly be able to act as the 
“buyer of last resort” and transition from being a ‘buyer’ 
of carbon assets to helping its clients countries position 
themselves as sellers. If risk and uncertainty declines 
in certain countries and for certain technologies, the 
Bank’s carbon funds will be no longer needed as the 
Bank’s participation becomes, over time, no longer nec-
essary to help create viable projects and to manage risks 
for buyers and sellers. Th is, in eff ect, constitutes a built-
in exit approach for the Bank from the lower-risk part 
of the carbon market (World Bank 2006).
Th is exit strategy has not functioned smoothly. Although 
the Bank did indeed move into higher-risk, pilot areas of 
the carbon market, it continued to build up its lower-risk 
Kyoto-oriented business aft er that market was already 
thriving. It then became clear that the bottleneck was not 
market demand for off sets, but creative, high-leverage ways 
to use those funds for sustainable development. Th is would 
have suggested greater emphasis on the supply side of the 
market.
CF Assist provided training to 6,225 people, more than a 
quarter in Sub-Saharan Africa, and helped in the prepara-
tion of 300 projects, about half of which were in the Philip-
pines and Uzbekistan. 
Conclusions
Th e World Bank’s CFU has played an important role in 
opening an entirely new fi eld of environmental fi nance, 
popularizing the idea of carbon markets and contributing 
to the institutional infrastructure of the market. Depend-
ing on the outcome of international negotiations, this could 
evolve into a major fi nancial vehicle for supporting devel-
opment and climate mitigation. Higher carbon prices will 
be necessary, though, to eff ect widespread transformation 
of energy technologies.
Th e 2005 exit strategy did not function 
smoothly; the Bank moved into pilot areas 
of the carbon market as planned but did 
not exit established parts of the market.
Constrained by the strictures of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
CFU has spent much of its creative energy grappling with 
the perplexities of establishing additionality and dealing 
with the CDM apparatus. Th e additionality and impact of 
its own actions are mixed. It has contributed to the diff u-
sion of some technologies, such as landfi ll gas, and support-
ed fi rst-of-kind technology investments in some countries. 
Th e BioCarbon Fund and the Community Development 
Carbon Fund have supported novel small-scale, rural, and 
forestry projects—and found in the process that this is dif-
fi cult to do. 
In contrast, much of the CFU’s support for energy technol-
ogies has gone to projects where its fi nancial leverage was 
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Conclusions and Recommendations
Economic life and GHG emissions have been closely intertwined. This evaluation has 
traced some of the most important parts of that large and complex knot, assessing the 
impacts of WBG attempts to disentangle the threads. Table 6.1 summarizes the  sectoral 
findings. This chapter draws conclusions that cross-cut those diverse sectors and 
 presents recommendations. 
The Congruence of Mitigation and 
Development
GHG mitigation directly contributes to development and 
poverty reduction. But it does so by managing long-term 
risks at the global level. Thus, countries are rightly con-
cerned about potential trade-offs between long-term, glob-
ally shared benefits and short-term, local benefits.
IEG finds that there are many important areas of action that 
combine significant global benefits with high local ones. 
Figure 6.1 plots indicative estimates of the local economic 
returns and global mitigation returns of some of the inter-
ventions discussed in this evaluation. These estimates must 
be taken with extreme caution, as they are based on possi-
bly overoptimistic appraisals or on sometimes inconsistent 
or poorly documented monitoring reports. 
But this evaluation suggests that energy efficiency and BRT 
offer local ERRs that exceed most development projects, 
with GHG as a significant side benefit. At current valua-
tions of carbon reduction, the domestic benefits are much 
larger than the carbon benefits. There was insufficient in-
formation to compute returns to forest interventions, but 
there are large deforestation reductions (and therefore large 
emissions reductions) from forest protection projects, es-
pecially where local sustainable use is allowed, and even 
greater reductions from the establishment or maintenance 
of indigenous forest areas. This suggests a combination of 
social, biodiversity, and carbon gains from these projects.
and become mired in controversy uninformed by a consid-
eration of alternatives. 
For instance, the WBG’s involvement in coal projects has 
been a lightning rod for debate. If there were an interna-
tional agreement that clearly set out how to achieve the 
UNFCCC goal of climate stabilization, with assigned roles 
and responsibilities, such a debate would not be necessary. 
In the existing vacuum, the SFDCC set out criteria that 
would restrict support to cases that are least cost, that op-
timize energy efficiency options, and for which no finance-
able low-carbon alternative exists. 
A study for Kosovo illustrates a way to apply these criteria. 
It employs a systemwide model to show that even in the 
presence of €10/ton of CO2 charges or credits, and taking 
account of the damages from air pollution, it would still be 
advantageous for Kosovo to build a large coal plant, while 
closing smaller, older ones. However, it is essential that such 
models incorporate the scope for efficiency improvements 
as an alternative to new power generation and consider 
higher levels of carbon payment.
Similarly, assessment of the costs and benefits of large 
 hydropower plants should be made in the context of a 
 systems model that identifies the advantages and disadvan-
tages of different sites (as in the Nile Equatorial Lake Stra-
tegic Environmental Assessment). The model should also 
consider the social and environmental impacts of alterna-
tive modes of power provision.
In the area of forests and land use, forest conservation 
needs to be accompanied by sustainable agricultural in-
tensification. Increased agricultural profitability by itself 
could motivate added deforestation; increased forest pro-
tection in one area could deflect pressures to another in 
the absence of a compensating supply of food, timber, and 
jobs. Likewise, the benefits of improved urban transit can 
be quickly eroded as cars expand into freed-up roadways; 
A Systems View Is Essential
As emphasized in Phase I of this evaluation (IEG 2009), a 
systems view is often necessary to assess interventions’ im-
pacts and to appraise alternatives. A narrow project-level 
focus can fail to account for positive or negative indirect 
effects, fail to identify important complementary efforts, 
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Economic and Carbon Returns to Investments
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FIguRE 6.1
a comprehensive system of transport demand management 
is necessary for sustained gains.
Recommendations
The WBG’s resources are small compared with the capital 
cost of providing low-carbon energy to developing and 
transition economies—to say nothing of broader develop-
ment needs. To make a difference for the planet, the WBG 
needs to leverage its resources as far as possible. It can do 
this through four interlinked lines of action:
Support favorable policies•	  (discussed at length in 
Phase I of this evaluation with respect to energy pricing 
and efficiency policies, and reiterated here in connec-
tion with renewable energy policies).
Be a venture capitalist for technical, financial, and •	
institutional innovations (in short, for fostering tech-
nology transfer) by identifying innovations that have 
potentially high returns, using a cycle of piloting and 
demonstration to test, adapt, upscale, and diffuse these 
technologies to wider and wider audiences
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Scale up high-impact investments•	  for solutions that 
work.
Use feedback and learning as a source of value for the •	
WBG and its clients.
The first point, with associated recommendations, was 
treated in Phase I. The other two are discussed here.
Be a venture capitalist of technologies, broadly 
understood
In both the public and private spheres, the WBG can sup-
port the transfer, adaptation, piloting and demonstration of 
innovative technologies, policies, and financial practices—
as it has, for instance, with energy service companies, bus 
rapid transit, solar photovoltaic systems, and agroforestry. 
As in the case of private investments, these demonstrations 
carry risks but can offer high returns. What counts for cli-
ents, the WBG, and the world, however, is the return on 
the portfolio in development, poverty reduction, and GHG 
mitigation. The vision is to prepare a pipeline of develop-
ment solutions that can be pursued on a large scale by the 
WBG and other funders, as climate finance expands.
A first challenge is to accept some prudent risks in pursuit 
of a high-return portfolio. For World Bank clients, this 
means using GEF or other concessional funds to support 
the earliest and riskiest ventures. Risk is further mitigated 
by starting small and staging successively larger pilots and 
demonstrations, from test site to province to nation. With 
increasing experience and comfort, the scale expands and 
the risk declines. For WBG staff and managers, it is impor-
tant that demonstration and pilot projects’ objectives be 
framed in terms of learning. For instance, if the project’s 
goal is to test the financial viability of an innovation and 
the test shows convincingly that it is not viable, it should be 
considered a successful project. 
But a more fundamental change in incentives may be neces-
sary. In IFC, for instance, a venture capital team has secured 
a niche within IFC’s generally conservative and risk-averse 
culture. This could be inspirational for the World Bank. 
A second challenge is to design projects effectively for 
leaning and diffusion. Pilot or demonstration projects 
must have a clear notion of what is being demonstrated, to 
whom, and how; demonstration should be formulated as 
a goal and appropriately measured. For instance, the Re-
gional Silvopastoral Project used experimental techniques 
to rigorously document the private gains from some kinds 
of agroforestry, and industry groups used this information 
to get government support to scale up. But some projects 
failed to recognize that private firms are reluctant to share 
proprietary information. So, for instance, the beneficiaries 
of technology licenses in the Efficient Boiler Project did not 
share their boiler designs with competitors. In contrast, pi-
lot ESCOs in the Energy Conservation Project were obliged 
to share their experience with others, and the model dif-
fused rapidly. 
In sum, the social networks and information mechanisms 
for demonstration and diffusion should be as important 
in project design as the hardware being demonstrated. So, 
too, is the capacity building, which is an integral part of 
technology transfer. The distinctive features of pilot, dem-
onstration, and technology transfer projects argue for addi-
tional support for preparation and supervision in funding 
and on-call expertise.
There is a clear case and large scope for WBG involvement 
in technology transfer at the national level. The case is less 
clear for WBG involvement in new technology development 
at the global level. Candidate technologies would be those 
where WBG support could make an appreciable difference 
to the global market, helping to push costs down. Of special 
interest are technologies that are beneficial for poor people 
and difficult to protect from copying (and therefore attract 
little private research and development)—for instance, in 
agriculture and land use. The proposed new WBG effort 
to support concentrated solar power is a plausible area of 
support because a large proportion of the suitable resource 
is located in client countries, the technology is suitable for 
manufacture in client countries, and the proposed effort is 
large enough to globally push the industry along the cost 
curve. 
Specifically:
The World Bank and IFC should create incentives and •	
mobilize resources to support effective pilot, demon-
stration, and technology transfer projects that have a 
clear logic of demonstration and diffusion. This will 
include mobilizing GEF and other concessional funds 
to mitigate World Bank borrower risk, reshaping in-
centives for staff and managers, providing adequate 
resources for the design and supervision of complex 
projects, and making available specialized expertise in 
technology transfer and procurement through a real or 
virtual technology unit.
Scale up high-impact investments
In the process of scaling up, the WBG can work with clients 
to choose the sectors and instruments that offer the greatest 
return on investment. This evaluation finds that the WBG 
could place more emphasis on energy efficiency. It is gener-
ally cheaper than renewable energy and has fewer potential 
negative environmental impacts. If coordinated with grid 
expansion, it can be an important contributor to energy 
access. It plays a prominent role in the 2010–30 time-slice 
of most long-term climate stabilization scenarios. And it is 
applicable to all countries—it is the poorest who can least 
afford inefficiency. There are many aspects of energy ef-
ficiency that are in need of further piloting, but there are 
ample candidates for scale up. 
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Specifically, the WBG could:
Place greater emphasis on large-scale energy efficiency •	
scale-up, as measured by savings in energy and reduced 
need for new power plants. This includes support for 
efficient lighting and for exploration of the scope for 
accelerating the global phase-out of incandescent light 
bulbs. It includes continued and expanded support for 
reductions in T&D losses. And it includes proactive 
search by IFC for large-scale, catalytic investments in 
energy efficiency. There is scope to coordinate World 
Bank support for demand-side energy efficiency poli-
cies with IFC support for more efficient manufacturing 
and more efficient products.
The WBG should, wherever possible, help clients find 
cleaner, domestically available alternatives to coal power. 
As is clear from the findings here and in Phase I, no-regrets 
alternatives can include energy efficiency, hydropower, and 
natural gas. Moreover, the WBG faces strategic choices in 
staffing and programming between building up expertise 
in “sunrise” sectors of broad applicability (energy efficiency, 
land use management for carbon, energy systems planning) 
versus “sunset” sectors (coal power).
But should the WBG completely forswear coal? Consider, 
as an analogy, the 1991 Forest Strategy’s ban on commercial 
logging in primary moist tropical forests. IEG’s review (IEG 
2000) found that the strategy prevented Bank staff from en-
gaging the sector in proactive ways to improve economic 
and environmental management of tropical forests. The 
ban was rescinded in the 2002 Strategy, without triggering 
logging investments. Analogously, it is important that the 
WBG maintain its “honest broker” ability to help countries 
engage in systemwide energy planning. A perverse result 
would occur if disengagement from coal had a chilling ef-
fect on the WBG’s ability to engage in policy and planning 
dialogue that could promote low-carbon alternatives.
IEG recommends that:
The WBG should help countries find alternatives to •	
coal power while retaining a rarely used option to sup-
port it, strictly following existing guidelines (including 
optimal use of energy efficiency opportunities) and 
being restricted to cases where there is a compelling 
argument for poverty or emissions reductions impacts 
that would not be achieved without WBG support for 
coal power. 
The WBG cannot tackle coal substitution alone. Comple-
mentary financing for renewable energy, and investments in 
technology research and development, are needed from the 
developed world to provide better options for WBG clients. 
Protected areas deter tropical deforestation, providing local 
environmental benefits and conserving biodiversity as well 
as reducing carbon emissions. These impacts are greater 
when sustainable use of the forest is permitted, and greater 
still for indigenous areas. This suggests compatibility of so-
cial and environmental goals. Environmental service pay-
ments can, in principle, achieve much the same results in 
forests where protected areas are not an option. However, 
payment for environmental services impacts have been di-
luted by limitations of finance and unfocused targeting of 
payments. Consequently, IEG recommends the following:
The WBG should continue to explore, in the REDD •	
context, ways to finance and promote forest conserva-
tion and sustainable use, including support for indige-
nous forest areas and maintenance of existing protected 
areas.
In terms of WBG instruments—
MIGA’s upcoming FY 2012–15 Strategy should outline •	
MIGA’s role and scope for MIGA to provide political risk 
insurance to catalyze long-term financing for renewable 
energy projects, building on its expertise and existing 
portfolio of climate-friendly guarantee projects.
The World Bank should enhance the delivery of its •	
guarantee products by taking actions to improve poli-
cies and procedures, eliminate disincentives, increase 
flexibility, and strengthen skills for the deployment of 
the products. It should assess the potential for greater 
use of partial risk guarantees to mobilize long-term fi-
nancing for renewable energy projects, particularly in 
the context of feed-in tariffs or other premiums to sup-
port investment in renewable energy.
The Carbon Partnership Facility and other post-Kyoto •	
carbon finance efforts should focus on demonstrat-
ing truly catalytic ways to overcome barriers to low-
carbon investments. They should also have clear exit 
 strategies. 
Reorient incentives toward learning and feedback
The WBG is valued by clients for its knowledge. It produces 
and publishes an impressive array of research, analyses, re-
views, and toolkits, drawing in part on its experience. Yet 
by failing to gather feedback from operations, it squanders 
valuable sources of knowledge—knowledge that could 
 improve its products and advice in economically measur-
able ways—by failing to learn from its project experience:
Hundreds of millions of dollars are allocated in guaran-•	
tees or loans for energy efficiency, without systematic 
feedback on how and where these interventions are in-
ducing investments.
CFL distribution projects are being scaled up to multi-•	
million bulb efforts without systematic feedback from 
earlier projects on which interventions are most effec-
tive and sustainable.1
Protected area and community forest projects lack sys-•	
tematic monitoring of forest conditions (including car-
bon storage and biodiversity), of the welfare of  forest 
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products, the WBG has an interest in tracking the perfor-
mance and sustainability of its projects. At the same time, 
it can work with public and private clients, when requested, 
to help them implement benchmarking and monitoring 
systems, so as to better define goals and track outcomes. 
This becomes increasingly feasible as information costs 
plummet; remote sensing resources multiply in number, 
sensitivity, and accessibility; and cell phone access becomes 
nearly universal. By wiring projects and sectors to return 
current and reliable information on forest cover, T&D 
losses, household access to electricity, and so on, global in-
novation can be accelerated, and the returns to investment 
enhanced. 
The WBG is a natural nexus and starting point for this 
global public good, which should eventually expand to a 
global network of information sharing. This is consistent 
with the strategic objectives for knowledge creation and ca-
pacity building.
Specific recommendations include the following:
Measure projects’ economic and environmental impact •	
during execution and after closure and aggregate this 
information for analysis. For instance, renewable en-
ergy projects should monitor capacity utilization, and 
energy efficiency projects should monitor energy sav-
ings. This may require the use of concessional funds to 
defray additional costs of monitoring by staff, clients, 
and project proponents. 
Link these measures to a results framework that shifts •	
the SFDCC toward a focus on outputs such as power 
produced, power access, forest cover, and transit share 
of urban trips, rather than money spent.
residents, and of the post-project financial sustainabil-
ity of management. Failure to document impacts or to 
learn systematically from experience has kept the REDD 
initiative from having a 20-year “head start.”
Failure to monitor can also lead to skewed incentives. For 
lack of an alternative, the WBG (and to some extent this 
evaluation) uses dollar volume of commitments to measure 
the organization’s orientation toward climate issues. Using 
dollars as a scorecard was arguably important for the Bonn 
Commitment in directing attention and resources toward 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. But ultimately the 
use of an input rather than an outcome measure risks driving 
the organization toward inefficient or ineffective activities. 
For instance, efficient lighting programs offer much higher 
returns—in cost savings and GHG reduction—than invest-
ment in renewable energy. But a hydro plant offers a much 
higher ratio of loan amount to staff preparation cost and is 
therefore potentially more attractive in a budget-constrained 
organization that scores achievement by dollars loaned. 
The CDM experience with monitoring points to a way 
forward. Unlike most other development projects, carbon 
projects are required to monitor their outputs. (Otherwise 
they do not get paid.) Calculating carbon offset production 
requires stipulating a “business as usual” emissions level. 
This is difficult and has often been contentious. But it also 
requires measuring the project’s actual performance—for 
instance, how many hours a wind turbine operates, or how 
many CFLs are distributed and installed. This generates 
timely, publically available, comparable information. 
Just as private sector firms derive value from monitoring 
the performance of and customer satisfaction with their 
Summary of Sectoral Findings
Sector Intervention Direct impacts Leverage and diffusion 
impacts
Monitoring needs and issues
Renewable 
energy — on 
grid
Lending Longer loan terms significantly 
improve bankability.
Better upfront planning has 
been important to assure better 
outcomes in hydropower.
Hydropower has generally 
higher returns than wind power.
What are the economic and carbon 
impacts?
What are the reasons for over or 
underperformance in capacity 
utilization? 
 Guarantees Guarantees against breach of 
contract could significantly 
improve bankability. 
TabLE 6.1
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Sector Intervention Direct impacts Leverage and diffusion 
impacts
Monitoring needs and issues
 Carbon finance Carbon finance has little impact 
on bankability of wind and 
hydropower projects. Moreover, 
the stated rationales for the use 
of carbon funds often refer to 
barriers that are best addressed 
with greater leverage through 
policy reform (such as unreliable 
power purchase agreements) 
rather than at the project level.
Carbon finance has  significant 
impact on bankability of projects 
that reduce methane emissions. 
Performance of carbon projects 
has often been poor (lower 
production of permits than 
expected).
Thirty-five percent of 
WBG carbon finance 
projects claimed some 
degree of technology 
transfer. 
Carbon project monitoring 
provides valuable feedback. For 
example, poor performance of 
landfill gas projects was detected 
and  corrective actions taken. GEF 
or other funds could enhance this 
de facto monitoring system.
 Resource 
surveys
Siting makes a huge difference 
in economic returns because of 
spatial variation in wind, water, 
geothermal, and so forth. There 
have been modest investments 
by the Bank in resource surveys. 
Impact not evaluated.
 How useful are surveys?
Can remote sensing provide 
continually updated and improved 
information on wind and water 
resources? 
 Policy reform   Standardized small 
power purchase agree-
ments have reduced the 
costs of entry of small 
hydropower producers in 
Sri Lanka, with significant 
cumulative impact.
Regulatory reforms in 
China, Mexico, and Turkey 
have catalyzed wind 
investments.
What is the fiscal impact and 
 investment response of feed-in 
tariffs or renewable portfolio 
standards?
Solar home 
photovoltaics 
Subsidies Subsidies increase household 
demand; impact not well 
measured.
Quality-contingent sub-
sidies for manufacturers 
boost competition and 
quality, and reduce price 
at the national level.
No global impact on 
price; scale was too small.
Longevity and utilization of the 
solar home systems
Manufacturing quality
Market penetration
Geographical extent of the electric 
grid and connection rate within the 
grid (to assess market size for photo-
voltaic); price elasticity of demand.
  Microfinance Specialized microfinance 
 institutions were able to support 
SHS buyers in Bangladesh and 
Sri Lanka.
(Continued)
Summary of Sectoral Findings (continued)TabLE 6.1
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Sector Intervention Direct impacts Leverage and diffusion 
impacts
Monitoring needs and issues
Energy 
 efficiency 
 
 
Subsidized 
guarantees 
for financial 
intermediaries’ 
energy ef-
ficiency lending 
to industry, 
commercial, 
and residential 
sector
 Guarantees facilitate energy 
efficiency investment by SMEs 
with poor credit, in poorly 
developed credit markets, or for 
housing coops in East Europe; 
but are superfluous for larger 
firms or for banks’ trusted clients. 
Guarantees were not, 
as assumed, catalytic in 
inducing diffusion of en-
ergy efficiency lending.
Pool information on subproject 
performance to identify promising 
market niches.
Technical assis-
tance for banks
 In China, technical assistance 
helped Industrial Bank gain 
market share; in Russia, may 
have helped banks to convince 
customers to borrow for energy 
efficiency. Energy efficiency 
appraisal tool was useful to 
recipient banks. 
Some diffusion of energy 
efficiency practice among 
Russian banks. 
 On-lending 
through finan-
cial intermedi-
aries
 Useful in countries with poorly 
developed credit markets.
  
 ESCO demon-
stration
  High leverage in China: 
demonstration was 
scaled up.
But ESCOs are small and 
are themselves credit-
constrained, limiting 
scalability.
 Public sector re-
form to permit 
ESCO contracts
  In Hungary, facilitated na-
tionwide investments by 
municipalities in efficient 
heating and lighting.
 
 Direct IFC in-
vestments in en-
ergy efficiency
Screening existing clients for en-
ergy efficiency opportunities has 
identified small loans with low 
absolute levels of CO2 reduction 
and is likely not cost-effective in 
staff time.
Mainstream lending is usually 
too late in the project cycle to 
 affect technology choice. 
 However IFC may be able to 
finance some credit-constrained 
large firms with high absolute 
levels of energy and GHG 
 savings.
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Sector Intervention Direct impacts Leverage and diffusion 
impacts
Monitoring needs and issues
 Efficient  lighting Apparent very high returns 
to compact fluorescent light 
distribution
Potentially very high 
demonstration and 
diffusion effects; poorly 
documented.
Operations research on impact of 
alternative promotion strategies 
on adoption and diffusion of CFLs; 
surveys on CFL usage. 
 Building and 
appliance ef-
ficiency and ef-
ficiency  policies
Evaluated in IEG (2009) With supportive enforce-
ment and supply of 
efficient materials, equip-
ment, and techniques, 
has had large cata-
lytic impact in developed 
countries.
Survey info on building energy 
consumption, both existing stock 
and new construction.
 T&D loss 
 reduction
High returns to engineering-
based reductions in technical 
losses.
Institutional and legal 
reform can promote 
reduction of non technical 
losses.
Real time, spatially disaggregated 
information on technical and non-
technical losses; better understand-
ing of who benefits from nontechni-
cal losses.
 Energy pricing 
reform
Evaluated in IEG (2009). Some 
examples of progress, for 
 example, Vietnam.
Very high leverage in pro-
moting energy efficiency 
and making renewable 
energy more competitive.
Information on levels and trends 
in energy pricing; industry and 
household surveys on incidence of 
subsidies, burden of energy costs.
Urban transit Bus Rapid 
Transit
Strong returns in health, conges-
tion reduction, fuel savings; 
modest CO2 reductions.
Bogota and Mexico City 
projects have had dem-
onstration impact.
Information on ridership, auto ver-
sus transport share, congestion, air 
pollution levels in transport corri-
dors; evaluation of the effectiveness 
of vehicle scrappage programs.
Forests Protected areas Strict protected areas reduce 
deforestation on average; reduc-
tions are higher for protected 
areas that allow sustainable use, 
and higher still for indigenous 
areas.
 Info is lacking on protected area 
impacts on biodiversity and local 
livelihoods and on protected area 
management practices.
 Afforestation/
Reforestation/
regeneration
 There have been implementa-
tion problems in most afforesta-
tion/reforestation
BioCarbon Fund projects. Small 
project scale makes these 
uneconomic; low GHG impact; 
trade-offs.
Silvopastoral Project has 
demonstration  effect, 
was scaled up.
Better documentation of the 
impacts of reforestation and 
 afforestation on biomass, 
 hydrology, biodiversity, and 
 livelihoods. 
 Payment for 
environmental 
services
 Impact depends on the effi-
ciency with which payments are 
sized and targeted at properties 
at risk for deforestation. 
 Better information on behavior of 
recipients versus nonrecipients.
 Support for use 
of sustainability 
certification by 
agribusinesses 
 Chain-of-custody tracing is 
expensive and has little impact 
in IFC-supported investments 
in Brazil.
Combination of NGO 
pressure on buyers, and 
government monitoring 
may have had significant 
impact on reducing 
 Brazilian deforestation.
Impacts of certification schemes 
(timber, palm oil, etc) remain un-
known. Better information required 
on relative prices of certified versus 
uncertified goods.
(Continued)
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Sector Intervention Direct impacts Leverage and diffusion 
impacts
Monitoring needs and issues
Technology 
transfer
Venture capital 
investments 
in early stage 
clean technol-
ogy companies
Has failed when investments 
had multiple handicaps: 
noncommercial technologies, 
inexperienced entrepreneurs, 
uninterested markets.
A new IFC approach—
invest in proven entre-
preneurs and globally 
proven technologies—
could be high leverage.
 
 Direct IPR 
transfer
Had modest effects in efficient 
boilers project. 
Private companies did 
not share transferred 
technologies. 
 Grants for R&D   Had encouraging 
results in REDP project. 
Industry-wide support 
led to competition, price 
reductions.
Monitor results of such projects.
 Demonstration 
of new tech-
nologies
Has been successful where 
there was a clear purpose for 
demonstration and target 
audience and where adoption 
was profitable: for example, 
introduction of ESCOs in China; 
Regional Silvopastoral program 
in Colombia.
Has failed or bogged down 
where purpose was not clear, for 
example, 1990s era investments 
in concentrated solar power; or 
when there was an expectation 
that private companies would 
share proprietary technologies.
Incorporate good monitoring into 
projects with pilot/demonstration 
purposes; monitor diffusion if that 
is the goal.
Source: IEG.
Note: CFL = compact fluorescent light bulb; ESCO = energy service company; GEF = Global Environment Fund; GHG = greenhouse gas;  
IFC = International Finance Corporation; IPR = intellectual property rights; NGO = nongovernmental organization; R&D = research and 
 development; REDP = China’s Renewable Energy Development Project; SHS = solar home voltaic system; SME = small and medium enterprise; 
T&D = transmission and distribution; WBG = World Bank Group.
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Appendix A
Renewable Energy Tables and Figures
TAble A.1 World bank Group Commitments to 2003–08 low-Carbon projects (by source)
project type ibRd idA iFC MiGA Guarantees GeF-World 
bank
iFC-GeF Carbon 
finance 
Total
Off-grid and mini-grid renewables
Direct investments including cook-stoves 
and household biomass/biogas
86.2 141.5 165.4 1.8 0.0 273.1 0.0 380.1 515.0
Via funds that support subprojects 3.5 199.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 235.4
Grid renewable energy
Direct investments in RE 801.1 634.7 513.9 313.8 227.5 59.2 0.0 34.7 3,054.8
Via financial intermediaries 202.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.7 212.6
energy efficiency
Transmission and distribution loss  
reduction 
188.7 247.6 144.4 39.6 0.0 32.4 0.0 0.0 632.8
End user energy efficiency 119.7 21.4 199.7 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.0 0.0 422.1
Combined heat and power and/or district 
heating
340.7 51.0 29.5 0.0 0.0 72.9 0.0 42.0 477.4
Supply-side energy efficiency 336.0 8.3 117.6 0.0 0.0 22.9 0.0 3.3 527.7
Energy efficiency investments via 
 financial intermediaries
314.0 3.8 214.1 0.0 0.0 10.3 165.1 20.6 811.8
Other
DPL, other investment programs and 
technical assistance
192.4 74.7 389.3 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 93.0 753.3
Combinations of RE and energy 
 efficiency, or unspecified, via financial 
intermediaries 
0.0 5.0 227.1 0.0 0.0 18.0 77.0 38.2 335.3
Total 2,584.3 1,387.4 2,000.8 355.2 227.5 503.0 242.1 677.7 7,978.1
Source: IEG.
Note: Unit of analysis is the project component. Excludes freestanding WBG AAA and IFC advisory services, and “special financing.”  
DPL = Development Policy Lending/Loan; GEF = Global Environment Facility; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development;  
IDA = International Development Association; IFC = International Finance Corporation; MIGA = Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency;  
RE = renewable energy.
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Grid-based Hydropower investments, 2003–08 ($millions)
Traditional financing
Total 
traditional 
financing
blended 
activities
Total 
blended 
financing
new financing
Total 
new 
financing
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All hydropower, 
grid connected 
453.0 849.4 528.5 358.7 2,189.7 72.9 72.9 0.4 145.5 33.7 179.6 2,442.2
Large  hydro power, 
with reservoir 
 (including 
 rehabilitation)
203.1 394.9 190.9 789.0 6.0 6.0 794.9
Large  hydropower, 
 run-of-river
249.9 540.4 213.6 351.6 1,355.5 72.9 72.9 129.5 28.7 158.2 1,586.6
Small  hydropower 202.0 28.0 7.1 237.1 0.4 4.1 14.0 18.5 255.7
Mini/micro/pico 
hydropower
0.4 5.9 6.4 6.4
Source: IEG.
Note: Unit of analysis is the project component. Excludes freestanding WBG AAA and IFC advisory services, and “special financing.”  
GEF = Global Environment Facility; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development Association; 
IFC = International Finance Corporation.
TAble A.3
Financial Rates of Return on iFC infrastructure investments
Secondary and tertiary 
sector
High risk Medium risk low risk
no. Max 
FRR %
Min 
FRR %
Avg 
FRR %
no. Max 
FRR %
Min 
FRR %
Avg 
FRR %
no. Max 
FRR %
Min 
FRR %
Avg 
FRR %
Large hydro 0 0 4 34.0 10.4 16.5
Small hydro (<10 MW) 0 0 2 13.1 12.6 12.9
Wind power 1 0 5 9.9 8.0 8.6
Thermal power generation 6 18.0 7.2 12.3
Coal 0 0 3 14.0 7.2 11.6
Gas 1 1 3 18.0 10.6 13.1
All infrastructure (including 
sectors not listed above)
27 35.0 14.0 20.6 32 33.7 10.0 18.4 51 36.0 7.2 15.7
Source: IEG.
Note: FRR = financial rate of return.
TAble A.2
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Grid-based biomass/biogass/landfill Gas/Methane Commitments 2003–08 by Technology and 
product line/Funding Source
Traditional financing
Total 
traditional 
financing
blended 
 activities
Total 
blended 
financing
new financing
Total new 
financing Total
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Biogas    2.8 2.8 40.2  40.2  5.8 4.2 10.0 53.0
Biomass    39.7 39.7 20.0  20.0  48.9 21.0 69.9 129.6
Municipal 
landfill
         18.4  18.4 18.4
Biomass 
unknown
  28.0 28.0     0.0   28.0
Source: IEG.
Note: Unit of analysis is the project component. Excludes freestanding WBG AAA and IFC advisory services, and “special financing.”  
GEF = Global Environment Facility; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development 
 Association; IFC = International Finance Corporation.
TAble A.4
Comparative Return on equity and economic Rate of Return for different Technologies
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Economic rate of return
Hydro Wind
Source: IEG, based on project documents.
Note: This comparative analysis does not represent actual or  predicted performance of the projects, because of the following standardized as-
sumptions: lifetime 30 years; tariff 6 cents/kWh; toll to grid 0.2 cent/kWh; no carbon finance or other incentives.  Financing structure: interest rate 
8 percent; grace period 2 years; maturity 10+ grace years; debt/equity 2.3; no local inflation; no hard currency inflation; stable exchange rate. 
Income tax rate 33 percent, capital gain tax rate 10 percent, VAT 18 percent;  depreciation 10 years, 95 percent of total value at 10 percent rate. 
FiGuRe A.1 
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Return on equity as a Function of 
electricity Tariff
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Medium hydro Large hydro Wind
Source: IEG. 
Note: These are hypothetical returns using a standardized set of as-
sumptions. kWh = kilowatt hour; ROE = return on equity.
FiGuRe A.3Capacity versus planned Capacity 
utilization, CdM Hydropower plants
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Source: UNEP Risoe CDM database.
Note: CDM = Clean Development Mechanism; MW = megawatt.
FiGuRe A.2
negative examples positive examples
Resettlement 
and 
 environmental 
issues
Latin America: One factor that led to unsatisfactory project 
ratings was that the resettlement and environmental 
management program were only partly implemented, with 
major issues remaining unaddressed. In addition, poor 
oversight of the areas to be flooded resulted in invasion of 
families seeking resettlement compensation.
Government was slow in performing land acquisitions and 
housing construction, adding to pressures that slowed 
down project.
Africa: Absence of information disclosure and communica-
tions developed in a sustainable manner.
East Asia: Until 2003, resettlement was carried out inad-
equately because of lack of knowledge or understanding at 
the provincial level of the Resettlement Action Plan, some 
provincial offices’ delayed approval of the compensation 
guidelines, and disparity between the compensation rates 
in the Resettlement Action Plan and that which the prov-
inces approved. In 2003, the situation was resolved with 
Plan-based compensation agreements being signed with all 
the households.
East Asia: Ertan resettlement program appears to 
have been successful overall and has given satisfac-
tory results in terms of restoration or improvement 
of living standards and better access to infrastructure 
and other services for the bulk of the affected popula-
tion. A 10-year post-project rehabilitation levy of on 
the project company’s electricity sales provided funds 
for environmental protection around the reservoir, 
infrastructure maintenance, infrastructure improve-
ments, and income-boosting activities for the resettle-
ment villages. This is a useful instrument to help ensure 
project sustainability, because it eliminates uncertainty 
about funding from budgetary sources. The use of an 
international environmental and resettlement panel 
proved its worth.
East Asia: High-quality up-front assessment ensured 
the project success—the highly satisfactory outcome of 
resettling more than 74,000 people.
East Asia: An independent review rated resettlement 
performance highly — “the best resettlement option 
was deduced from the country’s past resettlement  
experience. The women’s role in resettlement is empha-
sized.” An international panel of experts on environment 
and resettlement has conducted 12 meetings and 
helped ensure effective management of adverse envi-
ronmental impacts, by overseeing implementation of a 
systematic environmental management plan.
Key Factors in Hydropower project performance, with Outcomes and lessons from 
project Reviews
TAble A.5
(continued)
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negative examples positive examples
Project design 
issues: Policy 
context
Low ratings in some unsatisfactory projects in Africa were 
caused by weakness or absence of up-front detailed assess-
ment. 
East Asia: Lack of sufficient counterpart funding from the 
provincial government delayed the implementation of the 
irrigation works and the resettlement program. Resettle-
ment problems were compounded by the absence of a 
provincial resettlement office (as has usually existed in 
other Chinese resettlement cases) and the Bank’s initial 
overestimation of Hainan’s institutional capacity. As a result, 
the borrower has not yet achieved the project’s resettle-
ment objectives.
Africa: Failure to define water rights at an early stage of 
development of a hydroelectric project created water use, 
conservation, and environmental problems that were dif-
ficult to solve during project construction and introduced 
implementation delays.
Africa: Lack of government ownership led to low perfor-
mance. Weak government commitment to implement 
— (unbundling generation, transmission and distribution, 
transparent subsidies) and low capacity of utilities to lead 
sector reforms could be the main reason for failure.
South Asia: At the time of project appraisal, neither the 
government nor the Bank had a clear vision of how power 
sector reform would be carried out during the life of the 
project. Hence, in the two years before the project closing, 
as reforms started to take off in some states, the project 
was buffeted by unanticipated and sometimes ad hoc state 
regulatory changes. With one exception, states did not ad-
dress the renewable energy dimension of the sector.
East Asia: (a) The Bank assisted the utility in optimizing 
its investment program, particularly at the time when 
the country had been severely affected by economic 
and financial crises. The utility modified its power 
development plans, deferred many independent power 
producer projects, reduced operating costs, and scaled 
down its investment Program. (b) The utility adopted 
sound policies and strategies for environmental and 
social management and defined a framework and 
guidelines for environmental assessment of power de-
velopment plans. (c) The utility implemented the recom-
mendations of a study on economic regulation, tariffs, 
and development of bulk supply after the economic/
financial crises had faded out; these include efficiency 
considerations in determining revenue targets, trans-
parent mechanisms for transfer of subsidies, and the 
restructuring of the consumer billing system to provide 
for accounting of transmission and distribution charges. 
(d) The Bank acted as a facilitator and played an informal 
role in advising the government on the reform of the 
power sector, especially while the country experienced 
the economic and financial crises. During this period the 
Bank, through Energy Sector Management Assistance 
Programme, had a more formal participation in an 
independent review of the Power Pool and Electricity 
Supply Industry Reform Study conducted by National 
Energy Policy Office 
A Southeast Asia project was built on the outcomes of 
the first renewable energy project; by then the general 
strategies for renewable energy had been coordinated 
to the project activities. 
Project design: 
 Geological 
study
East Asia: The bank instability in the lower reservoir and the 
excessive local ground settlement in the upper reservoir 
were all unforeseen and delayed work progress. Adequate 
risk coverage/insurance products could be built in the busi-
ness model to mitigate such risks for both the developers 
and lenders.
Development 
of  adequate 
power 
 evacuation 
infrastructure 
Africa: Project delay was caused by the absence of 
 coordination between the project implementation plans 
and counterparts on provision of the energy delivery from 
the plant to the consumers. 
Renewable Energy Project: One of the most crucial 
issues and/or potential barriers in the scaling up 
development of large and small hydropower plants is 
the interconnection between the plant and the nearest 
grid point to maximize the power usage. Providing 
grid extension up to the plants based on an integrated 
basin development approach is one solution which 
should be considered when encouraging hydropower 
 development.
Source: IEG, based on ICR reviews and PPARs.
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TAble A.7 Solar projects
project Total project 
costsa                    
($ million) 
project dates
initiation Completion
Argentina Renewable Energy in the Rural Market 79.10 12/09/1999 12/31/2011
Bangladesh Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Development 25.34 12/31/2002 12/31/2012
Bolivia Decentralized Energy, ICT for Rural Transformation 13.93 12/18/2003 11/27/2009
China Renewable Energy Development 155.90 12/12/2001 06/30/2008
India Renewable Resources Development 23.80 04/06/1993 12/31/2001
Mongolia Renewable Energy and Rural Access 9.76 05/04/2007 12/31/2011
Pacific Islands Regional Sustainable Energy Finance 5.00 06/21/1007 12/31/2017
Philippines Rural Power 11.90 05/06/2004 12/31/2012
Senegal Electricity Services for Rural Areasa 18.00 06/30/2005 12/31/2012
Sri Lanka Energy Services Delivery 9.20 2/20/1997 12/31/2002
Sri Lanka Renewable Energy for Rural Economic Development 28.30 10/07/2002 06/30/2011
Uganda Energy for Rural Transformation 9.80 07/30/2002 02/28/2009
Source: World Bank.
a. Costs/financing are specific to solar component except Senegal Electricity Services of Rural Areas Project.
TAble A.6 CeR Yield Rate, non-Hydro CdM projects
Host party WbG unit Type of project Supplemental information Scale CeR issuance rate
Brazil Bank Methane recovery and utilization Landfill gas flaring Large 0.02866
Argentina IFC Methane recovery and utilization Landfill gas recovery and utilization Large 0.09123
Indonesia PCF Cement Alternative fuels Large 0.21724
Philippines Bank Wind power 1.65 MW x 20units Large 0.48997
India Bank Energy efficiency Factory Small 0.6457
India IFC Wind power 58.2 MW Large 0.82788
China Bank HFC reduction    Large 0.9857
China Bank HFC reduction    Large 1.03266
South Africa IFC N2O decomposition    Large 1.05671
Columbia PCF Wind power 1.3 MW x 15units Large 1.07518
India IFC Wind power 0.6 MW x 28units Large 1.08339
Brazil Bank Biomass Bagasse Large 1.13683
Source: IEG.
Note: CDM = Clean Development Mechanism; CER = certified emission reduction; HFC = Hydrofluorocarbon; IFC = International Finance 
 Corporation; MW = megawatt; PCF = Prototype Carbon Fund; WBG = World Bank Group.
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b. Gas capacity expansion (< 90 MW), Thailand
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A. Hydro/biomass capacity expansion (< 10 MW), Sri lanka
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Growth in Small power producersFiGuRe A.4
C. Renewable energy expansion (<50 MW) Andhra pradesh
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(continued)
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Growth in Small power producers (continued)FiGuRe A.4
d. Renewable energy expansion (<50 MW), india: Tamil nadu
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e. Renewable energy expansion (< 50 MW), india excluding Tamil nadu and Andhra pradesh
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F.  Renewable energy expansion (< 50 MW), developing countries excluding india, indonesia, Sri lanka, and 
Thailand (excluding Andhra pradesh and Tn)
Year
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
Total new RE capacity from plants under 50 MW
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
Ca
pa
ci
ty
 a
dd
iti
on
s 
(M
W
)
Source: Platts World Electric Power Plant database.
Note: Panel A—SPP initiation 1998; Panel B—SPP initiation 1992; Panel C—SPP initiation 1995;  
Panel D—SPP initiation 1995.
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Appendix b
World Bank Experience with Renewable Energy Surveys
Survey projects aim to reduce barriers to renewable energy 
development by developing or collating spatial and tempo-
ral data on wind speeds, water fl ows, sunshine hours, geo-
thermal potential, or biomass availability. Th ese data, made 
freely available, enable investors to select specifi c sites for 
the more intensive local surveys needed to instigate specifi c 
projects. Resource-based site selection can make a huge dif-
ference to project viability. For instance, an International 
Finance Corporation-fi nanced geothermal plant performed 
poorly because the steam resource was much weaker than 
expected. Exploration constitutes a large proportion of geo-
thermal energy costs, so a tool that increases the yield rate 
of exploratory drilling could boost profi tability. 
Th e Bank has undertaken relatively few projects with sig-
nifi cant renewable resource survey components. Survey 
components typically constitute a minor part of a much 
larger energy sector project—the component containing 
the resource survey typically constitutes 1–5 percent of the 
total project spending, and this component oft en includes 
technical assistance or capacity building that is not related 
to the resource survey.
International Development Association/International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development or Global Environ-
ment Facility (GEF) funding constitutes most or all of the 
resource survey fi nancing. GEF fi nancing has played a ma-
jor role in all the surveys save Morocco. Of the surveys listed 
here, only the Republic of Yemen and Armenia are complete. 
Data on survey impacts are not available. 
TAble b.1 World bank and GeF Funding of Renewable energy Resource Survey projects 
Year Country Resources Scale Component 
cost 
($ millions)
bank component 
contribution 
($ millions)
2005 Yemen, Rep. of Wind National 1.00 1.00
2006 Mexico Wind National 4.27 3.90
2006 Lao PDR Biomass, micro-hydro National 1.70 1.70
2006 Armenia Hydro, wind, solar, biomass, geothermal National 3.65 3.00
2007 South Africa Solar, biomass, hydro. National 0.78 0.45
2008 Morocco Wind National 1.00 1.00
2008 Mexico Wind, hydro Unavailable 12.46 7.94
2008 Ghana Wind, biomass, micro-hydro National (biomass, hydro), 
3 specifi c sites (wind)
1.96 1.74
Total 25.82 20.73
Source: IEG review of project documents.
CI Change Appendixes A-K.indd   97 11/3/2010   2:02:32 PM
98   |   Climate Change and the World Bank Group
Appendix C
Energy Efficiency: Supplementary Information
TAble C.1 Transmission and distribution projects with low-Carbon Components, 2003–08
Country/Region Year design features expected outcomes
primary goal WbG commitment 
($ millions) 
(T&d components 
Commercial 
loss reduction?
Technical loss 
 reduction (percent 
of generation)
npV 
($ millions)
eRR 
(%)
Tajikistan 2003  26.4  
20 (reduced from 
30 to 10) — —
Philippines 2004 Loss reduction 5 Yes  — — 
Moldova 2004 Loss reduction 22 Yes 5 69.2 39.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 2005 Interconnection/trading 75 No 2 — 48
Benin 2005 Access expansion 52.2 No — 65 35
Tajikistan 2005 Commercial loss reduction 8.5 Yes — — — 
Albania 2005 Loss reduction 41 No — — 46
Senegal 2005 Access expansion 15.7 Yes 2 (reduced from 
17.5 to 15.5)
— —
Vietnam 2005 Access expansion 225 Yes — 68.5 16.5
Sierra Leone 2005 Loss reduction 22 Yes — — 21
Turkey 2006 Capacity increase 150 No — — 15
Montenegro 2006 Capacity, outage reduction 2.1 No — — 13
Guinea 2006 Loss reduction 5.9 Yes — — — 
Bosnia and  Herzegovina 2006 Loss reduction 43 No — — 19
Sub-Saharan Africa 2006 Interconnection/trading 55 No 3 (reduced from 
5 to 2)
— —
Lao PDR 2006 Access expansion 6 Yes 5 (reduced from 
22 to 17)
281 687
Yemen, Rep. 2006 Loss reduction 48 Yes 5.5 (reduced from 
25 to 19.5)
33 —
Tajikistan 2007 Loss reduction 1 Yes 5 (reduced from 
18.7 to13.7) 
(ex post)
— —
Madagascar 2007 Loss reduction 2.9 Yes — — — 
Timor-Leste 2007 Loss reduction 1.6 Yes — — — 
Nigeria 2008 Loss reduction 15 Yes 10 — — 
Guinea 2008 Loss reduction 7.4 yes — 2.29 25
Dominican Republic 2008 Loss reduction 42 Yes 8 (reduced from 
15 to 7)
428 73
Ghana 2008 Loss reduction 77.4 Yes — — — 
Burundi 2008 Loss reduction 22 Yes 5.4 (reduced from 
24.4 to 19)
— — 
Zambia 2008 Access expansion 21 No 9 (reduced from  
23 to 14)
69 45
Tajikistan 2008 Loss reduction 2.3 No  — — — 
Brazil 2008  25   — — — 
Source: IEG component database. IEG has included some components not labeled as ‘low carbon’ in CEIF database.
Note: ERR = economic rate of return; NPV = net present value; T&D = transmission and distribution; WBG = World Bank Group. — = information not 
available.
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TAble C.2 Completed low-Carbon energy efficiency projects with Transmission and distribution Main 
Focus, 1999–2009
Year Country T&d 
project 
cost     
($million)
loss reduction 
targets
loss reduction impacts expected economic 
effects
ex post economic 
effects
1999 India (Andhra 
Pradesh) 
260 Total losses 
33%→ 26.4%
Total losses 
38%→ 26.5%
ERR 37.6% ERR 41.8%
1999 Armenia 90 Total losses 
33%→ 18%
Total losses 
33%→ 16.5%
ERR 24%, NPV 
$106m
NPV $1,547m
1999 Azerbaijan 9.4     
1999 Thailand 943    ERR 13%  (includes 
 generation 
 component)
1999 Yemen, Rep. of 19.4 Total losses 
39.5%→ 31%
Total losses 
39.5%→ 33%
 EIRR 10.5%  (includes 
generation)
2000 Kazakhstan 367 Transmission losses 
6%→ 5%
Transmission losses 
6%→ 6.2%
EIRR 24.5%, NPV 
$146m
EIRR 24.1%, NPV 
$142m
2000 Uttar Pradesh, India 201 Technical losses 
41%→ 30.4% 
Technical losses 
41%→ 32.8% 
29% ERR 18% ERR (changed 
WTP assumption)
2001 Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina
36   Improve revenue 
collection, 97/89/87 
to 99/100/96 (%)
Improve rev-
enue  collection to 
99/99/99 (%)
2001 India 1,465   17.2% ERR (sector) 15.9% (sector, 
using comparable 
 assumptions)
2001 Rajasthan, India 221 Distribution losses 
38%→ 12%
Rural feeders losses 
reduced 62.2%→ 21.1%
35% ERR (sector) ERR 22.39% 
 (sector), ERR 18.1% 
 (transmission), 
38.6% (distribution)
2002 Albania 40  Losses 41.8% to 41%   
2002 Nigeria 122 Technical losses 
11%→ 8%
Technical losses 
11%→ 9.5%
29.2%, $76.9m  
2007 Tajikistan  Losses kept 
below 19%
Losses reduced 
18.7→ 13.7%
Customer payment 
increased to 54%
Customer payment 
increased to 718%
Source: World Bank.
Note: Technical losses 33% → 26.4% means that losses were reduced from 33% to 26.4%. This is not an exhaustive list of all completed projects 
since 1999 that had transmission and distribution focus. ERR = economic rate of return; NPV = net present value.
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natural Gas prices for industrial users (euros/GJ), 1998–2009
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Source: Eurostat 2010.
Note: Prices are before taxes. GJ = gigajoules.
FiGuRe C.1
TAble C.3 Completed CFl project impacts
Country, 
 approval year
number of 
CFl bulbs
ex ante expectations ex post direct impact
Thailand, 1993 900,000 238-MW peak reduction, 1,427 GWh per yeara 566-MW peak reduction, 3,140 GWh per yeara 
Jamaica, 1994 100,000 1-MW reduction, 4.4 GWh per year, 5,200 tons CO2 1.7-MW reduction, 5.5-GWh savings, 6,500 tons CO2 
Mexico, 1994 1,700,000 Peak demand reduction 100 MW, Energy savings 
100 MW, 1,014 GWh
Peak demand reduction 34 MW, energy savings 
978 GWh
Poland, 1994 1,218,000 519-GWh overall savings, 198,000 tons CO2 725 GWh overall savings, 206,000 tons CO2 
(short term)
Various (ELI), 
2000
3,364-GWh energy savings, 1.8 million tons CO2 2,590 GWh energy savings, 1.9 million tons CO2 
Uganda, 2001 800,000 20-MW peak demand reduction, 53,000 tons of 
carbon per year
20-MW reduction
Vietnam, 2003 1,000,000 33.4-MW demand saving, energy savings 40 GWh 
per year, 48,000 tons of carbon per year
30.1-MW peak load reduction, 45.9 GWh per year 
energy savings
Ethiopia, 2006 5,800,000 131-MW demand reduction, 560 GWh per year 
(includes street lighting as well as CFLs)
5-MW demand reduction (first 350,000 bulbs only)
Source: World Bank data.
Note: CFL = compact fluorescent light; DSM = Demand side management; ELI = efficient lighting initiative; GWh = gigawatt hour; MW = megawatt.  
a. Entire DSM project, not just CFLs.
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TAble C.4 Reviewed energy effi  ciency Financial intermediation projects
project name Country WbG 
 approval 
year
Approach Closing 
Year
IBRD
Bulgaria Energy Effi  ciency Fund (BEEF) Bulgaria 2005 Specialized fund 2010
     
Croatia Energy Effi  ciency Project Croatia 2003 Loan to ESCO+PCG (2) to local banks 2010
     
Poland GEF Energy Effi  ciency project Poland 2004 Grant to ESCO+PCG to local banks 2011
     
Romania Energy Effi  ciency Fund (FREE) Romania 2002 Specialized fund 2007
Energy Conservation Project I China  ESCO  
IFC
Hungary Energy Effi  ciency Co-fi nancing 
Program (HEECP) 
Hungary 1997 PCG to local banks 2001
HEECP 2 Hungary 2001 PCG to local banks 2005
Commercializing Energy Effi  ciency 
Finance (CEEF) (1)
Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovak Republic 
2002 PCG to local banks 2008
OTP ESCO Hungary 2006 PCG to local banks 2011
Russian Sustainable Energy Finance 
Program (RSEFP)
Russian Federation 2005 Credit lines and PCG to local banks 2010 
CHUEE I China PCG to local banks
Source: IEG.
Note: ESCO = energy service company; GEF = Global Environment Facility; OTP = Hungarian bank; PCG = Partial Credit Guarantee.
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Appendix d
Lessons from Completed Transmission and Distribution 
 Projects
Although little evidence is currently available from trans-
mission and distribution projects approved by the World 
Bank over 2003–08, evaluation lessons can be drawn from 
previous Bank projects and reform efforts outside the 
Bank.
Review of these projects provides some lessons:
Large reductions in technical and nontechnical losses are 
feasible but are not always achieved.
A $201 million 2000–04 Bank project in Uttar Pradesh, 
 India, was successful in its technical component (increasing 
capacity and reducing losses) but unsuccessful in overall 
power sector reforms because of a change of government. 
The project was successful in reducing technical losses, 
from 41 percent in 2002 to 32.8 percent in 2004 (though 
still behind a target of 30.4 percent) but unsuccessful at 
reducing nontechnical losses, which remained at roughly 
11 percent. The ex ante project rate of return was appraised 
at 29 percent, and the ex post rate of return was estimated at 
18 percent (rising to 25 percent when gains to nonbilled 
consumers are included); the shortfall was due to a more 
conservative valuation of power.
Success depends crucially on local utility implementation, 
particularly for nontechnical loss reductions. It is diffi-
cult to reduce nontechnical losses without a local reform 
“champion.”
A $40 million Bank power sector rehabilitation project in 
Albania carried out over 2005–06 demonstrated weak re-
sults because of poor management by local utilities. The 
project was designed to increase use of on-grid power and 
to reduce transmission and distribution losses and outages. 
The project failed to achieve sustained target improvements 
in loss reductions or bill collection. Total losses fell from 
44.8 percent in 2001 to 39.7 in 2004, but they increased to 
41 percent by 2006. Technical gains were difficult to esti-
mate and were offset by increases in nontechnical losses. 
The economic impact of the project was poor, as expected 
increases in electricity sales did not eventuate.
Power sector restructuring alone has not been sufficient 
to improve transmission and distribution performance in 
countries with high losses.
A reform project in Andhra Pradesh, India, carried out by 
the state government (without Bank support) over 2000–03 
had major success in reducing nontechnical losses (Bhatia 
and Gulati 2004). The state utility was in poor financial con-
dition, with losses of $0.9 billion in 1997. Despite power 
sector restructuring, new distribution utilities remained 
weak, billing only 42 percent of the power entering their 
system because of losses and nonmetered agricultural us-
ers. The utility companies undertook major institutional 
change,  replacing meters and introducing remote- metering 
technology. Irregularities in billing and metering were 
found for 15 percent of the 23,000 industrial connections 
inspected in 2000–01. Total transmission and distribution 
losses were reduced from 38 percent in 2000 to 26 percent 
in 2003 through reductions in nontechnical losses caused by 
regularization of 2.25 million unauthorized connections.
Impacts of transmission projects are tied to activity in 
the generation sector. Power planning requires a systems 
 approach. Separating transmission from generation is 
 difficult because of their complementarity.
A Bank-supported transmission development project in 
Nigeria (carried out over 2004–08) highlights the impact of 
the generation sector on transmission investment economic 
returns, as well as the potential vulnerability of loss reduc-
tion gains. The project was designed to respond to critical 
power needs in Nigeria and an urgent request for assistance 
from the newly elected democratic government. It aimed to 
implement a major transmission system investment while 
supporting power sector reforms, including commercial-
ization of the power sector. The project was also motivated 
by the Bank’s desire for involvement in the power sector 
reform process. Total project cost was $122 million ($103 
million from the International Development Association).
Transmission infrastructure investments reduced techni-
cal losses from 11 percent to 8 percent in 2007, but loss-
es rebounded to nearly 9.5 percent by 2008 because of a 
 combination of poor maintenance and increased power 
transmitted through the system transmission. Although 
significant gains were made in system reliability, the pro-
jected economic benefits were not realized because power 
generation did not increase by enough to take advantage of 
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 implemented over 2000–05 and added signifi cant transmis-
sion capacity to the system. Th e goal was for transmission 
losses to drop from 5.8 percent in 1998 to 5.0 percent by 
2005, but losses actually increased to 6.9 percent in 2005 
and 6.2 percent in 2006. However, this increase in losses 
was due to a 40 percent increase in generation over the pe-
riod, which was the result of a booming economy. Higher 
power generation causes higher transmission losses, as lines 
become congested. Without the transmission investments 
from the project, losses would have been even higher.
the new capacity. Transmission system collapses were re-
duced from 15 in 2000 to 5 in 2008. Th e project claimed an 
economic rate of return of 29.2 percent and a net present 
value of $76.9 million. However, these calculations assumed 
that grid users would switch from expensive off -grid power 
to cheaper on-grid power, which has not yet happened. 
A Bank project in Kazakhstan further demonstrates the 
interplay between generation and transmission and a 
 potential problem with using “percentage loss” project tar-
gets as a measure of project performance. Th e project was 
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Appendix e
Coal
TAble e.1 Coal plant Case Studies
   Afsin-elbistan A 
 Thermal power plant 
lignite power Technical 
Assistance project 
Maritza east 1 Tata Mundra ultra 
Mega power plant 
lanco  
Amarkantak 
 power plant
WbG unit World Bank (IBRD) World Bank (IDA) MIGA IFC IFC
Country Turkey Kosovo Bulgaria India India
project type Rehabilitation Rehabilitation and new 
power plant
New Plant  (replacing 
older unit)
New Plant New Plant
Safeguards 
category 
 classification
A B A A A
power plant size 1,355 MW 600 MW (rehab of 
Kosovo A) and 600 MW 
(new Kosovo C)
660 MW 4000 MW 600 MW
unit sizes 3x340 MW + 1 x 335 
MW
3 x 200 MW (rehab); 
1 x 600 MW (new)
2 x 330 MW 5 x 800 MW 2 x 300 MW
Coal Domestic lignite Domestic lignite Domestic lignite Imported Indonesian 
coal
Domestic coal
Sulfur control FGD to be installed 
by 2010
FGD is planned for 
Kosovo C, but not for 
Kosovo A.  
FGD is part of the 
design
Use of low sulfur coal 
(0.6% S content)
Use of low sulfur 
coal 
(0.5% S content)
Type of support Debt (Specific Invest-
ment Loan)
Technical Assistance 
(IDA Grant)
Political risk  
insurance 
Senior debt Equity
Approval date June 6, 2006 October 12, 2006 2006 April 8, 2008 June 1, 2007
WbG support $336 million $10.5 million Up to €99 million $450 million $8 million
Total project cost $481 million Not yet defined €1.15 billion $3.2 billion $578 million
Other 
 components 
Support for financial 
and generational 
restructuring (€3 
million)
Sector policy, legal, 
regulatory, transactions 
and safeguards advice 
   
Source: IEG (Chikkatur background paper, drawing on public documents including World Bank Project Appraisal Documents, IFC Summary 
of Proposed Investment and Environmental and Social Review).
Note: MW = megawatt; WBG = World Bank Group.
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TAble e.2 Coal plant Case Studies emissions
 Afsin-elbistan A 
Thermal power 
plant (Turkey)
lignite power 
 Technical  
Assistance project 
(Kosovo)
Maritza east 1 
(bulgaria)
Tata Mundra 
 ultra Mega 
power plant 
(india)
lanco 
 Amarkantak 
(india)
Climate obligations Ratified Kyoto—
no obligation; 
 potential EU ETS
Not ratified UNFCCC; 
potential EU ETS
Ratified Kyoto. 
Need to reduce 
by 8% below 1990 
emissions
Ratified Kyoto. no  obligations; 
potential CDM credits
Case study facility Subcritical rehab Kosovo C  supercritical Subcritical w/ FGD Supercritical no 
FGD
Subcritical no 
FGD
Prior facility Pre-rehab plant Kosovo A Old plants None None
Comparator (counterfactual) plant Pre-rehab plant Subcritical similar to 
Kosovo B
Old plants 8 units of 500 MW 
each,  subcritical
Same plant
Lower carbon alternative Gas Gas Nuclear Gas w/LNG  
investmentb 
Gas w/pipeline 
investmentb
Size (case study) MW 1,355 600 660 4,000 660
Size (Prior facility) MW 1,000 275 500       
Size (comparator) MW 1,000 600 500 4,000 660
CO2 intensity kgco2/kWh (case study) 1.43  0.85 1.37 0.85
c 0.91
CO2 intensity kgco2/kWh (prior facility) 1.64 1.85 2.00       
CO2 intensity kgco2/kWh (comparator) 1.64 1.47 2.00 0.95
d  0.91
Reduction (case study/prior facility) 12.8% <54.1% 31.5%       
Reduction (case study/comparator) 12.8% <42.2% 31.5% <10.5% 0.0%
CO2 emissions in Mt /year (case study)
a 13.58 3.57 6.34 23.83 4.21
CO2 emissions in Mt /year (prior facility)
a 11.49 3.57 7.01       
CO2 emissions in Mt /year (comparator)
a 11.49 6.18 7.01 26.63 4.21
Difference in annual emission mt/year 
(case study-prior facility)
2.09 0.01  –0.67       
Difference in annual emission mt/year 
(case study-comparator)
2.09 –2.61  –0.67  –2.80 0.00
CO2 switching cost to lower carbon 
 alternative ($/tCO2)
 $5 $37 Not determined $135/$70
For gas at
$11/$7 per mm 
BTU
$115/$60
For gas at
$11/$7 per mm 
BTU
WBG additionality in catalyzing the 
investment
Not determined Yes Not determined Yes No 
WBG impact on technology choice No Yes No No No 
WBG impact on reducing social and local 
environmental impacts
Yes Yes Yes (attribution to 
EBRD)
Yes Yes
Source: IEG (Based on public documents and imputations).
Note: The italicized numbers reflect design parameters, bold numbers reflect intensities from operational data. In general, intensity based on 
actual operation would be higher than the design values. BTU = British thermal unit; CDM = Clean Development Mechanism; EBRD = European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development; EU = European Union; ETS =  Emissions trading scheme; FGD = Flue-gas desulfurization; LNG = ligue-
fied natural gas; UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; WBG = World Bank Group.
a. The annual emissions are calculated with a capacity factor of 80% in all cases. 
b. LNG investment for the Tata case and the pipeline investment for the Lanco case is assumed to be $1,000/kW. 
c.  The CO2 intensity for Tata is assumed to be 0.85 kgCo2/kWh, as per Tata’s own calculation, as given in the supplemental EIA. IFC gives a rate 
of 0.75 kgCO2/kWh.
d.  Based on average emissions intensity of 500 MW units in India. Data based on version 5 of CEA’s Baseline Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
Power Sector.
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Appendix F
Transport Tables and Figures
TAble F.1 number of Operations w/ GHG Reduction Objectives by Region and Subperiod
 Region  prereview period 
1998–2002
Review period 2003–08 postreview period 
2009–pipeine
Total 1998–present
G
H
G
 g
oa
l
G
H
G
 g
oa
l 
lo
w
n
o 
G
H
G
 
go
al
 S
ub
to
ta
l
 G
H
G
 g
oa
l
G
H
G
 g
oa
l 
lo
w
n
o 
G
H
G
 
go
al
 S
ub
to
ta
l
 G
H
G
 g
oa
l
G
H
G
 g
oa
l 
lo
w
n
o 
G
H
G
 
go
al
n
/A
 S
ub
to
ta
l
 G
H
G
 g
oa
l
G
H
G
 g
oa
l 
lo
w
n
o 
G
H
G
 
go
al
n
/A
 T
ot
al
LAC 1 2 5  8 5 5 7 17 3 2 1 1 7 9 9 13 1 32
EAP  6 1 7 3 2 2 7  1  3 4 3 9 3 3 18
AFR   7 7 2 2 3 7    2 2 2 2 10 2 16
SA  2 3 5   2 2 2 2   4 2 4 5   11
ECA   6 6    1 1        7   7
MNA   4 4   2 2   1   1   7   7
Total 1 10 26 37 10 9 17 36 5 5 2 6 18 16 24 45 6 91
Source: World Bank project documents.
Note: GHG goal includes operations with explicitly designed components to address carbon reduction with corresponding performance 
 indicators and systems to track and monitor progress. GHG goal low includes other operations that explicitly mention carbon benefits 
 (avoiding global warming) and assume fuel savings or mode shifting that could have carbon reduction potential, but that do not monitor or 
track carbon reductions. No GHG goal includes all other operations that do not mention GHG reduction explicitly. GHG = greenhouse gas. 
 Regions: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; AFR = Sub-Saharan Africa; SA = South Asia; ECA = Europe and 
Central Asia; MNA = Middle East and North Africa. N/A Project document not available.
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TAble F.2 number of Operations with GHG-Reduction Objectives, by Mode and Subperiod
GHG objective prereview period 
1998–2002
Review period 
2003–08
postreview period, after 
2008
Total
Mode
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Totals 1 10 26 10 9 17 5 5 2 6 16 24 45  6 91
A) No PT investmentsa   8      6       1          15    15
B) Traditional PT investments   11      2                   13    13
 a) Traditional bus improvements    2                           2     2
 b) No dominant PT modeb    9      2                   11    11
C) Urban rail investments  3 6  2  2    3           8  8    16
 a) commuter rail   3 5  2  1    3           8  6    14
 b) Metrollight rail    1      1                    2     2
D) Newer PT investments 1 5  8 6  5 4 1 1 6 13 12  6  6 37
 a) Dedicated bus lanes   5   3  1              8  1     9
 b) Proto-BRTS     2 2       1    3  2  3    3  8
 c) BRTS 1   6 1  4 4    1 3 11  1  5 3 20
E) Other interventionsc  2 1 2 1  2 1 1        3  4  3    10
 a) NMT   1                      1        1
 b) Local air quality   1  2 1    1 1        3  3        6
 c) Technical assistance    1      2                 3     3
Source: World Bank project documents.
Note: BRTS = bus rapid transit system; GHG = greenhouse gas; N/A = project document not available; NMT nonmotorized travel; PT = public 
transport. 
a.  Includes operations with explicitly designed components to address carbon reduction with corresponding performance indicators and 
systems to track and monitor progress. 
b.  Includes other operations that explicitly mention carbon benefits (avoiding global warming) and assume fuel savings or mode shifting that 
could have carbon reduction potential, but that do not monitor or track carbon reductions. 
c.  Includes all other operations that do not mention GHG reduction explicitly. 
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Appendix G
Energy Project Portfolio Databases
CEIF Database (Master Energy Database)
Scope 2003–08
This database, compiled by the World Bank’ Energy Anchor, 
was the starting point for IEG’s analysis. Although the Clean 
Energy Investment Framework (CEIF) was formulated in 
2005, the database was backfilled to include projects approved 
in 2003. It covers all World Bank Group energy projects across 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/
International Development Association, the Global Environ-
ment Fund, Carbon Finance, International Finance Corpora-
tion, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
The unit of observation is the project component. 
Component type categories include—
Oil (extractive industries and downstream, excluding •	
generation)
Gas (extractive industries and downstream, excluding •	
generation)
Coal (extractive industries and downstream, excluding •	
generation)
Energy efficiency •	
New renewable energy, broken down by technology, •	
for example, wind, small hydro, solar photovoltaic, so-
lar thermal, geothermal, and bioenergy. If there is more 
than one technology supported by the component, the 
general category “New Renewable Energy” is assigned. 
New Renewable Energy excludes hydropower> 10 MW.
Large hydro•	
Thermal generation (oil, gas or coal, specified)•	
Transmission and distribution•	
Other (including policy operations, environmental •	
 assessment).
Components were also mapped to the following groups: 
Low carbon•	 : Renewable energy projects (including all 
hydropower), energy efficiency, rehabilitation of power 
plants, district heating, biomass waste-fueled energy; 
reduction of gas flaring, transmission and distribution 
components that target low carbon and/or energy effi-
ciency, and other—investments with lower carbon goals.
Access•	 : Those that increase access to electricity ser-
vices. In IDA countries, all investments in generation 
and  transmission and distribution are assigned to the 
category of Access (as they all aimed to increase elec-
trification); in IBRD countries only electricity access 
projects and rural electrification projects are consid-
ered as “Access.”
Blended low carbon and access•	 : Those access projects 
that use low carbon energy options to increase access 
to electricity.
Transmission and distribution, oil and gas; other thermal •	
generation: projects that do not specifically target lower 
carbon or energy efficiency (some transmission and 
distribution is classified under low carbon, however).
Other energy•	 : Projects with energy policy support (De-
velopment Policy Loans) or projects for which energy 
form cannot be defined clearly or that have multiple 
energy subsector support—that do not target lower car-
bon and/or energy efficiency.
IEG review of the database
For this evaluation, IEG reviewed and modified the  2003–08 
CEIF database as follows.
Some components were further disaggregated, based on 
descriptions in appraisal documents. For instance, an 
$87 million component labeled “New Renewable Energy” 
was disaggregated into subcomponents: a $20 million 
 biomass facility and a $67 million wind project.
IEG used budget allocations reported in the appraisal 
document rather than the sectoral percentage assign-
ments used for project classification. For instance, the 
Turkey Renewable Energy project is a $202 million opera-
tion designed to support development of the renewable 
energy, providing financing via Turkish banks to private 
developers. CEIF recorded this project as $101 million op-
eration, because the project was officially allocated among 
the following sectors: central government administration 
(10 percent), micro- and small and medium enterprise fi-
nance (40 percent), and renewable energy (50 percent). 
IEG classified the entire expenditure as financing for re-
newable energy development ($202 million), including 
large hydropower, geothermal energy, and wind (as in the 
Project Assessment Document). For this reason, IEG’s 
reckoning of commitment amounts sometimes exceeded 
the CEIF’s. 
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energy and energy efficiency at a growth rate of 20 percent 
per annum between fiscal years 2005 and 2009, compared 
to a baseline commitment of $209 million (equal to the av-
erage of the previous three years). 
The World Bank reported on this commitment annually. 
For Bonn Commitment purposes, relevant project types 
were solar, wind, geothermal, biomass energy, hydropower 
of 10 MW or less, waste to energy, and energy efficiency 
(demand-side management and end-use energy efficiency, 
supply side energy efficiency—including mass transit sys-
tem). Large hydropower (>10 MW) was tallied but not 
counted toward the Bonn Commitment. A comparable da-
tabase, but with different criteria for energy efficiency, was 
backfilled to 1990. 
The following project types are classified by CEIF as low-
carbon but are not counted toward the Bonn Commit-
ment: 
Policy reform loans (except where directly concerned •	
with renewable energy and energy efficiency)
Reduction of gas flaring•	
High-efficiency thermal plants are classified in CEIF •	
as a low carbon, but not included in Progress Report/
Bonn Commitment data
Industrial low carbon investments •	
Landfill gas capture without utilization.•	
IEG eliminated a few cases of double counting, usually in-
volving GEF-funded components.
IEG identified some components that did not have clear 
low-carbon content, based on review of project documents. 
These projects were excluded from the scope of the Climate 
II database.
CEIF designates some transmission and distribution proj-
ects as “low carbon,” but not others. In principle, improve-
ment of existing systems is considered as energy efficiency, 
as opposed to construction of new systems. In practice, 
some of the transmission and distribution projects dis-
cussed in chapter 3 appear to result in loss reductions but 
are not included in either the CEIF or IEG tally of low-
 carbon projects. 
IEG added information and codes describing component 
or project objectives, technologies, instruments, and capac-
ity (if applicable). 
Bonn Commitment Database and Renewable 
Energy and Energy Efficiency WBG Progress 
Reports
Scope 1990–2008
At the Bonn International Conference on Renewable Ener-
gies in 2004, the WBG made a commitment to accelerate 
its support for new renewable energy and energy efficiency 
and committed to increase its financing for new renewable 
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Appendix H
Pilot and Demonstration Projects
Assessment of monitoring and 
evaluation
(0 = no details, 1 = moderate, 2 = strong)
project and 
 location
Year bank commit-
ment to project 
(millions)
product 
line
What is being 
 demonstrated?
To whom? internal 
project 
outcome 
logical frame-
work for dem-
onstration 
demon-
stration 
impact 
Small Scale 
Livestock 
Waste Manage-
ment Program, 
 Thailand
2009 $6.39 Carbon 
offset
Effectiveness of tech-
niques for reducing 
methane emissions 
through improved live-
stock waste management;
economic viability of 
adopting these tech-
niques when supported 
by carbon financing
Livestock 
producers in 
Thailand
2 0 0
Rural Energy 
Access Project, 
Republic of 
Yemen
2009 $26.4 IDA Feasibility of increasing 
energy access to rural 
households using SHS
Donor agen-
cies that might 
fund scale-up 
projects
1 1 0
Renewable 
Energy Develop-
ment Project, 
Vietnam
2009 $200 IDA Financial viability of 
small-scale grid- 
connected renewable 
energy projects
Commercial 
banking sector 
1 1 1
Coal-Fired 
Generation 
Rehabilitation 
Project, India
2009 $180 (IBRD) 
$25.4 (GEF)
IBRD 
GEF
Effectiveness and financial 
viability of energy- efficient 
rehabilitation of coal 
plants (versus replace-
ment); effectiveness of 
framework for implemen-
tation, risk mitigation and 
post-rehabilitation O&M of 
energy efficiency renova-
tion and modernization
Government 
of India, 
 electricity 
 utilities in India
2 2 1
Emergency 
Power Project, 
Central African 
Republic
2009 $8 IDA Effectiveness of prepaid 
meters in reducing 
nontechnical losses from 
power distribution (pilot)
Enerca (power 
utility)
Un-
known
2 Un-
known
Regional Sustain-
able Transport 
and Air  Quality 
Project, LAC 
Region
2009 $40 GEF Effectiveness of transport 
investments in improving 
air quality
Other cities in 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
Region
2 2 1
Assessment of Monitoring and implementation plans from low-Carbon energy projects with 
pilot or demonstration Objectives, 2007–09
TAble H.1
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Assessment of monitoring and 
evaluation
(0 = no details, 1 = moderate, 2 = strong)
project and 
 location
Year bank commit-
ment to project 
(millions)
product 
line
What is being 
 demonstrated?
To whom? internal 
project 
outcome 
logical frame-
work for dem-
onstration 
demon-
stration 
impact 
Bioenergy Sugar 
Ethanol Wastewa-
ter Management 
Process, Thailand
2009 €4.5 Carbon 
offset
Technology for methane 
capture from wastewater 
treatment
2 0 0
Energy Efficiency 
Project,  
Montenegro
2009 $9.4 IBRD Feasibility of energy 
 efficiency program in 
public sector
Public 
 agencies in 
Montenegro
1 0 0
Thermal 
Power Efficiency 
 Project, China
2009 $19.7 GEF Viability of efficiency 
improvements in thermal 
power plants
Power utilities 
in China.
2 2 1
Ecofarming 
Project, China
2009 $120 IBRD Technology best practice 
for integrating biogas 
into production systems
Local 
 governments 
in China.
2 1 0
GEF-World Bank 
Urban Transport 
Partnership, 
China
2008 $21.0 GEF Series of high-profile 
demonstration projects 
that will create models 
of sustainable transport 
solutions
Local 
 governments, 
municipali-
ties, transport 
authorities
2 2 1
GEF Increased 
Access to 
 Electricity 
 Project, Zambia
2008 $4.5 GEF Pilot “Sustainable 
Solar Market Packages 
(SSMP)”—preparation 
of nine sustainable solar 
market packages 
Rural Energy 
Agency—to 
provide solar 
photovoltaic 
energy to pub-
lic institutions, 
households, 
commercial 
consumers
2 1 0
Energy Access 
Project, Burkina 
Faso 
2008 $38.8 (pilot 
$1 million)
IDA Inerfuel substitutions: 
Pilot activities leading 
potentially to the produc-
tion of biofuels from Jat-
ropha, cotton, and other 
agricultural residues
Private sector, 
households
1 0 0
Energy Develop-
ment & Access 
Expansion Proj-
ect, Tanzania
2008 $111.5 GEF/
IDA
Loss reduction in distri-
bution systems. Rural 
energy agency is piloting 
schemes for off-grid and 
energy expansion. Scale 
up of pilot activities: solar 
photovoltaic, small PPA
Consumers in 
energy efficien-
cy component. 
Private sector, 
cooperatives, 
NGO—renew-
able energy 
component
2 1 0
Electricity 
Distribution and 
Transmission 
Project, Pakistan
2008 $256.7 IDA Pilot energy efficiency 
program, involving 
installation of energy 
saving equipment at the 
customer level
Utilities 2 0 0
(continued)
Assessment of Monitoring and implementation plans from low-Carbon energy projects with 
pilot or demonstration Objectives, 2007–09 (continued)
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Assessment of monitoring and 
evaluation
(0 = no details, 1 = moderate, 2 = strong)
project and 
 location
Year bank commit-
ment to project 
(millions)
product 
line
What is being 
 demonstrated?
To whom? internal 
project 
outcome 
logical frame-
work for dem-
onstration 
demon-
stration 
impact 
Electricity Sec-
tor Efficiency 
Improvement 
Project, Guinea
2008 $11.7 GEF Pilot operation focus-
ing on improvement of 
commercial and technical 
efficiencies
Government, 
utilities
2 1 1
Liaoning 
Medium Cities 
Infrastructure 
Project III, China
2008 $191.0 IBRD Contribute to implemen-
tation of heating reform 
by implementing in new 
heat-only boiler and CHP 
supplied systems: pilot-
ing technical approaches 
in network design 
through use of about 150 
building-level substa-
tions and in metering 
through use of building-
level meters
Provincial 
government, 
heating com-
panies/utilities
2 2 1
Integrated Solar 
Combined Cycle 
Power Project, 
Morocco
2007 $43.2 GEF Demonstration of opera-
tional viability of hybrid 
solar thermal power 
generation (dissemina-
tion of information)
ONE (utility), 
government, 
private sector
2 2 1
Renewable 
Energy for Rural 
Access, Mongolia
2007 $7.0 GEF/
IDA
Demonstration of techni-
cal models for small 
hybrid systems in the ex-
treme climate conditions 
of Mongolia (dissemi-
nation of information, 
public awareness) 
Herders, 
 private sector
2 2 1
Hybrid Solar 
Thermal Inte-
grated Cycle, 
Mexico
2007 $49.4 GEF Demonstrate the opera-
tional viability and value 
added of integrating a 
solar field with a large con-
ventional thermal facility
Utility, private 
sector
2 1 0
Furatena Energy 
Efficiency Proj-
ect, Colombia
2007 $1.1 Carbon 
finance
Demonstration pilot 
to exemplify a new ap-
proach to panela (sugar 
cane) production and 
commercialization
Hillside sugar 
cane producers
2 0 0
Urban Transport 
Project, Ghana
2007 $8.0 GEF BRT Infrastructure design 
and implementation 
Local 
 governments, 
transportation 
authorities
2 0 0
Source: World Bank data.
Note: CHP = combined heat and power; GEF = Global Environment Facility; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development;  
IDA = International Development Association; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean Region; NGO = nongovernmental organization;  
O&M = operations and maintenance; PPA = Power purchase agreement; SHS = solar home system.
Assessment of Monitoring and implementation plans from low-Carbon energy projects with 
pilot or demonstration Objectives, 2007–09 (continued)
TAble H.1
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Appendix i
Carbon and Economic Returns of Projects
TAble i.1
Type eRR (%) lifetime CO2 reductions (kg per $ investment) data source (appraisal, evaluation)
CFL 714 80 Appraisal
CFL 122 26.7 Evaluation
CFL 178 134 Appraisal
T&D 43.2 6.8 Appraisal
T&D 16.5 10.6 Appraisal
T&D 22.4 14.9 Evaluation
Off-grid solar 93.4 3.1 Evaluation
Off-grid solar 31.0 11.8 Evaluation
energy efficiency finance 20.0 23.4 Evaluation
Financial intermediary energy efficiency 22.0 61.4 Evaluation
Financial intermediary energy efficiency 20 117.2 Evaluation
Direct energy efficiency 143 160.3 Appraisal
Large hydro 18.1 57.2 Appraisal
Large hydro 7.0 15.4 Appraisal
Large hydro 17.1 21.8 Appraisal
Medium hydro run-of-river 18.0 42.8 Appraisal
Hydro 6.7 42.4 Appraisal
Hydro run-of-river 2.9 32.9 Appraisal
Medium hydro run-of-river 11.9 37.3 Appraisal
Medium hydro run-of-river 14.3 77.9 Appraisal
Medium hydro run-of-river 14.7 75.4 Appraisal
Medium hydro reservoir 16.5 82.8 Appraisal
Medium hydro 13.3 76.0 Appraisal
Medium hydro 9.5 25.4 Appraisal
Hydro run-of-river 12.7 49.5 Appraisal
Carbon and economic Returns  on projects
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Hydro run-of-river 8.7 76.9 Appraisal
Hydro run-of river 4.7 71.1 Appraisal
Mini-hydro 24 61.2 Evaluation
Wind 11.9 15.0 Appraisal
Wind 11.3 13.2 Appraisal
Wind 5.5 14.1 Appraisal
Wind 7.1 10.0 Appraisal
Wind 12.5 34.7 Appraisal
Wind 7.0 16.8 Appraisal
Wind 14.7 41.0 Appraisal
Wind 3.9 14.9 Evaluation
BRT 81 9.6 Appraisal
Source: World Bank data.
Note: BRT = bus rapid transit; CFL = compact fluorescent light; T&D = transmission and distribution.
Caveats:
These estimates have many limitations and are presented to indicate rough orders of magnitude and to illustrate the need for more thorough and •	
rigorous analysis.
Estimates—all adapted from WBG project documents—are mostly based on ex ante appraisals and could be overly optimistic. They are not produced •	
with consistent methodologies or rigor.
Carbon reductions per dollar consider only investment costs; operations and maintenance are excluded.•	
Economic rates of return (ERRs) typically do not include nonmonetized benefits such as reduction in local air pollution or the value of increased energy •	
security.
ERRs take the electricity tariff (and any associated capacity payments) to represent the economic value of electricity (except in the case of solar home •	
photovoltaics). In many cases tariffs are artificially low, so this will be an underestimate. 
In this sample, wind projects receive tariffs that are 2.2 times higher, on average, than the tariffs received by hydropower plants. Hence these estimates •	
should not be used for a head-to-head comparison of wind and hydro.
Lifetime emission reductions are based on approximations of project lifetime. Grid power plants are  assumed to provide emission reductions for •	
20 years; solar home photovoltaic systems 15 years; bus rapid transit 14 years; energy efficiency projects, transmission and distribution projects and  
off-grid power have an assumed lifetime of 10 years; compact fluorescent light bulb life is 6 years. To the extent that projects provide emission reduc-
tions beyond this, emission reductions are understated.
ERR values for compact fluorescent light bulb projects generally include only fuel savings; they do not also include the value of deferring the need for •	
construction of peak load plants, or reductions in load shedding.
Much of the variation in emission reductions (particularly for hydro) comes from variation in the carbon intensity of the baseline power generation •	
being displaced by the project.
Energy efficiency financial intermediary project ERR counts all benefits from subproject investments,  regardless of whether they were triggered by •	
WBG  involvement.
For direct investments in energy efficiency, the (relatively small) costs of energy audits are excluded. •	
Most of the economic benefits from offgrid solar come from studies that find high household willingness to pay for electrical power.•	
TAble i.1 Carbon and economic Returns  on projects (continued)
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Appendix J
Recent WBG Developments in Emission Mitigation Activities
The main body of this paper and portfolio analysis has fo-
cused on the 2003–08 period. As noted, there has been an 
increase in climate-related activity since the 2008 adoption 
of the Strategic Framework on Development and Climate 
Change. This appendix provides a descriptive review of 
key developments since 2008, including the 2009 energy 
portfolio, the Climate Investment Funds, the Carbon Part-
nership Facility, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 
and the Low Carbon Growth Studies program of the En-
ergy Sector Management Assistance Program. These areas 
have not been evaluated in detail or fully validated by IEG 
analysis.
2008–09 Energy Portfolio Developments
The growth in support for low carbon energy activities 
continued in fiscal 2009, reaching annual commitments of 
more than $3.3 billion. Low carbon financing constitutes 
roughly 40 percent of the energy portfolio. Although IEG 
has not formally validated the CEIF 2009 low carbon port-
folio classification, the CEIF definitions have been very 
similar to IEG’s reckoning of low carbon support in the past 
(see figure J.1).
Financing for low and non-low 
Carbon energy, 2003–09
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FiGuRe J.1
Most financing continues to come from traditional (IDA, 
IBRD, and International Finance Corporation) funding 
sources, with the proportion coming from traditional fi-
nancing increasing in 2009.
IBRD), India Coal-Fired Generation Rehabilitation 
($225 million), Turkey Programmatic Electricity Sector 
Development Policy Loan ($200 million), Vietnam Renew-
able Energy Development Project ($199 million), and 
 Nigeria Electricity and Gas Improvement ($182 million). 
Recent Activities: Climate Investment Funds
In 2008 the WBG and other multilateral development 
banks jointly established the $6.2 billion Climate Invest-
ment Funds. The core of the Climate Investment Fund is 
the $5.1 billion Clean Technology Fund (CTF), aimed at 
financing demonstration, large-scale deployment and 
transfer of low-carbon technologies in large or middle-in-
come countries.
CTF financing eligibility requires the creation of coun-
try or sector investment plans, and then selects projects 
for financing on the basis of potential for greenhouse gas 
 savings, cost-effectiveness, demonstration potential at 
scale,  development impact, implementation potential, and 
additional costs and risk premium. Eligible technologies 
include the power sector, transportation, and energy effi-
ciency in buildings, industry, or agriculture. 
For the first time, more than half of the low carbon portfo-
lio is for energy efficiency, though support for new renew-
ables has also increased markedly.
The increase in financing for low carbon projects in fiscal 
2008 and 2009 comes primarily from a few large invest-
ments. In fiscal 2008, most financing for energy efficiency 
and large hydropower was provided by stand-alone proj-
ects; 26 percent came from just three IBRD projects: In-
dia Rampur Hydropower Project ($395 million), China 
Energy Efficiency Financing ($200 million), and China 
 Liaoning Med. Cities III (an energy efficiency project, 
$185 million). 
The following year, the portfolio was dominated by large 
energy efficiency investments; 40 percent of financing came 
from 5 World Bank projects: Turkey Private Sector Renew-
able Energy and Energy Efficiency Project ( $500 million 
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Carbon Partnership Facility
The Carbon Partnership Facility (CPF) was established 
in 2007 as a response to uncertainty about the post-2012 
 international climate regime and the associated limited de-
mand for post-2012 carbon assets. It is designed to develop 
and market emission reductions on a larger scale by pro-
viding carbon finance to investments that will deliver post-
2012 emission reduction assets. 
The CPF intends to scale up carbon finance by support-
ing programmatic and sector-based approaches to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions and by collaborating with 
 government and market participants. It will operate in tra-
ditional sectors (power, gas flaring, transport, waste man-
agement systems, and urban development), in sectors that 
have not been reached by the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (urban transport and energy efficiency), and will pilot 
city-wide carbon finance programs.
CPF will draw on the World Bank’s financial and knowl-
edge resources to strategically integrate carbon finance with 
sustainable development plans. The emphasis on creating 
long-term credit streams will be attractive to both buyers 
and sellers, who prefer certainty in their offset require-
ments and revenue streams.
The CPF framework creates two funds. The Carbon Asset 
Development Fund supports the preparation of emission 
reduction programs, including grants. It provides funding 
for methodology development, emission reduction pro-
gram identification and development, and asset feasibility, 
Project Design Document development and monitoring 
plan. In addition, the Fund covers all facility costs for emis-
sion reduction program preparation. The main sources of 
funding for CADF are buyers’ payments and donors’ con-
tribution (about €2 million from each donor). 
The Carbon Fund will purchase the emission reductions 
generated by the CPF programs. This fund became opera-
tional in May 2010 with €100 million in assets.
As of July 2010 the emission reduction program has signed 
agreements with a Moroccan solid waste management pro-
gram (related to recent World Bank Development Policy 
Loans in Morocco on waste management), a Vietnam re-
newable energy program (corresponding to a World Bank 
loan in 2009), a Brazil solid waste management program, 
and an Amman city-wide program. In addition, there are 
13 different programs under development in East and 
South Asia, Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and 
North Africa, and the Africa Regions.
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 
The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility is designed to re-
duce emissions from deforestation and forest  degradation 
To date, the CTF has supported creation of investment 
plans for 12 countries, and for Concentrated Solar Power in 
the Middle East and North Africa Region. Together these 
represent planned investments of $40 billion, of which $4.4 
billion would be from CTF funds. Since May 2009, seven 
projects have been approved, five of which will be adminis-
tered by the WBG and the rest by other multilateral devel-
opment banks. The WBG projects support wind power in 
Egypt and Mexico, urban transport in Mexico, renewable 
energy in Thailand, and a mix of renewable energy and en-
ergy efficiency in Turkey. 
The second part of the Climate Investment Fund is the 
Strategic Climate Funds. With an initial capitalization of 
$250 million, the Funds aim to provide financing to pi-
lot projects that target specific climate change challenges 
or sector responses in five to ten low-income countries. 
The Strategic Climate Fund is currently supporting three 
programs. The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience funds 
resilience projects and integration of resilience consider-
ations into national development plans; the Forest Invest-
ment Program supports capacity building for forest gov-
ernance and investments to reduce pressure on forests; 
and the Scaling up Renewable Energy Program supports 
actions to remove barriers that inhibit private sector in-
vestment in renewable energy in low-income countries. 
Whereas the CTF supports both renewable energy and 
energy efficiency, the much smaller, low-income-oriented 
Scaling up Renewable Energy Program supports only re-
newable energy.
low-Carbon energy, 2003–09, 
by product lines
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access objectives are not highlighted in the studies pub-
lished so far.
Th e studies recognize that climate change harms develop-
ment and that mitigation actions form part of a  development 
strategy. In each case, the studies recognize the vulnerabili-
ties of the particular country to climate change, and thus 
the need for both mitigation and adaptation. However, they 
generally support the need for mitigation through an inter-
national climate agreement, and emphasize that any miti-
gation obligations must not harm the development rights 
of the poor. Low carbon development is also emphasized 
as a means of supporting negative cost no-regrets options, 
energy security, nonclimate pollution reduction, and ability 
to access carbon market opportunities.
Th ough the studies consider mitigation options in each sec-
tor sequentially, they attempt to take a systemic approach by 
making cost comparisons across sectors. Most studies devel-
op a unifi ed marginal abatement cost curve, where options 
are ranked by cost and scope. Th ese lead to diff erent strat-
egies across countries, depending on the specifi c details of 
each case. In each case, there are many negative or zero cost 
changes, particularly in energy effi  ciency or land use change.
For example, for Brazil, the emphasis is on agriculture and 
deforestation, with emission reduction goals of 11.7  GtCO2e 
per year. Th ere are few low-cost mitigation options in the 
energy and transport sectors, because emission intensity 
is already low by international standards because of the 
 reliance on hydropower and ethanol fuel. Th e Brazil study 
identifi es negative cost options for roughly 1.1 GtCO2e per 
year (mostly energy effi  ciency) and a further 7.1 GtCO2e 
per year of roughly zero cost changes for avoided deforesta-
tion, livestock and zero-tillage cropping options.
For Mexico, the emphasis is still on agriculture and forestry, 
but energy and transport are also important in achieving 
emission reductions of 5.3 GtCO2e per year. Under the low 
carbon scenario, the share of power from coal would drop 
from 31 to 6 percent, of which roughly 23.5 percentage 
points would come from increases in geothermal, biomass, 
wind, and small hydropower sources. Negative cost inter-
ventions would save 3.4GtCO2e per year, including bus sys-
tem optimization, cogeneration, charcoal production im-
provements, fuel economy standards, biomass power and 
improved cookstoves.
Th e strategies recognize that energy effi  ciency (including 
transport effi  ciency) and demand-side management will 
play a major role in any cost-eff ective mitigation strategy. 
In nearly every case, the scope for effi  ciency improvements 
is large and can be achieved at lower cost than increases in 
increasing generation through renewable energy.
Energy access issues were considered in the India study, 
though not in Brazil, China, or Mexico. 
by providing value to standing forests. It also seeks to 
 provide incentives and fi nancing for the sustainable use of 
forest resources and biodiversity conservation. Th e Facility 
became operational in 2008.
Th e facility has two parts: a readiness mechanism,  supported 
by the Readiness Fund, and a carbon fi nance mechanism, 
supported by the Carbon Fund. Under REDD Readiness, 
the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility will help  developing 
countries prepare national reference scenarios for emis-
sions from deforestation and forest degradation, develop 
country-owned strategies for reducing deforestation and 
forest degradation, and establish national measurement, 
reporting and verifi cation systems for REDD. Th e Carbon 
Fund will pilot and test REDD carbon transactions in the 
countries that have established a sound national framework 
through the readiness mechanism. 
Th irty-seven REDD countries had been selected for the readi-
ness mechanism by the end of fi scal 2009 (compared with the 
original design target of 20). Th irty of these had signed par-
ticipation agreements, and 18 had submitted detailed grant 
proposals (with three of the grant agreements fully signed). 
In this fi rst year, the Facility has increased the target volume 
for the Readiness Fund from $100 million to about $185 mil-
lion; as of March 2010 the Readiness Fund has $115 million. 
By the end of fi scal 2009 each country’s Readiness Prepara-
tion Idea Note was submitted to the Facility and received 
one to three Technical Advisory Panel reviews/discussions, 
Facility Management Team reviews, and informal reviews 
by World Bank country teams. 
REDD methodology support claims progress in the follow-
ing areas: establishing the fi rst Team Advisory Panel; devel-
oping instruments to support the process of the Readiness 
Mechanism; advancing thinking on reference scenarios, 
REDD modeling eff orts, reporting and verifi cation systems, 
and economic analysis of the costs of REDD; and creation 
of a capacity-building program for forest-dependent indig-
enous peoples and other forest dwellers.
Recent Activities: Low-Carbon Growth Studies
Starting in 2006, ESMAP’s Low-Carbon Growth Country 
Studies Program began helping Brazil, China, India, In-
donesia, Mexico, and South Africa assess their develop-
ment goals and greenhouse gas mitigation strategies. Th e 
centerpiece of the program is a series of country studies 
designed to identify low carbon opportunities across a 
range of sectors, including energy, transport, waste, and 
land use/land use change. Th e studies or summary case 
studies have been publically released for Mexico, Brazil, 
and India. Most studies generate a baseline scenario and 
a low carbon alternative and describe the technical solu-
tions by which the alternative could be achieved. Energy 
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Appendix K
Evaluation Summary from Climate Change and the World 
Bank Group—Phase I
Climate change threatens to derail development, even as de-
velopment pumps ever-greater quantities of carbon  dioxide 
into an atmosphere already polluted with two centuries of 
Western emissions. The World Bank, with a newly articu-
lated Strategic Framework on Development and  Climate 
Change, must confront these entangled threats in helping 
its clients to carve out a sustainable growth path.
But this is known territory—many of the climate change 
policies under discussion have close analogues in the past. 
This phase of the evaluation, focused on the World Bank 
(and not the International Finance Corporation or the Mul-
tilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), assesses the World 
Bank’s experience with key win-win policies in the energy 
sector—policies that combine gains at the country level 
with globally beneficial greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions. 
The next phase will look across the entire World Bank 
Group at project-level experience in promoting technolo-
gies for renewable energy and energy efficiency and at some 
issues related to climate change in the Bank’s transport and 
forestry portfolios.
Within the range of win- win policies, this report exam-
ines two that have long been discussed but are more rel-
evant than ever in light of record energy prices: removal 
of energy subsidies and promotion of end-user energy effi-
ciency. Energy subsidies are expensive, damage the climate, 
and disproportionately benefit the well off. Their reduction 
can encourage energy efficiency, increase the attractiveness 
of renewable energy, and allow more resources to flow to 
poor people and to investments in cleaner power. Though 
subsidy reduction is never easy, the Bank has a record of 
accomplishment in this area, especially in the transition 
countries. About a quarter of Bank energy projects included 
attention to price reform. Improvements in the design and 
implementation of social safety nets can help to rationalize 
energy prices while protecting the poor.
End-user energy efficiency has long been viewed as a win- 
win approach with great potential for reducing emissions. It 
becomes increasingly attractive as the costs of constructing 
and fueling power plants rise. About 5 percent of the Bank’s 
energy commitments by value (about 10 percent by number) 
have gone to specific efficiency efforts, including end- user 
efficiency and district heating. Including a broader range 
of projects identified by management as supporting sup-
plyside energy efficiency would boost the proportion above 
20 percent by number. Few projects tackled regulatory 
 issues related to end- user efficiency, though the Bank has 
invested in some technical assistance and analytical work. 
This historical lack of emphasis on energy efficiency is not 
unique to the Bank and reflects the complexity of pursu-
ing end- user efficiency, a pervasive set of biases that favor 
electricity supply over efficiency, inadequate investments in 
learning, and inattention to energy systems in the wake of 
power sector reform. 
The record levels of energy prices in 2008, although they 
have been relaxed, provide an impetus for the Bank and its 
clients to choose more sustainable long- term trajectories of 
growth. The mid-2008 oil price was equivalent to the 2006 
price, plus a $135 per ton tax on carbon dioxide—the kind 
of level that energy modelers say is necessary for long-term 
climate stabilization. To help clients cope with the burden 
of these prices, and take advantage of the signals they send 
for sustainability, the Bank can do four things:
It can make promotion of energy efficiency a priority, 1. 
using efficiency investments and policies to adjust to 
higher prices and constructing economies that are more 
resilient.
It can assist countries in removing subsidies by helping 2. 
to design and finance programs that protect the poor 
and help others adjust to higher prices.
It can promote a systems approach to energy.3. 
And it can motivate and inform these actions, internally 4. 
and externally, by supporting better measurement of en-
ergy use, expenditures, and impacts.
Goals and Scope
This evaluation is the first of a series that seeks lessons 
from the World Bank Group’s experience on how to carve 
out a sustainable growth path. The World Bank Group has 
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Findings
Development spurs emissions.
A 1 percent increase in per capita income induces—on 
 average and with exceptions—a 1 percent increase in GHG 
emissions. Hence, to the extent that the World Bank is suc-
cessful in supporting broad- based growth, it will aggravate 
climate change. 
But there is no signifi cant trade-off  between climate change 
mitigation and energy access for the poorest.
Basic electricity services for the world’s unconnected house-
holds, under the most unfavorable assumptions, would 
add only a third of a percent to global GHG emissions, 
and much less if renewable energy and effi  cient light bulbs 
could be deployed. Th e welfare benefi ts of electricity access 
are on the order of $0.50 to $1 per kilowatt-hour, while a 
stringent valuation of the corresponding carbon damages, 
in a worst-case scenario, is a few cents per kilowatt-hour.
Country policies can shape a low-carbon growth path.
Although there is a strong link between per capita income 
and energy-related GHG emissions, there is a sevenfold 
variation between the most and least emissions-intensive 
countries at a given income level. Reliance on hydropower 
is part of the story behind these diff erences, but fuel pric-
ing is another. High subsidizers—those whose diesel prices 
are less than half the world market rate—emit about twice 
as much per capita as other countries with similar income 
levels. And countries with longstanding fuel taxes, such as 
the United Kingdom, have evolved more energy-effi  cient 
transport and land use.
Energy subsidies are large, burdensome, regressive, and 
damage the climate.
Th e International Energy Agency’s 2005 estimate of a quar-
ter-trillion dollars in subsidies each year outside the Organ-
isation for Economic Cooperation and Development may 
understate the current situation. While poor people receive 
some of these benefi ts, overall the benefi ts are skewed to 
wealthier groups and oft en dwarf more progressive  public 
expenditure. Fuel subsidies alone are 2 to 7.5 times as large 
as public spending on health in Bangladesh, Ecuador, the 
Arab Republic of Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco, 
 Pakistan, Turkmenistan, República Bolivariana de Venezu-
ela, and the Republic of Yemen. At the same time, subsidies 
encourage ineffi  cient, carbon-intensive use of energy and 
build constituencies for this ineffi  ciency.
Th e Bank has supported more than 250 operations for 
 energy pricing reform.
Success has been achieved in the transition countries—in 
Romania and Ukraine, for example, where energy prices 
never had an explicit corporate strategy on climate change 
against which evaluative assessments could be made. 
 However, a premise of this evaluation series is that many 
of the  climate-oriented policies and investments under 
 discussion have close analogues in the past, and thus can 
be assessed, whether or not they were explicitly oriented to 
climate change mitigation.
Th is report, which introduces the series, focuses on the 
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and International Development Associa-
tion), and not on the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) or the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA). It assesses its experience with key win-win policies 
in the energy sector: removal of energy subsidies and pro-
motion of end-user energy effi  ciency. Th e next phase looks 
at the expanding project-level experience of the Bank and 
the IFC in promoting technologies for renewable energy 
and energy effi  ciency; it also addresses the role of carbon 
fi nance. A parallel study examines the role of forests in cli-
mate mitigation. Th e climate evaluation’s fi nal phase will 
look at adaptation to climate change.
Motivation
Operationally, the World Bank has pursued three broad 
lines of action in promoting the mitigation of GHG emis-
sions, the main contributor to climate change. First, it has 
mobilized concessional fi nance from the Global Environ-
ment Facility (GEF) and carbon fi nance from the Clean 
Development Mechanism to promote renewable energy 
and other GHG-reducing activities. Second, and to a much 
more limited extent, it has used GEF funds to stimulate the 
development of noncommercial technologies. Th ird, and 
the subject of this evaluation, it has supported win-win 
policies and projects—sometimes with an explicit climate 
motivation, oft en without.
Th ese actions not only provide global benefi ts in reducing 
GHGs, but also pay for themselves in purely domestic side 
benefi ts such as reduced fuel expenditure or improved air 
quality. Th e win-win designation obscures the costs that 
these policies may impose on particular groups, even while 
benefi ting a nation as a whole. Th is presents challenges for 
design and implementation. 
Two sets of win-win policies are perennial topics of dis-
cussion in the energy sector: reduction in subsidies and 
 energy-effi  ciency policies, particularly those relating to 
end-user effi  ciency. Th is report looks at these, and at an-
other apparently win-win topic: gas fl aring. Flaring is inter-
esting because of its magnitude, the links to pricing policy 
and to carbon fi nance, and the existence of a World Bank–
led initiative to reduce fl aring.
 Appendix K: Evaluation Summary from Climate Change and the World Bank Group—Phase I   |   119
CI Change Appendixes A-K.indd   119 11/3/2010   2:02:36 PM
120   |   Climate Change and the World Bank Group
 human behavior rather than electrical engineering, and 
whose efficacy is harder to measure. A general neglect of 
rigorous monitoring and evaluation reinforces the negative 
view of efficiency.
The Bank- hosted Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partner-
ship (GGFR) has fostered dialogue on gas flaring, but it is 
difficult to assess its impact on flaring activity to date.
Associated gas (a by-product of oil production) is often 
wastefully vented or flared, adding more than 400 million 
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent to the atmosphere an-
nually, or about 1 percent of global emissions. A modestly 
funded public-private partnership, the GGFR has succeed-
ed in highlighting the issue, promoting dialogue, securing 
agreement on a voluntary standard for flaring reduction, 
and sponsoring useful diagnostic studies. But only four 
member countries have adopted the standard. The GGFR 
has emphasized carbon finance as a remedy for flaring, but 
the use of project-level carbon finance is a mere bandage 
for policy ailments that require a more fundamental cure.
Recommendations
In mid-2008, real energy prices were at a record high. While 
this is burdensome for energy users, it opens an oppor tunity 
for the Bank to support clients in making a transition to a 
long-term sustainable growth path that is resilient to en-
ergy price volatility, entails less local environmental dam-
age, and is a nationally appropriate contribution to global 
mitigation efforts.
Clearly the World Bank needs to focus its efforts strategi-
cally on areas of its comparative advantage. This would 
include supporting the provision of public goods and pro-
moting policy and institutional reform at the country level. 
Furthermore, the Bank can achieve the greatest leverage by 
promoting policies that catalyze private sector investments 
in renewable energy and energy efficiency, including those 
supported by IFC and MIGA. The analysis in this report 
supports the following recommendations:
Systematically promote the removal of energy subsidies, 
easing social and political economy concerns by provid-
ing technical assistance and policy advice to help reform-
ing client countries find effective solutions, and analytical 
work demonstrating the cost and distributional impact of 
removal of such subsidies and of building effective, broad-
based safety nets.
Energy price reform can endanger poor people and arouse 
the opposition of groups used to low prices, thereby pos-
ing political risks. But failure to reform can be worse, di-
verting public funds from investments that fight poverty 
and fostering an inefficient economy increasingly exposed 
to  energy shocks. And reform need not be undertaken 
were adjusted toward market levels, and the intensity of 
carbon dioxide emissions dropped substantially. Subsidy 
removal can threaten the poor, however. Recent efforts to 
assess poverty and welfare impacts systematically appear 
to have informed the design and implementation of price 
reform efforts, though not necessarily with direct Bank in-
volvement. Examples include Ghana and Indonesia, where 
compensatory measures were deployed in connection with 
fuel price rises.
The Bank has rarely coordinated efficiency improvements 
with subsidy reductions to lighten the immediate adjust-
ment burden on energy users.
An exception is the China Heat Reform and Building Ef-
ficiency Project, which links improved insulation with heat 
pricing. A growing number of projects sponsor nationwide 
distribution of compact fluorescent light bulbs, but this has 
been done in response to power shortages (Rwanda, Uganda) 
or to stanch utility losses (Argentina, Vietnam), rather than 
to facilitate subsidy reduction.
Despite emphasis on energy efficiency in Bank statements 
and in Country Assistance Strategies, the volume and pol-
icy orientation of IBRD/IDA efficiency lending has been 
modest.
Although the IFC has recently increased its investments in 
energy-efficiency projects, World Bank commitments for 
efficiency were about 5 percent by value of energy finance 
over 1991–2007. This includes investments in demand-side 
efficiency and district heating, and may also include some 
supply-side efficiency investments. By this definition, about 
1 in 10 projects by number involve energy efficiency.
Including a broader range of projects identified by manage-
ment as supporting supply-side energy efficiency would 
boost the proportion above 20 percent by number over the 
period 1998–2007. Globally only about 34 projects under-
taken over the 1996–2007 period had components oriented 
to demand-side energy-efficiency policy. Among these, 
many attempts to promote efficiency have had limited suc-
cess because the Bank has engaged with utilities, which 
have limited incentives to restrict electricity sales.
There are several reasons why end-user energyefficiency 
projects, and especially policy-oriented projects, appear to 
be under- emphasized in the Bank’s portfolio.
The Bank has carried out some successful and innova-
tive efficiency projects. But internal Bank incentives work 
against these projects because they are often small in scale, 
demanding of staff time and preparation funds, and may 
require persistent client engagement over a period of years. 
There is a general tendency to prefer investments in power 
generation, which are visible and easily understood, over 
investments in efficiency, which are less visible, involve 
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current planning methods are inadequate in integrating 
considerations of end-use efficiency and in balancing the 
risks of volatile fuel prices and weather-sensitive electricity 
output from wind and hydropower plants. Water manage-
ment, urban management, and social safety nets are other 
areas where cross sectoral collaboration is essential to pro-
moting win-win policies and programs.
Invest more in improving metrics and monitoring for mo-
tivation and learning—at the global, country, and project 
levels.
Good information can motivate and guide action.
First, building on the Bank’s current collaboration with the 
International Energy Agency on energy efficiency indica-
tors, the Bank could set up an Energy Scoreboard that will 
regularly compile up-to-date standardized information 
on energy prices, collection rates, subsidies, policies, and 
performance data at the national, subnational, and project 
levels. Borrowers could use indicators for benchmarking; 
in the design and implementation of country strategies, 
 including sectoral and cross- sectoral policies; and in as-
sessing Bank performance.
Second, more rigorous economic and environmental as-
sessment is needed for energy investments and those that 
release or prevent carbon emissions. These assessments 
should draw on energy prices collected for the Scoreboard; 
account for externalities, including the net impact on GHG 
emissions; and account for price volatility. Investment proj-
ects should also be assessed, qualitatively, on a diffusion 
index, which would indicate the expected catalytic effect of 
the investment in subsequent similar projects. It is desirable 
to complement project-based analysis with assessment of 
indirect and policy-related impacts, which could be much 
larger.
Third, monitoring and evaluation of energy interventions 
continue to need more attention. Large-scale distribution 
of compact fluorescent light bulbs is one example of an in-
tervention that is well suited to impact analysis and where 
a timely analysis could be important in informing massive 
scale-up activities.
 overnight. The Bank can provide assistance in charting and 
financing adjustment paths that are politically, socially, and 
environmentally sustainable. Factoring political economy 
into the design of reforms and supporting better- targeted, 
more effective social protection systems will be elements of 
this approach.
Emphasize policies that induce improvement in energy ef-
ficiency as a way of reducing the burden of the transition 
to market- based energy prices.
Historically, energy efficiency has received rhetorical sup-
port but garnered only a small share of financial support 
or policy attention. This is beginning to change with such 
moves as China’s commitment to drastically reduce its en-
ergy intensity and India’s Energy Conservation Act. But 
the Bank can do much more to help clients pursue this 
agenda. If a real reorientation to energy efficiency and re-
newable energy is to occur, the Bank’s internal incentive 
system needs to be reshaped. Instead of targeting dollar 
growth in lending for energy efficiency (which may skew 
effort away from the high-leverage, low-cost interven-
tions), it needs to find indicators that more directly reflect 
energy savings and harness them to country strategies and 
project decisions. It needs also to patiently support lon-
ger, more staffintensive analysis and technical assistance 
activities.
Increased funding for preparation, policy dialogue, analy-
sis, and technical assistance is required.
Promote a systems approach by providing incentives to 
address climate change issues through cross-sectoral ap-
proaches and teams at the country level, and structured 
interaction between the Energy and Environment Sector 
Boards.
To tackle problems of climate change mitigation and adap-
tation, the Bank and its clients need to think, organize, and 
act beyond the facility level, and outside subsectoral and 
sectoral confines. One avenue for this is through greater at-
tention to systemwide energy planning. Integrated resource 
planning, once in vogue, has been largely abandoned in the 
wake of power sector privatization and unbundling. Yet 
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and undertook a consumer satisfaction survey in 2006, but 
subsequent monitoring reports complained of an inad-
equate response rate.
Chapter 3
1. Tunisia (2005, $8.5 million) and Uruguay (2004, 
$6.9 million) were excluded for geographic coherence.
2. Many efficiency projects involve replacement of old 
equipment with new machinery that is both more efficient 
but also has higher production capacity—for instance, re-
placing a bakery oven with a new one that produces twice as 
much bread per day. Energy savings are calculated by assum-
ing that, absent the project, the production would have been 
expanded using the old technology. This seems unlikely.
3. Environment Canada: http://www.ec.go.ca.
4. An intermediate category of scrutiny for environmental 
impacts.
Chapter 4
1. Source is CAIT 7.0. Tabulation includes all GHGs and 
land use change.
2. If a project had performance indicators linked to GHG 
reductions, it was classed as having a formal goal. Other-
wise, if the project mentioned GHG reductions as a project 
benefit, it was classed as having an informal goal.
3. Coincident with the financial crisis, which saw a 
Bank-wide increase in Development Policy Loans, about 
$600 million in forest-related loans were committed during 
fiscal 2009–10.
4. The payments in question were for avoided deforesta-
tion, not for reforestation or natural regeneration. Thus, 
this observation of increased forest growth could either in-
dicate a real but indirect impact (for instance, the abandon-
ment of marginal grazing land due to the PES payment) or 
a spurious correlation (the recipients’ land may, in fact, be 
of poorer quality than the control group’s, for reasons that 
are not observable, with the result that they are more likely 
to give up grazing).
5. The Regional Silvopastoral Project is the reportedly the 
first World Bank-executed conservation project framed as 
an experiment. A review of the Nicaragua component of 
the project (GEFEO 2009) found that its control group was 
poorly constituted and unsuitable for control/treatment 
comparisons. The Colombia component appears to have a 
better constructed control group.
Chapter 1
1. MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global 
Change (http://globalchange.mit.edu/resources/gamble/no-
policy.html) based on the research described in Sokolov and 
others (2009).
2. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important anthropo-
genic greenhouse gas, but there are others, such as methane. 
All are weighted according to their relative impact on climate 
change (for instance, methane is 25 times as potent as CO2). 
The weighted sum is expressed as CO2-equivalent, ppm.
Chapter 2
1. World Bank projects are evaluated after closure, and 
many investment projects last six to eight years or more. 
IFC projects are usually evaluated five years after the initial 
investment.
2. This set of projects follows the official classification of 
projects in an internal World Bank database. That classi-
fication may exclude some supply-side energy efficiency 
projects, including those that reduce T&D losses. 
3. Classification based on 2009 status.
4. Data are from the Development Outcome Tracking 
 System.
5. IEG’s calculation of Bonn Commitment volume exceed 
management’s report for 2005–08; no verification was at-
tempted for the 2009 report.
6. But see Deichmann and others (2010), whose spatial 
analysis of Ethiopia suggests surprisingly broad competi-
tiveness for grid-based electricity.
7. To impute the capacity factor, nominal capacity was 
multiplied by the ratio of actual certified emission reduc-
tions/design certified emission reductions.
8. For comparison, the average price of World Bank-
 purchased carbon credit is $8.07, according to the Carbon 
Finance Unit’s 2009 annual report. Average primary CER 
price in 2009 was $12.69 according to World Bank (2010).
9. Data from January 2009.
10. The World Bank has recently supported an Indonesia 
Infrastructure Guarantee Fund, though it is not specifically 
targeted on renewable energy.
11. Two supported both on- and off-grid.
12. Global average, excluding high-income countries, from 
World Development Indicators 2007 (World Bank 2007).
13. The Sri Lanka Renewable Energy for Rural Economic 
Development Project has an exemplary monitoring system 
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Chapter 5
1. From the chief economist’s blog: http://blogs.worldbank.
org/climatechange/why-coal.
2. Excluded was a small (60 MW) Indonesian facility. The 
investment in Medupi (South Africa) is out of the time 
frame for analysis.
3. The figures are not directly comparable because of the lag 
between approval and installation, but they convey the rela-
tive scale of WBG involvement. Private sector companies en-
tered contracts to build and operate 87.0 GW of new capacity 
in Bank-borrower countries over 2003–08. Of these, projects 
totaling 10.9 GW had some WBG involvement. The WBG’s 
share of investment (loans plus equity) in the private projects 
was 1.6 percent, plus guarantees covering 0.3 percent. 
4. The demand for carbon offsets is driven partly by the 
need for some developed countries (appendix I) to meet 
their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. At this writing, 
those obligations are not defined past 2012. However, CERs 
recognized under the CDM will in some cases be  acceptable 
in the European Union Emissions Trading System carbon 
market after 2012.
5. CF Assist helped with the design of the Fund to which 
this tax contributes.
6. The Montreal Protocol Fund’s phase-out of ozone-
 destroying substances, many of which are also GHGs. It 
helps transfer technology and pays for the marginal cost of 
abatement of the substances.
7. However, new firms have entered the industry. They are 
ineligible for CDM payments for HFC-23 emissions, and 
are emitting growing amounts of the gas (Montzka and 
others 2010). Thus, low-cost GHG abatement opportuni-
ties are not being utilized.
Chapter 6
1. As this report was being finalized, a WBG-supported 
mass distribution of CFLs in Bangladesh took place and 
included a rigorous engineering assessment of impact on 
overall power consumption.
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Photo Descriptions
x Women working in a compact fluorescent light bulb assembly plant.
xiii Efficient steel press financed through an energy management company; Jinan, China.
xix Lignite mining in Kosovo.
xxi Cleaning solar panels.
1 Wind turbine in China.
7 People and livestock walking in a dust storm during a drought in Madagascar, circa 2007.
11 Boy stands in front of solar module at Caoduo School, Rongbo, Yu Shu—part of the 2008 Renewable Energy 
 Development Project Ashden Award winner in China.
27 Ain Beni Mathar Integrated Combined Cycle Thermo-Solar Power Plant in Morocco.
33 Beneficiary of program that won Ashden Award for Sustainable Energy in Southeast Asia. 
39 Energy transmission lines in Tajikistan.
40 Tangle of electric wires, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
42 Solar energy is used to light a village shop in Sri Lanka.
47 Deforestation in Brazil.
49 Traffic congestion in Mexico.
58 Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon.
61 Ain Beni Mathar Integrated Combined Cycle Thermo-Solar Power Plant in Morocco.
69 Solar panels and telephones in Qunu in the Eastern Cape, South Africa.
79 Child standing on digester, which provides biogas from waste in a 2010 Ashden Award-winning project in Ngecha 
village, Kiambu West, Kenya.
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